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whether or not the law can or should pursue higher moral ambitions
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WELCOMING  REMARKS
My assignment  this morning is a very brief one.  First, I want to
thank the  keynote speakers,  all the participants  in the panels  and
the moderators of panels, for your willingness to participate in this
special program.
I want  to say to the Urban Law Journal  and  all the students in-
volved this year and last year what an incredible job you have done
in assembling  the  tremendous  quality  of people  who  will partici-
pate in the program today.
You mentioned the origin of the program as emanating from me,
but  it has  a much  deeper  involvement  that  does not  involve  me,
and perhaps it might be relevant to very briefly share that.
In the  fall of  1999,  during the  height  of the  impeachment  pro-
ceedings  involving  President Clinton,  I received  a call from  a stu-
dent attending  a graduate  school in California in a discipline other
than the  law.  The  student  asked  me,  on  behalf of her class,  if I
could share  some  views with the class through  the student on the
subject of forgiveness  in the  law.  The question  was:  did it have  a
place  in the law,  and, if so, what was  it?
I was,  frankly,  dumbfounded  by  the  question.  I found  myself
hesitant  about  offering  any  perspective  on the  subject  because  it
was not one that I had given really any thought to.  I realized that
the class was  a very  significant  class, indeed,  and I should not be
irresponsible  enough to offer some "two  cents"  kind  of response.
I said to the student that I would like to think about it and then
respond.  I then sought out the views of three or four members of
our faculty here  at Fordham Law School,  and I was astonished by
some of the responses I received.  Somehow, I did not feel from the
responses  any better  equipped  to  respond  to  the  question than  I
had been when I initially received  the telephone  call.
One member of the faculty said to me, "Forgiveness has no place
in the  law,  that  you  go  to the  law  when  everything  else  breaks
down,  and  the law  is there  when  nothing  else has  worked."  He
suggested of a writing that I might pursue.  I, frankly, threw up my
hands and did not return  the call.  I knew the  student who called
me and  I knew that she would understand  my  not calling.
Two  of the  editors  of the  Urban Law Journal must have  heard
my lament.  I was not aware until this morning that I had written a
little  note,  one  sentence,  I  was  told by  Elizabeth  Malang,  to the
Urban Law Journal,  asking the question of "is this something  that
students  might  have  an  interest  in,  in  developing  a  program?"
Everything  that has  taken  place  since  is the work product  of our
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students  and  our  Urban Law Journal,  co-sponsored  by our  Stein
Center on Law and  Ethics.
I just want to  say again  to  our students  thank you for bringing
together  such  a diverse  and talented  group.  I am not sure  at the
end of the day if I will be in any better position to respond than I
would be right now, but I do know I will benefit tremendously, as I
am  sure  all  of  you  will,  from  the  tremendous  variety  of  back-
grounds  and  points  of view  that  are obviously  present or  will be
present today in the room.
A final note would be that we live in a time when social idealism,
in my view,  is not as clearly present, certainly  among the popula-
tions that I interface with, as it was at an earlier stage in my life and
my early  participation in the legal  profession.  I lament  as I see  in
our  society  the constant  focus  on punishment, the constant  focus
on retribution, and on incapacitation.  These are, of course, impor-
tant values, important goals.  I  do not see  in American  society to-
day - at least the parts that I am familiar with, and that is obviously
a very small part - much discussion on subjects like forgiveness and
the law.  I salute you, Elizabeth, and all your colleagues  for bring-
ing us together to learn more about  this subject.
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KEYNOTE  ADDRESS
FORGIVENESS,  RECONCILIATION  AND  RESPONDING  To EVIL:
A  PHILOSOPHICAL  OVERVIEW
Introduction
PROFESSOR  MURPHY:  I  am honored  to  be  a part  of what
promises to be a rich and varied symposium on forgiveness.  What
I have  been asked to do is to present a philosophical overview on
the  topic of forgiveness  in order  to provide  a framework  for  the
day's later discussions.  I have also been asked to limit my remarks
to thirty minutes.  This time limit will, of course, entail that most of
what I  say will be  quite general, since I  shall not be  able to make
the kinds of qualifications  and refinements  that would be possible
if I had more time.  Being general is not the same as being shallow,
however,  and  I will do my best to avoid  this latter pitfall.
Before getting  into the details of my discussion, I  would like to
make  three preliminary points.
First, I should note that most of my thinking and writing on for-
giveness  and reconciliation has concerned what might be called in-
terpersonal forgiveness and reconciliation - e.g.,  forgiveness of an
unfaithful spouse, a betraying  friend, a malicious  colleague,  a gov-
ernment  agent by whom  one  has been tortured,  or  a criminal  by
whom one has been victimized.  With respect to law, my focus has
been more  on criminal than  civil law.
I have  only recently started to think and write about what might
be  called  group  forgiveness  and  reconciliation  as  possible  re-
sponses  to  such  mass  violence  as  genocide  and  apartheid.  My
views on this topic are still in a very early stage, and thus I feel very
fortunate that I shall be able to join you all this afternoon  in listen-
ing to the talk by Professor Martha Minow. She is the author of the
truly  splendid  book, Between  Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing
History After Genocide and Mass Violence.'
The second  preliminary  point I want  to make  concerns  my own
qualifications  to speak on the topic in question.  I have been think-
ing and writing about this topic for many years, and over the years
I have developed increasingly positive views about the value of for-
giveness.  (Indeed, my early views  on the topic were  perceived  as
so negative that a colleague  once suggested that my chapters in the
book  Forgiveness and Mercy should  be  subtitled  "An  Outsider's
1.  MARTHA  MINOW,  BETWEEN  VENGANCE  AND  FORGIVENESS:  FACING  HIS-
TORY  AFTR GENOCIDE  AND  MASS  VIOLENCE  (1998).
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View.")  However,  I want  to make  it clear  that my current  views
are  essentially  intellectual  and  theoretical  rather  than  autobio-
graphical  in  nature.  Although  I have  over the  years  suffered  my
share of petty slights and insults,  I have led an astoundingly fortu-
nate  life  in  the realm  of victimization.  I  have  experienced  some
small scale immorality, but nothing that I would identify  as evil.  I
have  never  to  my  knowledge  been  betrayed  by  a  loved  one  or
friend; I have never been tortured; I have never been raped; I have
never  been  violently  assaulted  or  been  the  victim  of  any  crime
more serious than auto theft - nor has anyone  close to me.  Thus,
when I speak of forgiveness  as a virtue, I know that I may be open
to the  charge  "easy  for you to  say."  When those  who have  been
seriously  victimized  can  emerge  from  their victimization  without
hate, there is nobility and moral grandeur to be found  in their ca-
pacity to forgive.  Nelson Mandela  seems  to be  such  a person.  I
have  no  idea,  however,  if I  could  rise  to  this  in  similar  circum-
stances;  and  thus  I  will  express  my  admiration  for  such  people
without ever  meaning to  suggest that I know that I could  act in a
comparable  way.
The  third  and  final  preliminary  point  I  want  to  make  concerns
the level  of precision that one  can expect  on the topic  of forgive-
ness.  With Aristotle, I tend to think that it is generally a mistake in
ethics to aim for a level of precision not really allowed by what is in
fact a quite messy  and conflicted  subject matter.  Neat theories in
ethics  generally  produce  not  illumination  but  rather  (in Herbert
Hart's  fine  phrase)  uniformity  at the  price  of distortion.z  (I  am
convinced, indeed, that a really insightful book in ethics would not
have  as  a  title  "The  Theory  of.  . . ." but  rather  something  like
"Muddling  Through"  or  "Stumbling  Along."'3)  Thus  all  one  can
hope to do is to enrich the discussion a bit by exposing some of the
value  choices  at the  heart of forgiveness  - a point  well made by
Professor Minow in her book when she says that she will resist "ti-
diness"  and "temptations  of closure"  in her own thinking and writ-
ing  about forgiveness.4
Preliminaries out of the way, I shall now move to my "philosoph-
ical overview."  But what exactly  is it that philosophers  do?  Well,
first  they draw  a lot  of distinctions.  (Indeed,  I  think it  was J. L.
Austin who once  suggested  that the drawing of distinctions  might
be the occupation and not just the occupational disease  of philoso-
2.  H.L.A.  HART,  THE CONCEPT  OF LAW  38 (2d  ed.  1994).
3.  The  second  title was  suggested  to me in conversation  by D.Z. Phillips.
4.  See MINOW,  supra note  1, at  4, 24.
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phers.)  Thus I  shall begin by attempting  to explain  what forgive-
ness is and, in the process, distinguish it from various other things it
is not but with which is has often been confused.  After that, I will
explore  what can be said against forgiveness  and then close with a
discussion  of what can  be said in its  favor.
The Nature of Forgiveness
I think that one  of the most insightful  discussions of forgiveness
ever penned is to be found in Bishop Joseph Butler's  1726 sermon
"Upon  Forgiveness  of Injuries."'5  In  that  sermon,  Bishop  Butler
offers  a definition  of forgiveness  that  I  have  adapted  in my  own
work  on  the  topic.6  According  to  Butler,  forgiveness  is  a  moral
virtue  (a  virtue  of  character)  that  is  essentially  a  matter  of the
heart,  the inner  self, and involves  a change  in inner  feeling  more
than a change in external action.  The change  in feeling is this:  the
overcoming,  on moral grounds, of the intense negative reactive at-
titudes - the vindictive passions of resentment, anger, hatred, and
the desire for revenge - that are quite naturally occasioned when
one  has  been  wronged  by  another  responsible  agent.  A  person
who has forgiven  has overcome  those  vindictive  attitudes and has
overcome  them  for  a  morally  creditable  motive  - e.g.,  being
moved by repentance  on the part  of the person by whom one has
been wronged.  Of course, such a change  in feeling often leads to a
change of behavior - reconciliation, for example; but, as our abil-
ity to forgive  the dead illustrates, it does not always  do so.
On this analysis  of forgiveness,  it is useful initially to distinguish
forgiveness  from  other  responses  to  wrongdoing  with  which  for-
giveness is often confused:  justification, excuse,  mercy, and recon-
ciliation.  Although  these  concepts  are  to  some  degree  open
textured  and  can  bleed  into  each  other,  clarity  is  - I  think  -
served  if one at least starts by attempting to separate them.  I will
discuss  each of them briefly.
1.  Justification: To  regard  conduct  as justified  (as  in  lawful
self defense, for example) is  to claim that the conduct, though nor-
mally  wrongful,  was  - in the  given  circumstances  and  all  things
considered  - the right thing to do.  If I  have suffered  because  of
5.  See Sermon IX, in SERMONS  OF JOSEPH  BUTLER  127-41  (W. E. Gladstone ed.,
1897).
6.  My adaptation of Butler is free, and  I make no pretense that what follows  is a
solid  piece  of Butler scholarship.  I  have  been  inspired  by  Butler's  discussion;  and
thus, even when I have modified or added to that discussion, I hope that I have always
been loyal to its  essential spirit.
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conduct  that was right - e.g.,  had my  nose bloodied by someone
defending  himself against  my  wrongful attack  - I have  not been
wronged,  have nothing legitimately  to resent, and thus have noth-
ing to forgive.
2.  Excuse:  To  regard conduct  as  excused  (as in the insanity
defense, for example)  is to admit that the conduct was wrong but to
claim that the person who engaged in the conduct lacked substan-
tial capacity to conform his conduct to the relevant norms and thus
was not a fully responsible agent.  Responsible agency is, of course,
a matter of degree;  but to the degree  that the person who  injures
me  is not  a responsible  agent,  resentment  of  that  person  would
make no more sense than resenting  a sudden storm that soaks me.
Again,  there is nothing here to forgive.
3.  Mercy:  To  accord  a wrongdoer  mercy  is  to inflict  a  less
harsh  consequence  on  that  person  than  allowed  by  institutional
(usually legal) rules.  Mercy is less personal than forgiveness, since
the one granting mercy  (a sentencing judge, say)  typically will not
be a  victim  of wrongdoing  and  thus will  not have  any feelings  of
resentment to overcome.  (There is a sense in which only victims of
wrongdoing have what might be called standing to forgive.)  Mercy
also  has  a public  behavioral  dimension  not necessarily  present  in
forgiveness.  I  can  forgive  a person simply  in my heart  of hearts,
but I cannot show mercy simply in my heart of hearts.  I can forgive
the dead, but I cannot  show mercy  to the dead.  I can  forgive my-
self, but I cannot  show  mercy to myself.
This distinction between mercy and forgiveness  allows us to see
why there is no inconsistency  in fully forgiving a person for wrong-
doing (that  is, stop  resenting or  hating the  person for it)  but still
advocate that the person  suffer the  legal consequence  of criminal
punishment.  To the degree  that criminal punishment is justified in
order  to secure  victim  satisfaction,  then - of course  - the  fact
that the victim has forgiven will be  a relevant  argument for reduc-
ing  the criminal's  sentence  and  the  fact that a  victim  still resents
and hates will be a relevant argument for increasing that sentence.
It  is  highly  controversial,  of  course,  that  criminal  punishment
should to any degree be harnessed to victim desires.7  Even if it is,
however, it must surely be  admitted that the practice  serves  other
values  as well - particularly  crime  control and justice;  and, with
respect to these goals,  victim forgiveness  could  hardly be  disposi-
7.  For a survey of the arguments  pro and con, on allowing  victim desires to influ-
ence criminal sentencing,  see the majority and  dissenting opinions in Booth v. Mary-
land, 482 U.S. 496  (1987),  overruled by  Payne v.  Tennessee, 501  U.S. 808, 825  (1991).
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tive.  In  short:  It  would  indeed  be  inconsistent  for  a  person  to
claim that he has forgiven the wrongdoer and still advocate punish-
ment for the wrongdoer in order  to satisfy his personal vindictive
feelings.  (If  he  still  has  those  feelings,  he  has  not forgiven.)  It
would  not  be  inconsistent,  however,  to advocate  punishment  for
other legitimate reasons.  Of course, the possibilities for self decep-
tion are enormous  here.
4.  Reconciliation.  The  vindictive passions  (those overcome
in forgiveness) are often a major barrier to reconciliation;  and thus,
since forgiveness often leads to reconciliation,  it is easy to confuse
the two concepts.  I think, however, that it is important also to see
how they may differ - how there can be forgiveness  without rec-
onciliation and reconciliation  without forgiveness.
First let  me  give  an  example  of forgiveness  without reconcilia-
tion.  Imagine  a battered woman  who has been repeatedly  beaten
and raped  by her husband  or  boyfriend.  This  woman  - after  a
religious  conversion,  perhaps  - might  well  come  to  forgive  her
batterer (i.e.,  stop hating him) without a willingness to resume her
relationship with him.  "I forgive you and wish you well" can, in my
view,  sit quite  consistently  with  "I  never  want  you  in  this house
again."  In short, the fact that one has forgiven does not mean that
one must also trust or live again with a person.
As  an  example  of  reconciliation  without  forgiveness,  consider
the example  of the South African  Truth and  Reconciliation  Com-
mission.8  In order  to negotiate  a viable  transition from apartheid
to democratic government  with full black  participation,  all parties
had to agree that there would in most cases be no punishment for
evil acts that occurred under the previous government.  Wrongdo-
ers, by making a full confession and accepting responsibility, would
typically  be  granted  amnesty.  In  this  process  the  wrongdoers
would not be required to repent, show remorse, or even apologize.
I can clearly see this process as one of reconciliation - a process
that will  allow  all to work toward a democratic  and just future.  I
do not so easily see this process as one of forgiveness, however.  No
change of heart was required or even sought from the victims - no
overcoming  of such  vindictive  feelings  as  resentment  and  hatred.
All that was required of them was  a willingness to accept this pro-
cess  as a necessary means to the future good of their society.
In my view, this counts as forgiveness only if one embraces what
is (to me)  a less morally rich definition of forgiveness:  forgiveness
8.  For a survey of the operation of the Commission, see MINOW, supra,  note 1, at
52-90.
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merely as the waiving of a right.  Examples of this are found in the
private  law  idea of forgiving  a debt  or in Bishop Desmond  Titu's
definition  of forgiveness  as "waiving one's right to revenge."9  But
surely one  can waive  one's rights for purely instrumental reasons;
reasons  having nothing to do with the change  of heart that consti-
tutes  forgiveness  as  a  moral  virtue.  One  can  even  waive  one's
rights  for  selfish reasons  - e.g.,  the  belief that one's  future  em-
ployment  prospects  will  be  better  if one  simply  lets  bygones  be
bygones.  I  am not saying that  it is wrong  to act for instrumental
reasons  - indeed,  for  South  Africa,  it  may  have  been  the  only
justified  course.  Neither  am  I saying  that  instrumental  justifica-
tions can  never  be moral justifications.  To attempt  reconciliation
for the  future  good  of one's  society,  for  example,  is  surely  both
instrumental and moral.  I am simply saying that, however justified
acting instrumentally  may sometimes be, it is - absent the extinc-
tion  of  resentment  and  other  vindictive  passions  - something
other than what I understand as the moral virtue of forgiveness.  In
short:  If all we know is that two parties  have decided to reconcile,
we  do  not  know  enough  to  make  a  reliable  judgment  about
whether the  moral  virtue  of forgiveness  has been  realized  in the
reconciliation.
Another point worth making about the relation between recon-
ciliation and  forgiveness  is this:  If one always  delayed reconcilia-
tion until forgiveness had taken place, then some vitally important
kinds of reconciliation  might not be possible.  Thus the realization
that forgiveness is often a helpful step toward reconciliation should
not lead us into the mistaken belief that forgiveness  is a necessary
condition for reconciliation.  Indeed, it is surely sometimes the case
that reconciliation,  coming first and  adopted for instrumental  rea-
sons, opens the door to future forgiveness.  After learning that one
can work with one's victimizer toward a common  goal, a sense  of
common humanity might emerge  and one's vindictive passions to-
ward that person might over  time begin to soften.
Let me now discuss the evaluation of forgiveness  as I - follow-
ing Bishop  Butler - have defined  it.
The Dangers of Hasty Forgiveness
In addition to his powerful sermon on forgiveness, Bishop Butler
authored an equally powerful sermon with the title "Upon Resent-
9.  Interview by  Bill Moyers  with Bishop Desmond TItu, PBS (Apr. 27,  1999).
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ment."'1 0  In that sermon, Butler started to make a  case for the le-
gitimacy  of  resentment  and  other  vindictive  passions  - arguing
that a just and  loving God  would not have  universally  implanted
these passions within his creatures  unless the passions served some
valuable purpose.  The danger of resentment, he argued, lies not in
having  it, but  rather  in being  dominated  and  consumed  by  it  to
such a degree that one can never overcome it and acts irresponsibly
on the basis  of it.  As the initial response to being wronged,  how-
ever, the passion  stands  in defense  of important values  - values
that might  be  compromised  by immediate  and  uncritical  forgive-
ness of wrongs.
What  are the values defended by resentment  and threatened  by
hasty and uncritical forgiveness?  I would suggest two:  respect for
self and respect for the moral order.  A person who never resented
any injuries  done to himself might be  a saint.  It is equally likely,
however, that his lack of resentment reveals a servile personality  -
a personality  lacking  in  respect  for  himself  and  respect  for  his
rights and status as a free and equal moral agent.  (This is the point
behind the famous  quip:  "To  err is human;  to forgive, supine.") 11
Just  as indignation or guilt over the mistreatment of others stands
as emotional testimony that we care about them and their rights, so
does resentment  stand as emotional  testimony that we care about
ourselves  and our rights.
Related to this is an instrumental  point:  Those who have vindic-
tive  dispositions  toward  those  who  wrong  them  give  potential
wrongdoers an incentive not to wrong them.  If I were going to set
out to oppress other people, I would surely prefer to select for my
victims persons whose first response  is forgiveness rather than per-
sons whose  first response  is revenge.  As Kant  noted in his  Doc-
trine of  Virtue,  "One  who  makes  himself  into  a  worm  cannot
complain  if people  step on him.'
12
Resentment  does  not  simply  stand  as  emotional  testimony  of
self-respect, however.  This passion - and the reluctance to hastily
transcend it in forgiveness  - also stands  as testimony to our alle-
giance to the moral order itself.  This is a point made forcefully by
Aurel Kolnai in his important essay on forgiveness. 3  According to
10.  See Sermon VIII, in  SERMONS  OF JOSEPH BUTLER, supra note  5,  at  115-126.
11.  I have heard this quip attributed to the comic writer S. J. Perelman (who often
wrote for the Marx Brothers), but  I am not certain if the attribution  is accurate.
12.  IMMANUEL  KANT, THE DOCTRINE  OF VIRTUE,  PART II  OF THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS  103,  (Mary J. Gregor  trans.,  1964).
13.  See AUREL KOLNAI,  Forgiveness, in PROCEEDINGS  OF THE ARISTOTELIAN  SO-
CIETY  91,  95-98  (1973-74).
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Kolnai,  we  all  have  a  duty to support  - both  intellectually  and
emotionally - the moral order, an order represented by clear un-
derstandings  of  what  constitutes  unacceptable  treatment  of  one
human  being  by another.  If we  do not show  some resentment  to
those  who, in victimizing  us,  flout  those understandings,  then  we
run  the risk of being  "complicitous  in evil."
If I had more time, I  could say many more  things in defense  of
the  vindictive  passions.  (Indeed,  I  am  soon  to  publish  an  essay
with  the  title  "TWo  Cheers for  Vindictiveness."' 4)  I hope  I  have
said enough, however, to support Butler's claim that these passions
have  some  positive value.  Having  such  value,  these  passions  are
unlike, say, malice - pure delight in the misfortunes and sufferings
of others.  Malice  is by no means  universal but is,  where present,
intrinsically  evil or  diseased  or  both.  Butler  essentially  wants  to
apply Aristotle's idea of the mean  to the passion of resentment  -
developing  an account  of the  circumstances  that justify it  and the
degree  to which it is legitimate  to feel  and be  guided by it.15  But
the doctrine of the mean does not apply to malice;  for the proper
amount of this passion is always  zero.
Uncritical  boosters  for  quick  forgiveness  have  a  tendency  to
treat resentment  and  the other vindictive  passions  as  though, like
malice, they are intrinsically evil - passions that no decent person
would acknowledge.' 6  In this, I think that they are quite mistaken.
In the  Oresteia, Athena  rightly made  an  honorable  home for the
Furies  (representatives  of  the  vindictive  passions)  - so  con-
straining their excess by due process and the rule of law that they
become  the  Eumenides  (the Kindly Ones),  protectors  of law  and
social stability.'7  There is no honorable home for malice, however.
Let  me summarize  what I  have argued  to this point:  The prob-
lem with resentment  and  other vindictive  passions  is not (as  with
malice)  their very existence.  In their proper  place,  they have  an
important  role to play  in the defense of self and of the moral and
legal  order.  The  problem  with these  passions  is rather  their ten-
14.  See  Jeffrie  G.  Murphy,  Two  Cheers for Vindictiveness, in  PUNISHMENT  AND
SOCIETY  (forthcoming).
15.  See ARISTOTLE,  NICHOMACHEAN  ETHICS 1107a,  reprinted  in NICHOMACHEAN
ETHICS  44-46 (Terence  Irwin trans., 1985).
16.  I  sometimes  think  I  find  such  uncritical  boosterism  among  certain  voices
within  what might  be called  the  "forgiveness  movement"  in clinical  psychology.  See
JEFFRIE  G. MURPHY,  Forgiveness in  Counseling:  A  Philosophical Perspective, in
CHARACTER,  LIBERTY  AND  LAW:  KANTIAN  ESSAYS  IN  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  223-
238  (1998).
17.  See AESCHYLUS,  ORESTEIA  (Robert Fagles  trans.,  1979).
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dency to get  out of control - to  so dominate  the life  of a victim-
ized person that the person's own life  is soured and, in his revenge
seeking, he starts to pose a danger to the very moral and legal or-
der that rightly identifies him.as a victim of immorality.  It is here
- as a  limiting  and overcoming virtue  - that forgiveness  has its
important role to play.
Forgiveness  as  a Virtue
It is,  of course,  possible to take one's revenge  against others  in
measured and proportional and peaceful ways - ways as simple as
a cutting remark  before colleagues or a failure to continue issuing
lunch  invitations.
Very  often, however,  a victimized  person  will allow  vindictive-
ness to take over  his very self - turning him into a self-righteous
fanatic  so involved - even joyous - in his outrage that he will be
satisfied  only  with  the  utter  annihilation  of  the  person  who  has
wronged him.  Such a person  is sometimes  even willing to destroy,
as  symbolic  stand-ins,  persons  who  have  done  him no  wrong  or
who may even be totally innocent. 18  Such a person is a danger to
himself  - very  like,  as  I  think  Nietzsche  once  said,  a  scorpion
stinging itself with its own tail - and poses a threat to the morality
and decency of the social order.  A person under the power of such
vindictiveness  can,  often unconsciously,  even use  the language  of
justice and crime control as a rationalization  for what is really sad-
ism and cruelty.  I cannot help thinking, for example, that many of
the unspeakably brutish conditions  that we tolerate  in our prisons
flow  not from  the  stated  legitimate  desires  for justice  and  crime
control, but rather from  a vindictiveness  so out of control that it
actually becomes  a kind of malice.
Against such a background, forgiveness  can be seen as a healing
virtue that brings with it great blessings - chief among them being
its capacity to  free  us from  being consumed  by our angers, its ca-
pacity to check  our tendencies  toward  cruelty,  and its capacity to
open the door to the restoration of those relationships in our lives
that are worthy of restoration.  This last blessing can be seen in the
fact that, since each one of us will sometimes wrong the people that
mean  the most to  us, there  will be  times when we will want to be
18.  The  von Kleist  story  Michael Kohlhaas - retold  by E. L. Doctorow in  his
novel, Ragtime (1974),  is a famous illustration  of this.  A good English  translation  of
Heinrich von Kleist's 1808 novella Michael  Kohlhass may be found in HEINRICH VON
KLEIST,  THE  MARQUISE  OF  0  AND  OTHER STORIES  114-213  (David  Luke  & Nigel
Reeves trans.,  1978).
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forgiven by those whom we have wronged.  Seeing this, no rational
person would  desire to live in a world where  forgiveness  was not
seen  as a healing virtue.  This  is,  I take  it, the secular meaning of
the parable  of the unforgiving servant.19
We  are faced,  then,  with  a complex  dilemma:  How  are  we  to
reap the blessings of forgiveness without sacrificing our self respect
or our respect for the moral  order in the process?
One great  help here  - and I make no claim that it  is the only
help or even a necessary condition for forgiveness  - is sincere re-
pentance  on the part of the wrongdoer.  When  I  am wronged  by
another, a great part of the injury - over and  above  any physical
harm I may suffer - is the insulting or degrading message that has
been given  to me by the wrongdoer;  the message is that I am less
worthy  than he  is,  so unworthy  that he  may  use me  merely  as  a
means or object in service to his desires and projects.  Thus failing
to resent (or  hastily forgiving)  the wrongdoer  runs the risk that I
am endorsing that very immoral message for which  the wrongdoer
stands.  If the wrongdoer sincerely repents, however, he now joins
me in repudiating the degrading  and insulting message - allowing
me to relate  to him  (his new  self)  as an equal  without fear that a
failure to resent him will be read as a failure to resent what he has
done.  In short:  It is much easier to follow St. Augustine's counsel
that we  should  "hate the sin  but not the sinner"  when the sinner
(the wrongdoer)  repudiates  his own wrongdoing through  an act  of
repentance.20
My  point  here  is  that  sincere  repentance  on  the  part  of  the
wrongdoer  opens  the door to forgiveness  and often  to reconcilia-
tion.  This  is not  to  suggest,  however,  that  we  should  always  de-
mand repentance as a condition for forgiveness  and reconciliation.
When a person comes to repentance  as a result of his own spiritual
growth, we are witness to an inspiring transformation  of character.
Any repentance  that is simply a response to a demand or external
incentive, however, is very likely to be fake.  In what could be read
as a commentary both on certain aspects of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines2'  and on remarks made by some of our current crop of
19.  See Matthew 18:21-35.
20.  St. Augustine's  remark,  so often  rendered  as  it is  here, more  literally reads
"with  love  of  mankind and  hatred  of sins."  THE  OXFORD  DICTIONARY  OF QUOTA-
TIONS 37 (Angela  Partington ed., rev. 4th ed.  1996)  (citing Letter 211, reprinted in 33
PATROLOGIAE  LATINAE  (J. P. Minge  ed.,  1845)).
21.  See U.S.  SENTENCING  COMMISSION GUIDELINES  MANUAL  § 3E1.1  (1998)  ("If
the  defendant  clearly  demonstrates  acceptance  of responsibility  for  his offense,  de-
crease the  offense level  by 2  levels.").
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elected  officials,  Montaigne  wrote:  "These  men make  us believe
that they feel  great  regret  and  remorse  within,  but of atonement
and correction  or interruption they show us no sign ....  I know of
no quality so easy to counterfeit  as piety. '22  Montaigne's  observa-
tion also suggests that the South Africans were perhaps wise in not
making repentance a condition for amnesty under their Truth and
Reconciliation  Commission.
So let us welcome repentance when we find it, and let us do what
we can to create a climate where it can flourish and open the door
to the  moral rebirth  of the wrongdoer  and  to  forgiveness  by  the
wronged.  But, out of respect for the genuine article, let us not de-
mand  or  otherwise  coerce  it.  Demanding  tends  to produce  only
lying and may even be degrading to the wrongdoer  - inviting his
further corruption rather than his moral rebirth.  David Lurie, the
central  character  in J.  M.  Coetzee's  recent  novel  Disgrace, could
save  his  job  if  he  simply  expressed  the  kind  of  repentance  de-
manded  of him  by  the  university  disciplinary  board that  has  au-
thority over  him.  I  find myself sympathizing  with  the reasons  he
gives for not giving them what they want when he says:
We went through the repentance  business yesterday.  I told you
what  I  thought.  I won't do it.  I appeared  before  an  officially
constituted  tribunal,  before  a branch  of the  law.  Before  that
secular  tribunal  I  pleaded  guilty,  a  secular  plea.  That  plea
should  suffice.  Repentance  is neither  here  nor there.  Repen-
tance  belongs  to  another  world,  to  another  universe  of  dis-
course ....  [What  you  are  asking]  reminds  me  too  much  of
Mao's  China.  Recantation,  self-criticism,  public  apology.  I'm
old fashioned, I would prefer simply to be put against a wall and
shot.23
There has in recent  times been much  cheap and shallow chatter
about forgiveness  and repentance  - some  of it coming  from high
political officials and  some coming from the kind of psychobabble
often  found in self-help  and  recovery  books.  As  a result  of this,
many people are, I fear, starting to become cynical about both. For
reasons  I have  developed here,  repentance  may pave the way for
forgiveness.  It is less likely to do so, however, in a world where we
come to believe  that too many claims  of repentance  are insincere
and expedient  - talking the talk without  (so  far  as we  can  tell)
walking the walk.
22.  MICHEL DE  MONTAIGNE,  ON  REPENTANCE  (1588),  in  THE COMPLETE ESSAYS
OF MONTAIGNE  617 (Donald Frame trans.,  1958).
23. J.M.  COETZEE,  DISGRACE  58,  66 (1999).
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I have reached a point where I fear that I have both used up my
time  and worn out my welcome.  So I will now move  to bring my
remarks  to a  close  by touching briefly  on one additional  issue.
Forgiveness  and Christianity
At  a  symposium  on  forgiveness  sponsored  by  a  distinguished
Catholic university, it would be fitting for me to close  my talk with
a  few general remarks  about the relationship  between religion  -
particularly  Christianity  - and  forgiveness.  As  someone  who  is
neither devout nor trained in theology, I am hardly the best person
to  do  this  - either  spiritually  or  intellectually.  However,  I  will
take  a brief stab  at it none the less.
There  are, I  think, at least three ways  in which  a Christian per-
spective  on the world might make the struggle toward forgiveness
- not easy, surely - but at least slightly less difficult than it other-
wise  might  be.  (Similar  perspectives  might  also  be  present,  of
course,  in other religions  and world views.)
24
First, I think that Christianity tends to introduce  a humbling per-
spective on one's self and one's personal concerns - attempting to
counter our natural tendencies  of pride and narcissistic self impor-
tance.  According to this perspective,  we are all fallible  and flawed
and  all  stand in deep  need  of forgiveness.  This perspective  does
not seek to trivialize the wrongs that we suffer, but it does seek to
blunt our very human tendency  to magnify those wrongs out of all
reasonable sense  of proportion  - the tendency to see ourselves as
morally pure while seeing those who wrong us as evil incarnate.  By
breaking  down  a  sharp  us-them  dichotomy,  such  a  view  should
make  it  easier  to  follow  Auden's  counsel  to  "love  your  crooked
neighbor  with your  crooked  heart. '25  This  should make  us  more
open to the possibility of forgiving those who have wronged us and
should also help  us to keep our justified resentments  from turning
into malicious  hatreds and our demands  for just punishment  from
serving  as rationalizations  for sadistic cruelty.
24.  See, e.g.,  the discussion of the background world view that underlies the Judaic
conception  of forgiveness in  Louis E. Newman's  The Quality of Mercy:  On the Duty
to Forgive in the Judaic Tradition, 15 JOURNAL  OF RELIGIOUs  ETmics 155 (1987).  For
the context provided  by Stoicism, see Seneca,  On Anger and On Mercy, in 1 MORAL
ESSAYS  106-449 (John W. Basore trans.,  1994).  For a discussion of forgiveness in capi-
tal murder  cases from an  Islamic perspective,  see  Azizah  al-Hibri,  The Muslim Per-
spective on the Clergy-Penitent Privilege,  29 Loy.  L.A. L. REv. 1723,  1728-29  (1996).
25.  W.H.  AUDEN,  As  I  Walked  Out  One  Evening, in  COLLECTED  POEMS  135
(1991).
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Related  to  this  is  a second  Christian  teaching  that  might  help
open the door  to forgiveness  - a teaching  that concerns not the
status of the victim, but the status of the wrongdoer.  According to
Christianity, we are supposed to see the wrongdoer, as we are sup-
posed to see each person, as a child of God, created in His image,
and thus as ultimately precious.  This vision is beautifully expressed
by  the  writer  William  Trevor  in  his  novel  Felicia's Journey.  He
speaks  with  compassion  and  forgiveness  even  of the  serial  killer
who is a central  character  of that novel  and writes  of him:  "Lost
within a man who murdered, there was  a soul like  any other soul,
purity itself it surely once  had been."26  Viewing the wrongdoer  in
this way - seeing in him the innocent child he once was - should
make it difficult  to hate him with the kind of abandon that would
make forgiveness  of him utterly impossible.
Third and finally, Christianity teaches that the universe is - for
all its evil and hardship - ultimately benign, created and sustained
by a loving God, and to be met with hope rather than despair.  On
this view, the world may be falling, but - as Rilke wrote - "there
is One who holds this falling/with infinite  softness in his hands."27
If I could embrace such a view of the universe and our place in it
- a view for which there is surely no proof, requiring a faith that is
properly  called  religious  - then  perhaps  I  would  not  so  easily
think that the struggle against evil - even evil done to me - is my
task  alone,  all  up  to me.28  If  I  think  that  I  alone  can  and  must
make things right - including making sure that the people  I have
branded  as evil get exactly what is coming to them - then I take
on  a kind of self-importance  that makes me not only unforgiving
but dangerous - becoming the kind of person Nietzsche probably
had  in  mind when  he  warned  that  we  should  "mistrust  those  in
whom the urge to punish  is very strong. ' 29  If I were  capable of a
26.  WILLIAM  TREVOR,  FELICIA'S  JOURNEY  212  (1994).
27.  RAINER  MARIA  RILKE,  Autumn, in  THE  BOOK  OF  IMAGES  (Edward  Snow
trans.,  1991).
28.  I came  to see the value of this perspective  when it was used  by philosopher-
theologian  Marilyn Adams  in  her critique of some  of my  earlier  writing on  forgive-
ness.  See Marilyn Adams, Forgiveness: A Christian Model, 8 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
277-304 (1991).  I  have also recently come to see the wisdom in Herbert  Morris's use
of  the thought  of Simone  Weil on  these  matters.  See  Herbert  Morris  & Jeffrie  G.
Murphy,  Exchange on Forgiveness, 7  CRIMINAL  JUSTICE ETHICS  3,  22  (Summer/Fall
1988).
29.  FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE,  Thus Spoke Zarathrustra,  Second Part, On the Taran-
tulas, in THE  PORTABLE  NIETZSCHE  212  (Walter  Kaufmann  trans.,  1970).  I pursue
Nietzsche's  thoughts on punishment in somewhat greater detail in my Moral Episte-
mology, the Retributive Emotions,  and the "Clumsy Moral Philosophy" of Jesus Christ,
in THE PASSIONS  OF LAW  149 (Susan  Bandes ed., 1999).
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certain kind of faith, then perhaps  I could  relax a bit the clinched
fist  with  which  I  try  to  protect  myself,  sustain  my  self  respect,
avenge  myself, and hold  my world together all alone.
This  brings  to  a  close  my  brief ruminations  on forgiveness  -
ruminations  that have, I hope, helped  a bit to provide a framework
for the discussion to follow today.  As much as I love my own disci-
pline  of philosophy,  however,  I  believe  that  it  is  the  poets  and
other  literary  artists  who  do  the  best  job  of  providing  a  vision
around  which not just our thinking but our sensibilities can be or-
ganized.  And  thus I  shall give  my last word to  the poet  Seamus
Heaney  and simply  read to you  a brief excerpt from  his play,  The
Cure at Troy:
Human  beings suffer.
They torture  one  another.
They get hurt and get hard.
No poem  or play or song
Can fully right a wrong
Inflicted  and endured.
The innocent in goals
Beat on their bars  together.
A hunger-striker's  father
Stands in the graveyard  dumb.
The  police widow in veils
Faints  at the funeral home.
History says, Don't hope
On this side of the grave.
But then, once in a lifetime
The  longed-for tidal wave
Of justice  can rise up.
And hope  and history rhyme.
So hope  for a great sea-change
On the far side of revenge.
Believe  that a further shore
Is reachable  from here  .. 30
30.  SEAMUS  HEANEY,  THE CURE AT TROY  77  (1991).  This play  is Heaney's per-
forming version of Sophocles's Philoctetes.
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FORGIVENESS  AND  JUSTICE*
PROFESSOR  MURPHY:  I  was  struck  by  something  Linda
Meyer  said about the way in which  crime undermines basic public
trust.3'  I think that is a very important insight.  On the other hand,
it seems to me that it can be a matter of degree, in that I think one
of the sad commentaries  on our current society is that there is not a
terribly high level of public trust.  If we had a more communitarian
society,  the idea that a crime undermines public trust would be an
even  more  powerful  argument  than  in  a  society  as  "discom-
munitarian,"  as  ours increasingly  is.
The example I think of is how deeply upset I get when I hear a
crime has been committed as the result of appealing to the rare and
precious  human  quality  we  think  of as  generosity.  The  kind  of
crimes  I am  thinking  of are when  people pretend  to  be  accident
victims  and  a  generous,  Good  Samaritan-type  person  stops  and
helps them, and then that person is beaten and robbed.  That seems
to me to lend extra horror, over and above what was done, because
it undermines  our increasingly  fragile sense  of community.
PROFESSOR  ZIPURSKY:  I have a question  as well as a  com-
ment.  The  term  "forgiveness"  is  ambiguous  and  can  refer  to an
emotion.  It can  also  refer  to  a  disposition  to do  the  opposite  of
"standing  on one's rights,"  as Jeff Murphy put it in his book  with
regard  to mercy.32  It can  refer  to the  equivalent  of loan  forgive-
ness, refraining from enforcing a right that you have.  In this sense,
there is a certain degree of forgiveness  in, one could argue, a prose-
cutor who does not go for the maximum  sentence.
My question is whether there are connections between the dispo-
sition to forgive  in the  sense of not enforcing one's  rights to their
full power, on the one hand, and the disposition to feel forgiveness
in the way that Jeffrie Murphy and others have described it, on the
other.
*  The  presentations  of the  following  panelists  are  presented  in detail  in their
respective  articles or essays written in connection with this Symposium.  See Jeffrie G.
Murphy,  Keynote  Address, Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Responding to Evil:  A
Philosophical  Overview, 27  FORDHAM  URB.  L.J.  1353  (2000);  Susan  Bandes,  When
Victims  Seek  Closure:  Forgiveness, Vengeance  and  the  Role  of  Government, 27
FORDHAM  URB.  L.J. 1599 (2000); Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness  and Public Trust,  27
FORDHAM  URB.  L.J.  1515  (2000);  Everett  L.  Worthington,  Jr., Is There a Place for
Forgiveness in the Justice System?, 27  FORDHAM  URB.  L.J.  1721  (2000).  We reprint
here the  discussion  and questions  that followed the presentations.
31.  See Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM  URn.  L.J.
1515  (2000).
32.  JEAN  HAMPTON  & JEFFRIE MURPHY,  FORGIVENESS  AND  MERCY  (1988).
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A closely  related question is,  how do we want to define  the vir-
tue  of forgiveness:  in  terms of the  disposition  to  go  through  the
acts of refraining from enforcing one's rights in a variety of circum-
stances,  or in terms of the disposition  to feel  forgiveness?
PROFESSOR  BANDES:  I have  a number  of questions, if that
counts  as  a  response,  not  just  about  your  comments,  Ben,  but
about  a lot of what  Linda said  as well.
I certainly agree with Linda, for example, that a lot of these for-
giveness issues are communitarian issues,33 issues of what the com-
munity  is  willing  to  forgive  and  what  kind  of  vengeance  the
community  needs.  I  think  that  raises  a  host  of  questions  that
trouble  me  about  the  individual's  standing in  the criminal justice
system.
I guess I have the same question about Ben's question, which is,
what do we mean when we say "enforcing  one's rights?"  If we are
talking  about  criminal  law  - I  don't know  if your question  was
confined  to  that - the sorts  of rights  the prosecutor  is  enforcing
are not individual rights, they are community rights.
These  are things  I am  struggling with  and I don't have  any an-
swers.  It seems that the real problem is in the individual's role and
not the community role.  For example, when does the victim get to
object  to a prosecutor's  decision or a sentencing  decision?  When
Linda talks about  a more  expansive  definition  of who  gets to for-
give,  my question  is  what  is the  legal  implication  of that?  What
should be the legal consequences of saying that only certain people
can forgive,  when it  seems that we  are dealing  here with  a much
more collectivized  notion of forgiveness?
PROFESSOR  MEYER:  Maybe my response  will answer, or at
least partially respond to, both of those thoughts.  There  is a very
deep connection between giving up one's rights, if you will, and the
forgiveness  idea.  I would extend  it  even to reconceptualizing  our
understanding of punishment.  If we take seriously the idea that a
wrong  is  a breach  of trust with the community, and  we take  seri-
ously the idea that forgiveness  is, in a sense,  being willing  to deal
with that offender again, punishment is no longer about just deserts
because  we have  acknowledged  that just deserts are impossible.
Punishment then becomes  a matter of atonement.  Here I would
gesture  toward  Stephen  Garvey's  recent  article,  Punishment as
Atonement,34 which provides  a wonderful transitional  view of pun-
33.  See Meyer,  supra note 31,  at 1519-21.
34.  STEPHEN  P.  GARVEY,  Punishment as Atonement,  46  UCLA  L.  REV.  1801
(1999).
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ishment that says, "look at what we are doing when we are punish-
ing. We are not getting even, we  are not doing vengeance, but we
are giving the opportunity to a defendant to atone  for his crime so
that he can then be reconciled."
Atonement  avoids  the  problem  that  mitigating  a  punishment
seems unjust.  Instead, the offender is doing penance, undertaking
a sacrifice,  in order  to demonstrate her sincerity and her desire to
move  back into  the community.  Atonement  ends up pushing  to-
gether forgiveness and punishment in a way with which we are not
familiar.  "Just desserts"  drops out of the picture.
PROFESSOR  MURPHY:  In  ordinary  language  we  use  the
word "forgiveness"  to mean two rather different things.  It is prob-
ably a good idea to try to keep those separate.  The idea of simply
waiving  a right does not necessarily  imply that anybody has done
any wrong.  That  is  one sense  of forgiveness.  The other  sense  of
forgiveness  is forgiving  a wrong.
There  is  a  perfectly  legitimate  sense  in  which  we  might  talk
about  the  legitimacy,  let's  say,  of  forgiving  third-world  debt.  I
would  not want  it tacitly  to  be  thought that  if we  talk  that way
somehow there is wrongdoing on the part of the third world.  That
is a different sense of forgiveness,  it seems to me, than forgiving  a
wrong.  For that reason, it is worth keeping those two concepts sep-
arate  sometimes.
PROFESSOR WORTHINGTON:  It is important to make a dis-
tinction between forgiveness as an intrapersonal  event versus recon-
ciliation, which  I  define  as  restoration  of  trust  after  a  breach  in
trust.  Reconciliation  involves  a lot of talking  about the transgres-
sion and talking about forgiveness.  It is a separate issue  than the
experience of forgiveness.  Although they are related to each other
and  there  is  a  psychological  relationship,  they  are  still  different
issues.
QUESTIONS  AND  ANSWERS
AUDIENCE:  I am interested in forgiveness  as a personal trans-
formation and the degree  to which  the legal system can  facilitate
that, engender it or encourage  it.  Professor Murphy talked  about
the  relationship  between  religion  and  forgiveness  and  named,  I
think, three  components  of how religion  and  Christianity  can  en-
courage forgiveness.  I want to know if he has any ideas about re-
forms or  mechanisms  in the  law  that can  encourage  or engender
forgiveness on the part of victims,  to encourage victims  to forgive
their wrongdoers?
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PROFESSOR  MURPHY:  The  one  thing  I  am  aware  of is the
victim/offender mediation family conference model in juvenile jus-
tice.  An  Australian  philosopher  and  politician,  named  David
Moore,  has  written  quite  insightfully  on  this  in  Criminal Justice
Ethics.
35
AUDIENCE:  The  implicit  baseline  assumption  here  is  that
there is a category of situations in which it is right to inflict human
suffering  in order to achieve certain goals, such as to feel better or
get justice.  I am mystified  as to  the basis for this.  Forgiveness  is
treated  as this weird sort of spigot, and sometimes we turn off that
thing and take for granted that imposing human suffering is a good
thing  to  do.  Why  isn't  it  the  other  way  around,  that  inflicting
human suffering  deliberately  is  a bad thing to do and that forgive-
ness  is the  normal thing, and possibly  there  are situations where,
for consequential  reasons  you still have  to punish?
PROFESSOR  MEYER:  I think  you are right, and  I think  that
one of the things that I would like  to see  changed is our view that
justice is what creates community and undergirds our relations with
each other.  I think that justice is chancy.  If you look  at the statis-
tics,  very  few  crimes  get  reported,  very  few  crimes  that  are  re-
ported get prosecuted, very  few of the prosecutions result in trials,
and  so forth.36  So the ultimate numbers of cases that actually  get
tried and get "justice"  are very  few.  I think it is very important to
recognize  that, indeed,  forgiveness  is the norm  and forgiveness  is
what really binds us together, rather than justice.
PROFESSOR  MURPHY:  I  guess  I  would slightly  disagree  in
that if you look at all of the philosophical  writings on punishment,
all  the  way  back  to  Plato,  the  underlying  assumption  has  always
been  that what we do to people  in punishing  is  a bad and terrible
thing.  It is to hurt  people.  In our  system, it is essentially locking
them  up in  cages  or  killing  them.  If you wanted  to  teach some-
body, a little kid, what it means to do something terrible to some-
body and to hurt them, you could hardly give two better examples.
So it is not quite right to say that our assumption is that hurting
people is okay.  I think our assumption is that hurting people is not
okay, which is why everybody has always  thought that punishment
35.  DAVID  B.  MOORE,  Shame, Forgiveness & Juvenile Justice, CRIMINAL  JUSTICE
ETHICS,  Winter/Spring  1993,  at 3.
36.  See  YALE  KAMISAR  ET  AL.,  MODERN  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  14-35  (8th ed.
1994); cf. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU  OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,  NAT'L CRIME  VIC-
TIMIZATION  SURVEY  (1999)  (estimating  the number  of  unreported  serious crimes);
U.S.  DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL  BUREAU  OF INVESTIGATION,  UNIFORM CRIME  RE-
PORTS  (1998)  (summarizing  reported  crimes).
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requires  a justification.  Why  is it that it  is  sometimes  okay  to do
something that any decent person would have to admit is normally
not okay to do?
AUDIENCE:  What happens when we tout forgiveness  as a vir-
tue?  I like thinking of forgiveness as a virtue.  But what happens to
us  as human  beings  when we  get  into, as  Professor  Worthington
said, a place where we want to deny our unforgiveness?  What hap-
pens then, for  example, when you say to your child,  "I  am  angry
and I forgive you."  How do you get into a place to really be forgiv-
ing while  you are angry?
To use your example, Professor Worthington, within twenty-four
hours  of your mother's  murder,  you  say,  "I forgive  you, the  of-
fender."37  Is the virtue of forgiveness present then, or are we in a
place  of  denying  our  unforgiveness  and  wanting  to  move  too
quickly  to the virtue?
PROFESSOR WORTHINGTON:  I wish that I were such a for-
giving person that every single thing that I ever had to deal with in
life I could just forgive like  I was blessed to be able to do with the
murder.  But, unfortunately, I chair the Department of Psychology
at Virginia Commonwealth University, and dealing with the faculty
has demonstrated  to me that I am not always  a very forgiving per-
son.  I hate to admit that, and I struggle with it a lot, because  I do
think forgiveness  is a virtue and  I do want to  practice that virtue.
Some  people  can  forgive  horrendous  things  very  quickly,  and
some  people  have  to  struggle  for  years  to  forgive  the  smallest
things.  I have  become  reluctant to over-generalize  and to say one
always must take  a lot of time  to deal with forgiveness  or one  al-
ways should be able to forgive instantly.  It is very individual within
a person  as well as  across different individuals.
AUDIENCE:  I  want to go  back to  Professor  Zipursky's  com-
ments  distinguishing  between  forgiveness  in  the sense  of ceasing
anger, an emotional sense internally, versus forgiving a debt exter-
nally.  Usually, when we think of what the law does, we think of it
in a coercive  way; the law is the power to put someone in jail or to
order someone  to pay damages, or something like that.  The latter
sense  of forgiveness, in terms of relinquishing a right and so on, is
something  conceivably  the  law  could  do.  But  as  to  the  former
sense,  in terms of ceasing anger, I wonder whether there the most
that one  could hope for from  legal mechanisms  is that they might
foster  an  environment  that  could  promote  internal  psychological
37.  See Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Is There a Place  for Forgiveness in the Justice
System, 27  FORDHAM  URB.  L.J.  1721  (2000).
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transformation rather than command it in some sense, because it is
beyond the scope  of command.
PROFESSOR  ZIPURSKY:  I am going to take one other ques-
tion and then let the panel  answer.
AUDIENCE:  I  have  a  comment  about  the  idea  that  we  are
moving away from a communitarian  model.  I wonder what every-
one  thinks  about  the  idea  that,  through the  mass  media,  we  are
becoming more and more aware of certain crimes and they become
a crime  to all of us.  So, as much as I hated hearing about the O.J.
Simpson  trial,  it showed  that  people  were  completely  enamored
with the  idea of learning what  was happening, and it still has not
gone away.
PROFESSOR  BANDES:  One  way  the  law  could  do  that  is
through the way the law chooses what stories  to tell about people.
A lot of the comments today show that the more we understand, or
try to understand, about people's  motives and backgrounds - for
example,  Everett's  very  moving  story  about  his  mother  - the
more able we  are to forgive  them.
There  are many ways  of telling stories  in the court room about
defendants, as well as victims, many choices that get made all down
the line.  I suppose that greater ability to understand will often lead
to, although certainly not predictably, greater compassion and em-
pathy, but with the caveat that I think Jeff mentioned earlier, that it
is not only impossible  to demand, but also impossible  to measure,
the sincerity of the resulting feelings.
PROFESSOR MURPHY:  Also, if we are going to take account
of victim  feelings, it is important to consider the time  at which we
take account of them.  Professor Worthington, as Susan said, told a
story that I think  we  all probably  found  deeply  moving.  But my
own  personal  story,  from  which  I learned  an  enormous  amount,
provides  a slightly different lesson.
I  had  my car stereo  stolen by  teenagers  when  it was parked  at
the  airport.  My  immediate  response  was,  "those  little  sons  of
bitches, I'd like to kill them.  If I had them here, I would.  ... "  My
wife said to me, "Do you hear what you sound like?"  Suddenly,  I
saw myself in an astoundingly unattractive  way.  I thought maybe I
had learned something about how the victim perspective occasion-
ally  can  be  a  quite  nuts  perspective.  So  that  is  probably  worth
keeping in mind, too.
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MR. LERMAN:38  Can the law make room for forgiveness?  The
short answer  is yes.  And,  is that possible  from a prosecutor's  of-
fice?  The  answer  is yes.
I believe,  first, that forgiveness  should  be seen  as  flowing from
the  victim  (or  a surrogate  victim  or  a victim's  representative)  or
from the neighborhood most affected by a particular crime.  To the
extent that a prosecutor takes on the mantle of the community to
effect justice, then I  as a prosecutor  may engage  in forgiveness.
Otherwise, I think that what I do when I engage in plea bargain-
ing,  or  lowering  a  sentence,  is  compassion  or mercy,  or rachmo-
nes,39 as people ask me  for in court; I  often hear, "Give me a writ
of rachmones in this particular  case."
Prosecutors  are the hub  of the  system.  We  control  so much  of
what goes  on in the criminal justice  system;  therefore, I think we
play an absolutely vital role in advancing the notion of forgiveness
in criminal justice processes.  How should we do that?  We should
allow for practices that advance the possibility of forgiveness.  This
is what  is most helpful to victims,  I believe.
There  is a natural desire on the part of people  to be connected
with one another.  We heard from one of the earlier panelists about
the  lack of trust  among people.  Crime  contributes  to  that.  The
current  system  focuses  too  heavily  on  punishment,  which  really
only breeds  further  distrust.  Part  of that is fueled  by  the  media.
Willie Horton ads, for example, but there is a lot of blame to pass
around as to why we have  a very vindictive and retributive  system.
The desire of the people to be connected with one another  con-
tinues even after a person has been harmed.  Victims desire to have
some  solace  from  the community  around them.  Prosecutors'  of-
fices  are  becoming  better  at  providing  that  service  to  victims
through victims witness units, and there are  offices that are  engag-
ing social Workers in offices.  Des Moines  is one  of them.
These  practices  fall into the  rubric of restorative justice.  For a
very quick thumbnail definition of restorative justice, I would offer
38.  For further comments, see David M.  Lerman, Forgiveness  in the Criminal  Jus-
tice System:  If It Belongs, Why  Is It So Hard to Find?, 27 FORDHAM  URnB.  L.J. 1663
(2000).
39.  "Rachmones"  is  Yiddish  for "compassion."  See  LEO RoSmN, THE  Joys  OF
YIDDISH  304  (1968).
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this:  it  is  a  general  framework  for  viewing  crime  and  its  after-
math. 4°  It is not any particular  program.
We  can  compare restorative  justice to  the traditional  system as
follows:  The  traditional  system  asks three  questions:  Who  is  the
perpetrator; what law was violated; and how do we punish that per-
son?  Restorative justice asks a different set of questions:  first and
foremost, what is the harm that has been caused; secondly, how do
we  fix that harm; and  third, who  is responsible  for that repair?
When you ask those  questions, you end up with a very different
focus  for justice  seeking.  You  become  future-oriented,  which  re-
quires, if done properly, turning to the people most affected by the
wrong.  These  people  are  the  individual  victims,  or  in  victimless
crimes, such  as prostitution  or drug sales,  neighborhoods.
There  are practices  which allow those harmed parties to partici-
pate very readily.  Victim/offender  conferencing  is one of the most
viable practices.  It goes by different terms, i.e., victim/offender rec-
onciliation or mediation, but the core idea is to bring a victim, or a
victim's  surrogate,  or a neighborhood  panel, together with  an of-
fender  in a  safe  setting, with a facilitator,  to  engage  in a process.
First, you go through  the facts of the case.  Secondly and most im-
portantly, you  discuss  what the  impacts on  the victim  and  on the
offender  are, finally what the restitution is,  what is the repair that
can be had here?
I want to talk quickly about this in terms of the life of a prosecu-
tor.  There  are standards  put out by  the National  D.A.'s Associa-
tion that talk about "doing justice."'"  I think in order to arrive at a
system  where  forgiveness  plays  a  role,  we  prosecutors  have  to
change the way we view justice. Justice is not about getting notches
in your belt.  That  is  a hard thing.  Young  prosecutors go  into an
office and want to be tough and to be vigilant, and often there is an
office  culture  that  suggests  that  you  have  got  to  ask  for  tough
sentences. You do not want  to be thought of as being  reasonable.
You can see a lot of cultural change has to take place within many
prosecutors'  offices.
A great way to do this is for prosecutors  to talk with community
members.  When you talk with community members, you learn, in-
evitably, that people do not always want the ten-year sentence on a
second burglary.  What they want  to  see  is  drug  treatment. What
40.  See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic
Accounts, 25  CRIME  & JUST.  1 (1999);  Charles  W. Colson,  Truth, Justice, Peace: The
Foundations of Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT  U. L. REv. 1 (1998).
41.  NATIONAL  PROSECUTION  STANDARDS  (National Dist. Attorneys Ass'n  1991).
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they  want  to  see  is  the  offender  become  an  active  participant  in
society, somebody who pays taxes.  You do not get that by sending
people to prison.
There  is  a  recent  study,  August  1999,  by  the  Council  of State
Governments  Eastern  Regional  Conference,  which  has  as  one  of
its questions, "Should the public provide victims the opportunity to
talk  to  offenders? '42  Seventy-seven  percent  of  the  public  re-
sponded yes.  That  is huge.
Before  closing,  I  want  to  talk  briefly  about  what  forgiveness
means  by way  of  example.  A  couple  of  years  ago,  there  was  a
shooting at a high school in Kentucky.  The next day,  a group of
students  held  a  big banner  outside  the  high school:  "We  forgive
you, Michael. ''43  In my tradition, in the Jewish tradition, that could
not have happened without Michael  having done something  to ar-
rive at the place where there could be forgiveness.  In other words,
the  offender  has  to  take  some  affirmative  steps  to  warrant
forgiveness.
There  is diversity  in this room, there is diversity in this country,
and  therefore,  differing  ideas  on  how  to  arrive  at  forgiveness.  I
think defining what forgiveness must be for every individual victim
is too difficult and should not be done. But providing the opportu-
nities for meaningful discussion, which may help  a victim move to-
wards forgiveness, is imperative if we are to humanize our criminal
justice  system.
MR. GAY:44  Two weeks  ago tonight, I happened to be at a local
Catholic worker  house in Des Moines, Iowa.  They had asked  me
to give a little presentation on restorative justice.  Earlier that day,
I had  looked  at the mission  statement for  this Symposium  which
asked, "Can  the law make room for the virtue  of forgiveness,  and
should it?"
I  posed  those  questions  to  the  people  at  the  Catholic  worker
house.  They  were  staff  members, people  from the  faith  commu-
nity, homeless  individuals,  and  some  other people.  They  did  not
address  the  "can  it,  should  it?"  question.  They  said,  "Why
wouldn't  it?"  For  them,  it  was unanimous.  That  is  the  business
that we  ought to be  about in our criminal justice community.
42.  COUNCIL  OF  STATE  GOVERNMENTS  EASTERN  REGIONAL  CONFERENCE  RE-
PORT  fig. 36  (Aug. 1999).
43.  See Leslie Scanlon, Coping With Grief,  LOUISVILLE COURIER-J.,  at A7 (Dec. 6,
1997).
44.  For further comments, see Frederick W. Gay, Restorative  Justice and the Prose-
cutor, 27  FORDHAM  URB. L.J.  1651  (2000).
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I was heartened, certainly, by those responses and got to think-
ing about groups  I had met with over  the years - victim groups,
offender groups, church groups, community groups . They  always
respond the same way:  "Why wouldn't we do this kind of thing?"
They  are  not  concerned  about the  legality.  They  are  concerned
about saving human lives.  The only time I do not get that kind of
response  is when  I talk  to lawyers.
Our experience was that, back in 1990-1991, we began looking at
these questions  as  a result  of oftentimes  experiencing  victims dis-
satisfied with the process.  Our office,  the Polk  County Attorney's
Office,  represents  Des Moines,  Iowa,  a  community much  smaller
than Manhattan, about 450,000 people.  It is a typical prosecutor's
office in  a  mid-sized, Midwestern  community.  Someone is prose-
cuted,  found  guilty,  sentenced,  goes  to  prison.  Closure  has  not
taken place.  What  do  we do about that?
We looked around and found a program out of Elkhart, Indiana,
called the PAC Program; they had a victim/offender  reconciliation
("VOR")  program  based  on  restorative  justice  principles.  We
thought that it was an isolated program but found out that it was
not, that there were  programs  around the United  States, Canada,
Western Europe, Belgium, England,  Germany,  et cetera.45
We  took what  others  had done  and created  a program,  called
Victim/Offender  Reconciliation,  whereby  victims  of crimes  meet
the offender in a very controlled, safe, mediated session.  It started
out small, with minor shoplifting  crimes.  Today we do about  1000
to  1200  cases  a  year,  the  minor  crimes  - harassment, property
damage  cases  - and  some  major crimes  - sexual  assault  cases,
burglaries, robberies, and homicides.
It  was  tough getting  started.  The judges thought,  "Why  would
we do this?"  Now they accept it.  It is part of our process.  We do it
as a result of a sentencing, we  do it between plea  and sentencing,
and we do it post-plea in some cases.
How does the process work?  As David outlined a little bit, there
is  a  discussion  of the facts,  always  questions  by the  victim as  to:
"Why  me,  why  me?  Why  my  house?  Why  my  car?  Why  my
45.  See  Mark  S.  Umbreit  & William  Bradshaw,  Victim  Experience of Meeting
Adult vs. Juvenile Offenders: A  Cross-National  Comparison, 61  FED.  PROBATION  33
(1997);  see also, e.g.,  Dieter Rossner, Mediation as a Basic Element of Crime Control:
Theoretical  and Empirical  Comments, 3  BumF.  CRIM. L. REv. 211, 211-12  (1999)  (dis-
cussing section 46(a) of the German Penal Code, which contains a provision by which
the judge  and prosecutor  may, at their discretion,  refrain from  punishment in cases
where the maximum penalty is one year in prison and Victim/Offender Reconciliation
has taken place).
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daughter?  Why  my  son?"  Then  we  discuss  the  offender's  re-
sponse; finally,  we talk  about what justice  should  look like in this
case.
I want to talk to you about one specific case.  A couple of years
ago, two young neo-Nazis in Des Moines did considerable  damage
to a local synagogue.46  There  was considerable  public uproar and
support for  the Jewish  community.  After  a  couple  of weeks,  the
two  perpetrators  were  apprehended.  There  was  a  pseudo-lynch
mob mentality among the community.
The case ended up on my desk.  I called the Rabbi, Rabbi Fink,
and  asked  him  about  doing  a  victim/offender  reconciliation.
"You've got to be kidding me," he said.  "Why would we do some-
thing like that?  I'm so mad I could  strangle those  two."  I  asked
him  to  think  about  it.  He  called  back  two  days  later  and  said,
"That's what  we ought to be  doing.  It is not what my heart says,
but I think that is what  we ought to be doing."
We  had a meeting in the basement of the synagogue  with seven
members from the synagogue, the two perpetrators,  and  a trained
mediator.  We talked about what had happened.  It was fascinating.
The synagogue members found out about the histories of these two
young men and the two young men found out about what this did
to the Jewish community.  There  were several Holocaust  survivors
in  Des  Moines  that  actually  went  into  hiding  as  a  result  of  the
desecration.
Based  on  the  meeting,  they  reached  an  agreement.  The  boys
agreed  to  do community  service  at the  temple,  and  also  to meet
with the Rabbi over a period  of about  six months to study Jewish
and  Holocaust history.  The  boys kept their promise.  Six  months
later, I saw a transformation among the offenders,  and also among
the  members  of  the  synagogue.  The  boys  had,  in  fact,  become
friends  with the people  at the synagogue.
At  one point  in  the  dialogue,  one  of  the  Holocaust  survivors
said,  "What  do  you want  from  us?"  The  young  male  said,  "We
want to be forgiven."  Her response  was, "In our tradition we can-
not  forgive  without  atonement."  They  discussed  the  Jewish  con-
cept of atonement, and what that would look like in this particular
case.
About  a  year  after  this  meeting,  the  Drake  University  Law
School  in  Des  Moines  had a  day-long  symposium  on restorative
46.  See  Tom  Alex,  D.M. Synagogue  Defaced, DES  MOINES  REGISTER,  Mar.  4,
1994, at  1.
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justice.47  Rabbi Fink spoke about his experience with this and sub-
sequent VOR meetings.  At the very end  he  discussed the Jewish
concept  of atonement.
Two  weeks  ago  we  observed  the  holiest  day  of the  Jewish
year, Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement.  On this day we fast
for twenty-four hours.  It is literally a twenty-four-hour fast from
sunset to sunset, no water, no food of any kind, unless  there is
great  physical  need.  We  do  this  because  we  concentrate  on
making reconciliation  with God.  But in order to reconcile with
God,  in order to end the state of alienation  that exists  between
us and  God, we need to first ask those whom we have wronged
for  forgiveness.  And,  unless  we  can  get up  the  courage  to go
and ask these people to forgive us, then God will not forgive us.
There are some crimes that are so heinous that we human be-
ings cannot forgive, and so we  leave forgiveness up to God, but
for most acts that are done against us, for most wrongs, we  can
forgive.
We  saw  this  process  literally  fade  out  in  the  secular  arena
through the VOR proceedings and working with the two perpe-
trators.  We were wronged and they came to us.  They made sin-
cere  repentance.  They  were  examples  of  what  it  means  to
repent, to make atonement.  They really meant it.  I don't think
they  are  going  to  ever  do  something  like  this  again.  So  we
granted  atonement.  It  wasn't easy,  but we  did  it.  We  worked
through our feelings and, willingly, towards the end, we granted
them atonement  and gave  them our friendship.
We  learned  an important  lesson  as well.  We  learned  that in
order  to make reconciliation  with  God we  must reconcile  with
God's creation.  As we  know,  we  are imperfect  human  beings,
but the VOR process  has given us the opportunity  to reconcile
with one  another.
A question  that that gives rise to is:  Why wouldn't we  attempt
that all the time?
MR.  BARRETT:  I  am  not  going  to  engage  in  the  semantic
parsing of forgiveness versus mercy.  I just want to flag, with a con-
fession, that I am perhaps  bleeding  those into each other as I dis-
cuss this.
But what I  do want to move  to is a different idea of the victim
role.  Much of the previous discussion has focused on cases where
crime  is perpetrated  on an identified individual.  A lot of offenses,
however,  particularly  in  the federal  system,  are  victimless,  in the
47.  See  Drake  University  Law  School  Restorative  Justice  Symposium  (Oct.  4,
1996)  (unpublished).
1378FORGIVENESS IN  THE LAW
sense that there is no identifiable  individual who has suffered this
infraction.  Examples  in both  state  and federal  law  are  obviously
drug crimes, the classic possession  or intent  to distribute  offenses.
In addition, the whole realm of white-collar crime  is very hard to
connect up with identified individuals.  There are obviously excep-
tions in the economic  fraud context, but much  of it does not con-
nect to somebody who has been injured.
Public corruption and integrity offenses are also a realm of crimi-
nal law  and criminal prosecutions  that does not have  victims with
faces.  Think of things like bribery, gratuity, conspiracy, perjury, or
obstruction of justice.  The victim  is the public order.  There is no
localized  neighborhood  in which  the  crime  occurred.  It is  simply
public order, as embodied in the law itself, which has been injured.
The person of the victim in those cases, frankly, is the government.
At the first level it is the aggrieved cop or the aggrieved agent; at a
later level in the process - I do not want to say a higher level -
the victim is  the prosecutor who gets responsibility for that matter
as an investigation  and the  decisions that will follow.
I  want to focus on victimless  criminal conduct,  and prosecutors
as actors in that realm.  This connects  back to some of the themes
discussed at last year's Fordham Urban Law Journal  Symposium on
"The  Changing Role of the Federal Prosecutor." 48  They are really
quite intertwined.
Government,  and  particularly  prosecutorial  behavior  in  those
cases,  has two characteristics,  as  I see it.  The  first is  that there  is
extremely  little  official  guidance  about  how  a prosecutor  should
behave.  There  is a  realm  of enormous  discretion  on  how  an  of-
fense  is  viewed,  on how  an  investigation  gets conducted,  and  on
how  the  perpetrator  will  be  treated  as  that  investigation  moves
forward.
There is, many of you may know, a United States Attorneys' Man-
ual, which  is  a thick  publication.49  In  all  the  clinches  where  the
action actually occurs, however, where decision making counts, the
federal government  has refrained from making choices.  The Man-
ual explicitly embodies  a lot of discretion for federal prosecutors  in
48.  See Symposium,  The Changing Role of the Federal Prosecutor,  26 FORDHAM
URB.  L.J.  645 (1999).
49.  See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S  MANUAL  (1997).  A copy of the
Manual is also available online, and is updated  regularly.  See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
U.S.  ATroRN,  EY's  MANUAL  (updated  Nov.  12,  1999)  <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/>.
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deciding "how will I handle this; how will I handle him or her as my
investigative  activity and my decisions come  forward? '5 0
Prosecutors  do  forgive  perpetrators  in  this  realm  all  the  time.
They  show  mercy,  or cut  slack,  or move  on.  Sometimes  they re-
spond to a change  of heart.  Sometimes they see the prospect of a
change of conduct.  They show mercy in making decisions like con-
ferring  immunity  or  not, which  is technically  judicial  but is  trig-
gered by a prosecutorial  decision and is basically mechanical at the
judicial level.
Prosecutors  engage in cooperation  agreements  with certain peo-
ple,  simply  decline  to prosecute  or  to  push the  investigation  fur-
ther,  make  plea  offers,  write  5(k)  letters  that  allow  downward
departures  in sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
All of those are  ways  individual  prosecutors,  with relatively  little
supervision, make  mercy/forgiveness  decisions.
How does it work?  Well,  it works the way any interpersonal  in-
teraction works.  It works at the heart, at the emotion, at the level
of person-to-person  affinity:  "I like  this person enough - or I do
not hate this person enough - to take the hard path; I choose the
easier path."  I want to focus  more on  that realm of unregulated
discretion.
We should officially  encourage  two processes  as we look  at for-
giveness  by federal prosecutors.  The first is direct human  contact,
the face-to-face  contact between this person who is going to be the
subject  of the prosecutorial  decision  and  the prosecutor  who  will
make it.  That happens in some cases.  It usually is a function of a
choice  by  a criminal defense lawyer.
Obviously, no one has to talk - Fifth Amendment, et cetera  -
but better lawyers, at least in white-collar or victimless cases of the
type I am describing, make the contact.  Often they will bring their
client in to make the contact, to communicate the human reality of
who this person  is.  Otherwise the person  is  just the other side  of
"United States v."  and the next statistic that the Assistant U.S. At-
torney is contemplating in his or her advancement  as a prosecutor.
That process is valuable, it is appropriate at the human level, and it
is something that the Manual, or the U.S. Attorney, or the Attor-
ney General, whatever the right official process, should encourage.
50.  See  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  JUSTICE,  U.S.  ATTORNEY'S  MANUAL  § 9-2.001  (granting
U.S.  Attorneys authority  and discretionary  power  in criminal  matters).
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It also, obviously, connects  up to the counsel issue.5'  The lawy-
ering on the criminal defense  side - quantity and quality  of lawy-
ering  and  the  compensation  for  the  lawyering  - are  important
aspects  of this face-to-face  meeting and  we neglect  a key  compo-
nent if we skip over the counsel  question.
Human contact  is vital.  Face  the situation, look  at it, meet the
perpetrator, understand the bigger picture, not just the act, not just
the facts, not just the draft indictment.  A second thing, however,
that we should  officially  encourage  is visibility  or transparency  in
the decision making  of forgiveness.  Indictments  are visible, trials
are visible,  pleas are  visible,  but cutting  breaks  is  often  invisible.
We  hurt ourselves  by making it invisible.  To put  it affirmatively,
we would benefit  by making  the process  visible and transparent.
On the perpetrator's  side we would gain a way of accepting  ac-
countability, which  is  a predicate  to  forgiveness,  has  social  value,
and  is part  of what  I  am  talking  about  here.  If you  can  see  the
person come  into the U.S. Attorney's  Office but not become a de-
fendant  - and  have  some  understanding  about  what  transpired
there  - you  achieve  something  for  that  person  and for  society.
Plus, you build a factual record,  knowledge  in society  itself about
human conduct, about law enforcement, about this kind of decision
making.
You would also help prosecutors in prosecuting.  In part, this vis-
ibility would combat, a bit, the trend of prosecutors  taking on the
victim  role,  of believing  that they  are  assigned  to  feel  aggrieved,
that they  are assigned to  hate the perpetrator.  "Because  there is
no battered person in this case, I am going to do it.  I am going to
make you pay for what you did to the law.  The law is me.  See you
in court."  Some sense  of valuing  forgiveness  and  explaining  for-
giveness  would counteract that a little bit.
In addition, it would be at the government  level - at the broad
level - a good way of showing humanity.  It would be a good way
of government teaching about, and then perhaps building, the com-
munity bonds that we all  agree are implicit  in this topic.
It is obviously a question of leadership.  Federal law enforcement
has  an  incredibly  top-down  command  structure,  and  so  part  of
what we  need is  a better, different,  fuller audience.  This  is really
partly a pitch to future Attorneys General, to future FBI directors,
51.  Susan Bandes  implicitly discusses  this in her Essay.  See Susan Bandes,  When
Victims Seek  Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 27 FORD-
HAM  URB.  L.J.  1599  (2000).
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and  to  lots  of  U.S.  Attorneys  who  need  to  be  part  of  the
conversation.
MS. LOVE:52  I will pitch it one higher and talk about presiden-
tial pardons.  Pardon may seem a curious and even vestigial part of
the justice  system these days, but it  is very important to consider
the gestures  of executive  clemency that are the real  and symbolic
signs of a forgiving or merciful government.  In the state system, of
course,  gubernatorial  pardon  powers  parallel  the President's  par-
don power.
My interest in the subject of forgiveness derives from my experi-
ence  as  Pardon Attorney in the Department  of Justice.  I was re-
sponsible  for  reviewing  and  making  recommendations  on  the
literally  hundreds  of petitions  that came  into  the  Department  of
Justice every year.  After we had finished looking at them, we sent
them to  the White  House for action  by the President.
These  applications  came  from  people  who  were  in prison  and
wanted  their  sentences  commuted.  They  also  came  from people
who had been convicted  many years earlier and were seeking res-
toration of civil  rights or the removal of the  stigma of conviction.
Sometimes  petitioners  simply  wanted  to  be  forgiven  for  having
broken  the law,  and  they used that  word, although now  I under-
stand, having prepared for this conference a little bit, that mercy is
really what they were looking for.  They were asking the President,
basically, to dispense a better, or at least a more complete, form of
justice than  they had heretofore  received.
Very few of them  got what they were  looking for.  The  process
was mysterious,  it was slow, it was unpredictable  and it resulted in
very  few  grants.  This  is  not  always  the  way  it  was;  until  about
twenty years ago, twenty-five to forty percent of those who applied
for presidential  pardon  or commutation of sentence  got what they
wanted.53  That  is  literally  hundreds  of grants  every  year.  These
days  there are  only  a handful.  I  would  like  to  comment  on  this
phenomenon, the atrophy of this most visible sign of official mercy,
and what it might reflect and what it might signal.  It reflects  some-
thing very hard about the heart of the government  that somehow
parallels a hardening of the law.  It also sends a negative  signal to
52.  For  further comments,  see  Margaret  Colgate  Love,  Of Pardons,  Politics and
Collar Buttons: Reflections on the President's  Duty to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB.
L.J.  1483  (2000).
53.  See  OFFICE OF  THE PARDON  ATTORNEY,  PRESIDENTIAL  CLEMENCY  ACTIONS
BY  FISCAL  YEAR,  1900 TO  1945  (1999);  OFFICE  OF THE  PARDON  ATTORNEY,  PRESI-
DENTIAL  CLEMENCY  ACTIONS  BY  ADMINISTRATION,  1945  TO  PRESENT  (1999,  Supp.
Feb. 2000).
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those who  are responsible  for administering the  law  on a day-to-
day basis - line prosecutors - as well  as to the public.
The pardon power began to decline about twenty years ago for a
number of reasons, not the least of which was that within the De-
partment of Justice prosecutors became responsible for making the
recommendations to the White House.  The war on crime was  go-
ing  into  high  gear.  One  of those  prosecutors  was  your  current
Mayor; when  he  was  Associate  Attorney  General,  Rudolph  Giu-
liani  was  responsible  for  making  the  decisions  as  to  what  cases
would  go  forward  to  Ronald  Reagan.  Not  very  many  went
forward.
By the time  I came to be involved in the pardon  process, in the
late  1980s,  official parsimony  had been more  or less institutional-
ized.  The fact that there were  very few grants  by President Bush
reflects  the  fact that there were  very  few favorable  recommenda-
tions made  by the Department  of Justice.
This  did not change  with the  Clinton Administration,  although
there  were  a number  of encouraging  early  pronouncements  from
Attorney  General  Reno  that  resulted  in  an  absolute  flood  of in-
mate petitions into our office.  We did not really know what to do
with them.
The FALN  cases,54  in which  President  Clinton offered  to com-
mute the sentences of sixteen Puerto Rican terrorists last summer,
therefore  came as a pretty big surprise.  His  decision was  greeted,
of  course,  with  considerable  suspicious  and  cynicism.  The  New
York press took up the cry, virtually on a daily basis, that this had
been  done to help  Mrs.  Clinton's  Senate  campaign.55  The  Presi-
dent had  to  defend  his  action  in a very  unusual  way and  he dis-
avowed the fact that political considerations had played any part in
it at all.56
There is good news and bad news in the FALN cases.  The good
news is that he did it at all; the kind of political risk now associated
with any clemency  decision is such that it is very discouraging  and
is likely  to  dry up the process entirely.  The  good news is that he
54.  See  Charles  Babington,  Puerto Rican Nationalists Freed From Prison; Most
Are Heading Home; Controversy Over Clemency  Remains, WASH.  POST,  Sept.  11,
1999, at A2.  "FALN"  stands for Fuerzas  Armadas  de  Liberaci6n  Nacional  (Armed
Forces National Liberation).
55.  See, e.g.,  Dick Morris, PostOpinion: Hillary's Self-Inflicted Wounds - Keeping
Secrets Keeps the Home-Loan and FALN Scandals Alive, N.Y. POST, Sept. 21,  1999, at
43.
56.  See Charles Babington,  Carter,  Tutu  Were Involved On Clemency; Clinton De-
tails His Reasons for Offer, WASH.  POST, Sept. 10,  1999, at Al.
2000] 1383FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. XXVII
explained  his act  in retributivist terms  that, if they are  listened to
by  those who  are administering  the process,  may have  real  effect
on some of the decisions  that are made  on  a day-to-day  basis  by
line prosecutors.  Clinton cited Bishop Tutu and Coretta Scott King
as having persuaded him to be merciful, because the sixteen FALN
members  "had spent over a decade  in prison and that they would
not see their children grow up."57  This was  a humanitarian reason
for commuting their sentences.
The  bad news, of course, is that very  few people  believed  him.
I hope there will be some effort to follow up on these cases be-
cause I think that there  is not only a lot of work to be done at the
grassroots  level, but that there has to be some work done to pene-
trate the consciousness of the officials responsible for sending these
vindictive and unforgiving signals about the criminal justice system.
We have received  these signals for so many years now that we are
almost  inured  to  any  thought  that  the  government  could  be
merciful  in a principled and considered fashion.  That is a very  sad
situation.
MR. AMMAR:  (Comments presented in detail in his Essay writ-
ten in connection with this Symposium.) 58
PROFESSOR  WEINSTEIN:  At  what  point  in  the  process
should forgiveness play a role, and does it matter who is doing the
forgiving?  If  it  comes  from  the  victim  of  the  crime,  should  we
think about that at the time a charging decision is made, should we
think  about  that  only  in  relationship  to  sentence,  or  should  we
think about it in relationship to commutation  later in the process?
Does it make a difference whether it is the victim, or whether it is a
surrogate  victim like a prosecutor?  Does their receiving some for-
giveness,  or does their feeling  some forgiveness,  suggest  it should
be at  a different  point in the process?
I  also  wonder  if anybody  had  any  reaction  to  Doug Ammar's
suggestion that these ideas of forgiveness work better in some com-
munities than  in other communities.
5 9
MR.  LERMAN:  I  would like  to respond  to  the  last  point.  In
Milwaukee,  which  is  not  a  homogeneous  community,  restorative
justice practices work  in the African-American  community.  There
57.  Letter from the President to The Honorable Henry Waxman, Ranking  Minor-
ity  Member,  Committee  on  Government  Reform,  Sept.  21,  1999,  at  2  [hereinafter
FALN  letter].
58.  See Douglas B. Ammar, Forgiveness and the Law: A Redemptive Opportunity,
27  FORDHAM  URn.  L.J.  1583  (2000).
59.  See id. at Part III.
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is very intense  support from our  NAACP  chapter  and  something
called  the  Social Development  Commission,  which  runs  commu-
nity panels for juvenile  offenses  in four  police districts.  They  are
not  major  crimes,  they  are  ticket  cases,  but  nonetheless  it  is  the
practice where  you are  bringing the community together.
Restorative justice uses the crime as a fuel of sorts with which to
engage  in community building.  It is not just a matter of forgive-
ness.  This goes to the communitarian discussion that we heard ear-
lier.  It can  take  hold.  The  notion that  it cannot  take  hold  in a
minority community  is wrong.
Doug  is right to point out that there  are  cultural  issues  in play
that might affect how it takes place and how it grows.  I would sug-
gest  turning  to  the  faith  community  and  asking  them  to  get  in-
volved  because  they  inevitably  preach  these  concepts  at  their
services.
MR. GAY:  In  Des Moines,  the capital  of Iowa,  which  is rela-
tively small but not a homogeneous community either, with a large
immigrant  population  in  recent  years  as  well  as  a  large  African-
American  community,  restorative justice  works  well within  those
communities.
In terms of "where  in the process,"  at least  in our system, any-
where:  post-plea, between plea and sentencing,  and post-sentenc-
ing.  We  have  brought  prisoners  back  from  prison, for  example,
because  victims  of  sexual  assault  have  said,  after  three  or  four
years  following  sentencing,  "I  have  gone  through  counseling,  I
have  gone through therapy.  It hasn't worked.  I need to meet this
person.  I need to be able to confront this person.  I need to be able
to  tell him what this did to me."  When that initial dialogue  takes
place, oftentimes  forgiveness  is a result.
There  is  no  crime  where  this  is  not  hypothetically  possible.  I
think when it does not occur you either have  an offender or a vic-
tim who is not ready.  But hypothetically any crime  is possible and
anywhere  in the process is possible.
We have  had great  results pre-plea.  In our system now, all per-
sons who  plead guilty to  a felony have  to have  a pre-sentence  in-
vestigation done by the Department of Corrections.  It takes about
six to eight weeks.  The court, upon accepting  a guilty plea, orders
that  investigation  and  orders  a  victim/offender  meeting,  so  that,
hopefully,  the  victim  and  the  offender  meet  following  the  plea.
The  meeting  takes  place  before  sentencing  so  that  if they  reach
agreement we  present the agreement  to the court at sentencing.
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On the non-felony level, because we are pushing people through
so  quickly,  most  of  the  time  the  victim/offender  meeting  takes
place post-sentencing and agreements then become addenda to the
court's sentence.
MR. LERMAN:  I just want to quickly  say that Des Moines  is
one of the shining lights in the restorative justice practices, the best
place  for  restorative  justice  in  the  country.  Milwaukee  is  years
behind.
PROFESSOR BARRET'T:  Commit your crimes in Des Moines.
PROFESSOR  WEINSTEIN:  Actually, John,  I  have  a  thought
that takes off from  your joke.  We  have  talked  about forgiveness,
but it is not immediately obvious to me that that means more leni-
ent  sentences.  What  is  the  relationship  between  forgiveness  and
mercy, if we  are to  understand mercy  as mitigation?
PROFESSOR  BARRETT:  Particularly  in  the  kind  of  federal
victim  list offense  category  that I  am talking  about, the  decision-
making process is really a decision about how serious the infraction
is.  The decision to forgive, to mitigate,  is  all the same  thing;  it is
what you think about this person who  has violated the law.
The  meeting  process,  the face-to-face  engagement,  the  order  I
am imagining from some bold U.S. Attorney, that "we won't indict
cases  where  we  have  not first  truly tried to  meet and engage  the
person  and offer Queen for a Day immunity and get some kind  of
conversation  and see what the fuller picture might be,"  is a way of
getting to the homogeneous  world.  It is not a question  of locality.
The  situation  is  incredibly  heterogeneous  at  the  beginning.  The
meetings  I  am  familiar  with start  with  somebody  on  the govern-
ment side of the table and a law breaker, in their view, on the other
side of the table.  Although they may be of similar race, education,
class, whatever,  that  is  all incidental  to that fundamental  defining
difference  between the two:  "my world"  and "your world."  If you
are  not  even  there,  and  I  have  just  developed  facts  about  your
world,  I see you  as the "other."
I  am  trying  to  advocate  something  that  brings  a  person  into
something like  a community with a prosecutor, where the time for
forgiveness  is  on  a  rolling  basis  as  the  decision  making  occurs.
There  is not one  magic moment.  Obviously,  it can  be too late  at
every  stage.  I think the more you emphasize  it, and the earlier  it
happens,  the  more  balanced,  and  more  frequent,  the  mitigation/
mercy/forgiveness  will be.
MR.  GAY:  You  are  exactly  right, whether  they are  victim  or
victimless crimes.  When you have that kind of dialogue, the prose-
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cutors tend to look at it as "it's us versus them"  until you have this
dialogue, the beginning of a relationship.  When you do that, it be-
comes more of a problem-solving  model than a prosecution model.
MS.  LOVE:  It  is  also  important  to  restore  forgiveness  and
mercy  to  some  respectable  status  as  responses  to  crime.  I  am
speaking mostly from my experience  in the federal  system.
It is also important to bring it out into the open.  As it is now, it
pretty much operates under the table, and that is a reflection of the
harsh  and  inflexible  sentencing  law  that  discourages  exceptions.
But  in  order  to  do justice  - and  not  all  prosecutors  are  hard-
hearted - it is very important to make  exceptions.  So, in a sense,
the  pardon  power  that  the  Framers  of  the  Constitution  contem-
plated would be placed in the President6° has been effectively dele-
gated  on a day-to-day  basis to  line prosecutors.
But it does not operate in the open; it cannot operate in the open
until  it is restored  to some  sort of respectability.  That  is the key
thing.
QUESTIONS  AND  ANSWERS
AUDIENCE:  When  does it not work?  When does  restorative
justice  not work,  when does  the mercy  not work,  when  does the
pardon  application  not work, when  does the  community building
not work, and why?
MR. GAY:  At least  in our  system, you have  less favorable  re-
sults when you have offenders  that are not prepared.  But you do
not have to have  a perfectly prepared offender  in order to have  a
successful  meeting  resolution  because  the  process  itself  is  trans-
formative.  You  are  not  going to  have  this  angel  going  into  the
meeting.  At least in the meetings we have, you may have  an hour,
hour-and-a-half, where you have  a recalcitrant  offender  or a very
strident victim.
One  of  the  keys,  by  the  way,  is  very  well-trained  mediators/
facilitators who will allow the process to develop fully.  If you have
very  goal-oriented  mediators  who  want  a  bottom  line  and  who
push the  thing through too quickly, you do not get  a good result.
But if you allow the thing to take place with  no time limits, then
rarely do you not have  a favorable  dialogue.
There  are  certainly  offenders  who  are pathological.  There  are
people who have  no conscience  who do not belong in those meet-
ings.  We try to screen them out through the preparation process if
60.  See U.S. CONST.  art.  II, § 2, cl.1.
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we  see  that they  have  no conscience.  But  there  are  some  times,
even with the no-conscience  offender, where there is value to a vic-
tim still being  able to tell the perpetrator what  happened to them.
There  is a  value  in that, a very strong value.  So  it is rare, I  think,
that it does not work at some level that  is good for the victim  and
also for the offender.
MR. AMMAR:  I have seen it not work often across racial lines,
across class lines,  and that is sort of what fuels  my observation.
AUDIENCE:  I teach undergraduates  at Pace University, mostly
business law, some law topics.  My question is, beyond the dialogue
between the parties and the asking for forgiveness  and  giving the
victim's views, what else can the perpetrator do to enhance forgive-
ness or foster forgiveness?  I understand  the thing about the dese-
cration of the synagogue,  but do other things occur  to you?
MR. LERMAN:  Yes.  We have used victim/offender conferenc-
ing in employee  theft cases.  We have had several employees, who
have of course been fired,  go back to the store to talk to new em-
ployees  about the  embarrassment  and  the  pain of being  arrested
and  caught.  That provides  a real service  to the stores.
MR. GAY:  We have  had major  embezzlement  cases, hundreds
of thousands of dollars lost, and they will agree to restitution.  Oft-
entimes  they will confess civil judgment  so a civil suit is not neces-
sary.  And sometimes, when there is an insurance  company that is
providing coverage,  there will be a confession of judgment and  as-
signment of that judgment to the insurance company.  So to satisfy
perhaps your business  interest, that takes place.
MR. AMMAR:  Restitution, too.  We  do  a lot of restitution  in
our  office,  before it even  gets in front of a judge  or a D.A.
AUDIENCE:  I am from  the Center for Court Innovation  here
in New York City.  I would offer a friendly critique that the courts
are missing from  the panel.61  That is a perspective  that I want to
try  to fill in quickly  and then follow  with a question.
There is a huge movement  going on in the courts and there is a
lot  of  excitement  going  on  around  problem-solving  courts.  You
have mentioned some  of that, in particular drug treatment courts,
where  the court is seen less  as an engine of punishment  and more
as a way to get people who are committing drug offenses treatment
as an alternative  to  a harsh  sentencing  regime.
61.  For the courts'  response to this Symposium, see Derek Denckla, Forgiveness  as
a Problem-Solving Tool in the Courts: A Brief  Response to the Panel  on Forgiveness  in
Criminal Law, 27 FORDHAM  URB.  L.J.  1613  (2000).
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There  is also a community court model.62  There is one  here  in
midtown, just a couple of blocks away, which our center started.  It
has  a victim panel and  also  a community  service  component, and
takes these victimless crimes  and puts  a face on them.  The people
whose  store was  spray  painted, let's say,  in a  graffiti  case,  would
meet with the wrongdoer, describe how it makes them feel, what it
did to their business, and how much money they had to spend on it.
In some cases  the wrongdoer would undo that wrong.
There is a whole movement afoot, and in fact the center is taking
part in a national conversation with the Justice Department, which
has funded a lot of these courts, in a project called the Justice Pro-
ject.63  So the government  has done some things.  There  has been
some  talk on  the panel  about how  government  can  do  more  and
government has not done much on this issue, but there is the Drug
Court Program Office of the Department of Justice'  and the State
Justice  Institute.65  They  have  funded  very  innovative  programs
that have restorative justice elements.
Another thing that touches upon all these issues is the notion of
therapeutic jurisprudence,66 which connects very nicely up with all
this.
My question to the panel is the following:  is the whole notion of
forgiveness in the law and these other subsets that I have identified
- holistic lawyering, therapeutic jurisprudence  - aren't  all these
just new consequentialism, similar to law and economics, new ways
to make law more effective?  And, if so, does that change the tone
from  purely  forgiveness?  Are  we  talking  about  something  quite
different  altogether,  so that there  would not be the conflation be-
tween the emotional notion of forgiveness  talked about in the first
panel  and the actual more implementational notion of forgiveness
that we are talking  about in the  criminal justice context?  Are we
talking about something else when we talk about forgiveness in the
62.  See Hon. Judith S.  Kaye, Rethinking Traditional  Approaches,  62 ALB.  L. REV.
1491,  1494 (1999).
63.  See Janet Reno, Remarks to the American Association of University  Women
(June  19,  1999),  available  at  <http://www.usdoj/gov/ag/speeches/1999/orgwomen-
speech.htm>  ("We  have  funded  and encouraged  new community  strategies - com-
munity  policing, innovative  crime prevention programs,  community courts.").
64.  See  Office  of Justice Programs (visited  Apr.  7,  2000)  <http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/dcpo>.
65.  See  State  Justice  Institute  (visited  Apr.  7,  2000)  <http>://www.statejustice.
org>.
66.  See Robert F. Schopp, Integrating  Restorative Justice and Therapeutic  Jurispru-
dence, 67  REV.  JUR. U.P.R. 665 (1998).
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criminal justice  context  because  we  are  looking at  it being  more
effective, it being more consequentialist?
MR. AMMAR:  One quick point.  The consequences  seem to be
pretty good right now, with  1.8 million people in prison.67  We are
really good  at being  consequential  in  the criminal justice  system.
There are, however, some fundamental  challenges that are happen-
ing a lot of places,  like the community courts,  et cetera.
One problem with the community court here in Midtown, by the
way, is that it is post-sentence,  it is post-conviction,  so there is not
as much incentive, I believe, for the offender to have some owner-
ship in wanting to do that.  But that is just a  small point.  Some of
the things we are talking about are before the case is resolved, and
those are pretty innovative  and revolutionary.
MR. GAY:  Going back to your comments earlier  about the his-
torical  underpinnings  of restorative  justice, this  is  not just a new
fad.  It  is  a  return  to  a  previous  way  of  doing  business,  quite
frankly.  If you  look  at  a lot  of the indigenous  cultures  and how
they determine justice - Navajos,  aboriginal Australians and New
Zealanders, native  Canadians  - this is  part of the way that their
justice  systems have operated  for hundreds  of years, thousands  of
years perhaps.68  So it  is not new, it is only new to us.
MR.  AMMAR:  That's  right.  In  cultures  that  are  much  more
homogeneous,  like Japan and China, the criminal justice system is
much  more  about bringing  the  offender  and the victim  together.
That is again another challenge to why we do not do it in this coun-
try, is our xenophobia  or incredible  narcissism.
AUDIENCE:  I have been a criminal appellate defense attorney
for the indigent for twenty years in New York, where prosecutorial
decisions  are  made  by  twenty-five-year-old  prosecutors  who  do
want notches on their gun belts, unfortunately.
I would like to speak to Margaret Love.  Most criminal offenses
are  state  offenses,  with  governors  wielding  the  power.  At  that
level, there are virtually no pardons.  For instance,  during Gover-
67.  See Jason Zeidenberg  & Vincent Schiraldi,  The Punishing  Decade: Prison  and
Jail Estimates at the Millennium (Justice  Policy  Institute  1999),  available at <http://
www.cjcj.org/punishingdecade/punishing.htm>.
68.  See,  e.g.,  Robert  Yazzie,  "Hozho Nahasdlii" - We Are Now In  Good Rela-
tions: Navajo Restorative Justice, 9  ST.  THOMAS  L. REV.  117  (1996);  Donna Coker
Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women:  Lessons From Navajo Peacemaking, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1, n.6  (1999)  (citing Marianne  0.  Nielsen, A  Comparison of Develop-
mental Ideologies:  Navajo Nation Peacemaker Courts and Canadian Native Justice
Committees, in  RESTORATIVE  JUSTICE:  INTERNATIONAL  PERSPECTIVES  207  (Burt
Galaxy & Joe Hudson eds., 1996); Mark S. Umbreit, Humanistic  Mediation: A  Trans-
formative Journey of Peacemaking, 14 MEDIATION  Q. 201  (1997)).
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nor Bush's five and a half year term, Texas executed  121.69  Gover-
nor  Bush  has  never  even  used  his  power  to  grant  a  thirty-day
stay.7°  What can  be done with  state governors?
MS.  LOVE:  You  elect  them, that  is  what  you  do  with  them.
That  is kind  of a tough answer, but I  do not know where  else the
process  of change  starts.  It has  to come  from  the  top.  It has to
come from  some change of heart  in those we elect.  On the other
hand, we  are  electing  people  to  office  who  are  apparently  doing
things that they think we  want them to do.
The  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  is one of the  hardest-hearted
bodies.  When asked to equalize  the sentences  for crack  and pow-
der  cocaine,  because  the  sentences  for  crack  were  so  draconian
compared  to powder,7'  its response  was  to increase  the  sentences
for powder to the level  of crack.72  Do we  want this?  They think
we do.
So I am really thrilled to hear so much wonderful process talk, it
is  so exciting.  But at the  same  time  the prison population  is still
increasing.  It is not 1.8 million, it is an estimated 2 million in Feb-
ruary, 2 million  people in this country in prison. 73  And there  are
now 137,000 in the federal system, compared to 24,000 federal pris-
oners in 1980,  a figure  that had remained  about the same for the
entire preceding half century.74  These  are really  telling numbers.
Something  is happening  out there.  Hopefully the tide will turn,
but right now I  cannot put these two trends together.
69.  See  Michael  Graczyk,  Texas  Executes Convicted Killer, 2000  WL  14324030
(Feb. 25,  2000).
70.  See Margo Athens, A  Test for Bush's Compassion?, BALT.  SUN,  Jan. 21,  2000,
at A2.
71.  The differential  between crack and powder  sentences has been  the subject of
much  controversy.  See  U.  S.  SENTENCING  COMMISSION  SPECIAL  REPORT  TO  THE
CONGRESS:  COCAINE  AND  FEDERAL  SENTENCING  POLICY.  See also Judy  Mann, The
Harm in Mandatory  Sentences, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2000,  at C15.  The debate in the
Senate  over  the  proposal  to  equalize  crack  and  powder  sentences  is  available  at
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?r106:1:./temp/-rlO6RoVI8I:e12083>.
72.  See id.
73.  See Zeidenburg  & Schiraldi,  supra note 67.
74.  As  of March  6, 2000,  the inmate population of the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(including contract facilities) stood at 138,842.  See OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS  AND
ARCHIVES,  FEDERAL  BUREAU  OF PRISONS  ("FBOP"),  COMPILATION  OF  YEAR-END
POPULATION  FIGURES,  (Mar.  6,  2000).  For annual  population  figures between  1930
and the present, see FBOP, MONDAY  MORNING  HIGHLIGHTS  NEWSLETrER  (1994  to
present);  FBOP,  STATISTICAL  REPORTS  (1960  to  1993);  ANNUAL  REPORT  OF  THE
FEDERAL BUREAU  OF PRISONS  (1930  to 1960).
2000] 1391FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
MR.  GAY:  You  talk  about  twenty-five-year-old  prosecutors,
and they are the problem a lot of times.  What preceded that was
going to law school.  That is the problem we have.  We put them on
the high-volume dockets and they screw things up because they are
so litigation-minded, which  is fine.  We want young prosecutors  to
have good litigation  skills.
But they can be educated.  As an example, in July I spoke with a
couple  of  prosecutors  from  a  particular  docket  that  dealt  with
lower-level  misdemeanors  - assaults,  property  damage  - and
before  they could touch a  file they had to  go through  a two-week
restorative  justice training  course.  I  was just amazed.  Now they
pick up a file and say, "What should justice look like in this case?"
The challenge is not governors, it is law schools.  You have got to
bring  the curriculum  in to  law schools  and at least  offer  it on  an
elective  basis for people who think  they want to be defense  attor-
neys  or prosecutors.
MR. LERMAN:  And  you engage  in the  discussion  elsewhere,
outside of the legal world.  In other words, going  back to the faith
communities is one obvious place to have this discussion. Certainly,
many prosecutors, law enforcement  personnel, and system person-
nel attend houses of worship.  And if this discussion is occurring on
Saturdays  and Sundays then there should be some cognitive  disso-
nance of some sort that goes on, or should be going on, for prose-
cutors who  are  simply interested  in the notches  on the belt.
PROFESSOR  WEINSTEIN:  Perhaps  it  should be  no  surprise
to us - and this bit of the discussion  brings it out clearly - that
we see  legislators  who have  no  contact  with individual  cases  and
are  under  strong  political  pressure  who  continue  to  ratchet  up
sentences.  We  have  assembled  a panel  of four prosecutors,  and
one  defense  attorney,  who  sound  like  voices  for  moderation.  I
think that is because  those who have  contact with individuals  and
individual cases think about things like forgiveness, which operates
on an individual  level.
Margaret's  comment was  that we elect  the governor.  Well,  it is
true, but unfortunately mass politics  is such  that, at least now, our
criminal sentences seem to be a one-way ratchet.  We  need to find
a way to make forgiveness  a political issue but it is particularly  ill-
suited  to that  because  it operates  on  the individual  level.  This  is
really quite  a problem.
It suggests  to me why what John says  about bringing some visi-
bility and standards to  this process to legitimize  it makes  so much
sense.  Margaret reminds us that forgiveness  has fallen  into disre-
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pute and, at least from the legislative  point of view, the only good
prosecution  is  a harsh prosecution  seeking  a maximum sentence.
But people who do the work tell us that that is not what should be
going  on.FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
KEYNOTE  ADDRESS:  FORGIVENESS  AND  THE LAW
INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR MINOW:  In one of my favorite cartoons, the first
panel shows a letter that says, "Dear Minister:  I am sick and tired
of your holier-than-thou  attitude.  Signed, Fed Up. ' 75  The  second
frame shows  a minister reading the letter, thinking, and then writ-
ing one back that says, "Dear Fed Up:  I forgive you."  In the third
frame, the minister says to himself, "Shame  on you.
'"76
As  this cartoon  suggests,  forgiveness  is,  in a fundamental  way,
about  power.  I  am  honored  to  be  at  this  conference  that  has
launched  an extraordinarily  rich and fascinating set of discussions.
I was so intrigued by the fact of the conference, by its existence, by
its name, by its  timing.  It would not have happened  twenty years
ago, I do not think, although we have long had forgiveness  in bank-
ruptcy,  clemency  in criminal  law, Rule  60(b)  in civil  procedure,77
amnesty  in  settings  ranging  from  public  library  overdue  fines  to
international  human  rights  violations.  My  quick  computer  Lexis
search for forgiveness  "within  five of law"  turned up over 300 ref-
erences,  the bulk  of the first  twenty  of them  concerned  loan for-
giveness for law students,  so I stopped looking.
Each  of these  and  other  modes of forgiveness  in law  have  be-
come more salient now, not only because of powerful and valuable
scholarly works, such as Jeffrie Murphy's, 78 and not even solely due
to notable  institutional  experiments,  such  as South  Africa's Truth
and Reconciliation  Commission.  I think the depth and breadth of
interest in forgiveness  among law-types reflects  something  more.
As we  have  heard  somewhat  this morning,  for the  last twenty-
five years or more, scholars and practitioners  have generated strik-
ingly convergent  alternatives  to conventional adversarial  litigation
in a whole  host  of areas  that otherwise  have  nothing  in common.
These alternatives respond to governmentally  sponsored atrocities,
to local  misdemeanors,  and to family conflicts.  The  contemporary
infusion of apologies, pardons, amnesties  and calls  for healing and
forgiveness  in the wake of inter-group violence, government-spon-
sored  violence,  misbehavior  by  government  actors  around  the
world, and private misbehaviors have striking parallels with restor-
75.  Doug  Marlette, Kudzu, CHI.  TRIB.,  Nov  28,  1988, at  8.
76.  Id.
77.  See  FED.  R.  Civ. P.  60(b)  (permitting relief  from judgment  or order due to
"mistakes;  inadvertance; excusable  neglect;  newly discovered  evidence;  fraud; etc.").
78.  See, e.g.,  JEFFRIE  G. MURPHY  & JEAN  HAMPTON,  FORGIVENESS  AND  MERCY
(1988).
1394FORGIVENESS IN THE LAW
ative justice community conferences, divorce and child custody me-
diation hearings,  and juvenile justice community hearings.
In  each  instance,  the  search  for  alternatives  reflects  a critique.
Critics  find  conventional  litigious justice  isolating,  destructive  of
human  ties,  inflexible,  impersonal.  It  offers  little  or  only  con-
strained  roles  for  the  parties;  it permits  compromise  only in  its
shadows;  and it requires people  to put aside their whole identities
- their needs, their spirituality, their beliefs  - in order to trans-
late the  conflict into specifically  legal terms.
Alternatives  draw upon or help  to  forge interpersonal  ties  and
social norms, help to reconnect  people  who  have been in conflict,
involve people in designing their own unique solutions so that they
feel invested  in them, and abandon  a "winner take all/loser  suffer
all"  approach  to  human  conflict.  Alternative  methods  can  invite
people  to  bring their  whole  selves,  including  their  emotions  and
religious  commitments,  their  tears  and  their  hopes,  as  they  deal
with wrongdoing, conflict,  and dereliction  of duties.
Crudely put, to critics law is arcane, remote  and divisive, even if
it is also principled, formal and professional.  Jessamyn West writes
of law, "It seems to be all Greek and turkey tracks. '79  In contrast,
alternatives  - such  as mediation,  restorative justice  circles,  truth
and reconciliation  commissions  - depart  from  precedent, depart
from  professional  scripts,  to  seem humane,  integrative,  and  heal-
ing.  No  small virtue  of the  alternatives  is  that they can  promote
forgiveness.  Forgiveness,  writes author  Christina Baldwin,  "is  the
act of admitting that we are like other people."80
Admitting  that  we  are  like  other  people,  that  those  who  ao
wrong are like  us, that we could be like them  - these aspirations
strike the keys  of compassion  and empathy, connection  and inter-
dependence.  The  Lord's Prayer, variously phrased as "forgiveness
as we forgive our trespassers"  or "forgive  our debtors,' "81  suggests
that the Almighty, too, is part of this web of reciprocal forgiveness,
although  I  leave  to  theologians  whether  the  Supreme  Being  also
needs or can receive  forgiveness.
79.  JESSAMYN  WEST,  THE FRIENDLY  PERSUASION  (1945).
80.  CHRISTINA BALDWIN,  LIFE'S  COMPANION,  JOURNAL WRITING  AS  A SPIRITUAL
QUESTION  (1990).
81.  Matthew 6:9-13  (King James).  See also Phillip Nonet, Sanction, 25  CUMB.  L.
REV. 489,  527  (discussing Hegel's  notion of forgiveness  as human comprehending  of
the necessity that God does God's work:  "The judge himself must fall  to the ground
and  embrace  the  sinner  in  confessing  to  the  sin  of  judging."  (internal  citation
omitted)).
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The aspirations  of forgiveness  depart from  those conventionally
guiding Western, democratic, secular, legal systems which are much
more  at home with the ideals of equal  treatment, impartiality, just
desserts, and  respect for individual autonomy.  This  sets the stage
for my central  question:  Are  these  distinctive  sets  of aspirations
compatible?  Can  compassion  join  impartiality,  interdependence
join just desserts,  connection  join  individual  autonomy?  Can  we
create a  legal world adept at judgment  and  also comfortable  with
forgiveness?
I have  been struggling with these issues as  I examine responses
to the situations in Kosovo and in Rwanda.  In Rwanda, the justice
system there is so overwhelmed by the numbers of people incarcer-
ated following  the genocide that they will never be able to prose-
cute  everybody  who  is  incarcerated.  So  what  should  happen?
Should the thousands who are incarcerated just be let out and sent
home?  The  people  I  have  been  consulting with there report that
one option they are considering  is trying to revive traditional forms
of communal justice,  which were  themselves devastated by the ge-
nocide.  Traditions  of informal,  communal  justice  may  provide  a
sense of accountability  without the economic  and political costs of
prosecutions;  perhaps  they  could  promote  reconciliation  as  well,
yet the obvious  difficulty is finding people steeped  in the traditions
who remain alive and  willing to guide  and conduct  the process.
My  own  thoughts  have  turned  back  to  this  country,  and  espe-
cially to hate  crimes  and domestic  violence.  Can  compassion join
impartiality?  Can forgiveness join law enforcement  and protection
of rights?  These  are hard questions.
So my eye wandered  and found the program for this conference.
Being a teacher of civil procedure, I focused on the vital words, the
conjunctions  and  prepositions.  I  noticed that we  are here for the
Symposium  entitled  "The  Role  of Forgiveness  in the  Law,"  but
the first  panel  this morning  addressed  "Forgiveness  and Justice,"
the second looked at "Forgiveness  in the Criminal Law," while this
afternoon  we  will hear about "Forgiveness  in the Civil  Law"  and
"Forgiveness  and International Amnesty."
Forgive  me,  please,  if I  make  too  much  of this  contrast.  But
there  is a difference  between "in"  and "and."  We can unearth the
dimensions  of  forgiveness  and  mercy  already  present  within  the
formal justice systems and rules, forgiveness that may temper rigid-
ities, or that may reflect pragmatic  assessments  about how to elicit
compliance,  or  that create  settlements  with individuals.  Yet,  for-
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giveness  also  affords  something  that can  only be juxtaposed with
the law, by acknowledging  a separation, joined only by an "and."
Forgiveness  in  this sense  signals  an  outside  vantage  point ena-
bled by psychological,  religious  and political perspectives  that cri-
tique  law's  limits.  Approaching  wrongs  with  forgiveness  in  this
sense means sustaining alternatives to lawsuits, to prosecutions  and
to  convictions,  and  thereby  confining the  instances  governed  en-
tirely  by  rules,  punishment,  and  predictability.  Forgiveness  is  a
kind of supplement  to  law's  core,  whether it  is introduced  inside
the system or promoted outside the corridors  of formal legal insti-
tutions.  Forgiveness  is  "in"  law,  but also  one  of the  "law  and's,"
like law and society, law and literature, law and economics, law and
justice.
The shifts between  "in"  and "and"  highlight potential questions
about what happens to law when forgiveness  is available and what
happens to  forgiveness  when law proceeds.
I will explore these  questions by comparing  the domains of law
and forgiveness.  When are they separate?  When do they overlap?
Can  forgiveness  substitute  for law,  or law  for forgiveness?  I will
explore  these  problems  by  addressing  what  I  will  call  the  moral
ambitions at work in forgiveness  and  in the ordinary  rule of law.
In  the  domains  of Law and Forgiveness,  Forgiveness  does not,
and should  not, necessarily  take the place of a legal process,  pun-
ishment, or justice.  Indeed, their domains could be viewed  as en-
tirely separate  and also  compatible.82
One  observer  put  it  this  way:  "Human  codes  of law  establish
indispensable  rules  of life together  and  standards  of relationship.
Any attempt to weaken the supremacy  of the law thus entails  the
erosion  of the  humane.  Forgiveness  is  about renouncing  unjusti-
fied power, not about weakening the pursuit of justice."83 Accord-
ingly, forgiveness marks  a change  in how the offended feels about
the person who committed  the injury, to  a change  in the action  to
be taken by the legal system.  For an individual, forgiveness, many
tell us, essentially means the relinquishment  of resentment that  is
otherwise warranted  based on an offense  or a wrong.
82.  Elizabeth  Kiss  pursues  a  related  inquiry  about  the  moral  ambition  of truth
commissions.  See Elizabeth  Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Con-
straints: Reflections on Restorative Justice, in TRUTH  V.  JUSTICE:  THE MORALITY  OF
TRUTH  COMMISSIONS  (Robert  Rothberg & Dennis Thompson  eds., 2000).
83.  GEIKO  MULLER-FAHRENHOLZ,  ART  OF  FORGIVENESS:  THEOLOGICAL  RE-
FLECTIONS  ON  HEALING  AND  RECONCILLIATION  at viii (1997).
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In  this  view, wrongdoers  should  be  forgiven  if they accept  re-
sponsibility  and consequences,  or wrongdoers may be forgiven  in-
dependently  of the operation of the formal justice  system.  Either
way, forgiveness  need not substitute  for punishment  or liability.
That we can advocate punishment  for a wrongdoer one has for-
given  or  will  forgive  shows  how  potentially  separate  are  the
domains of law and forgiveness.  Forgiveness operates interperson-
ally; the legal system operates impersonally.  Through forgiveness I
forgo my anger and hatred towards someone who has harmed me,
but I  do not and  cannot alter  the requirements  of just desserts.8
Those  requirements  reflect  the rule of law's  commitments  to pre-
dictability,  neutrality,  treating  like  cases  alike,  building  a factual
predicate  for decisions,  and restraining the personal views  and bi-
ases of decision makers so that we have a government of rules, not
of people.  Punishment, in this view, should follow wrongdoing  in
order to ensure  like treatment for factually similar conduct  as well
as neutral  and predictable  application of the law.
Supporting  punishment  can  be  compatible  with  forgiveness  on
an entirely  different  view  that points to rather  lofty moral  ambi-
tions.  Here, forgiveness  and legal punishment both partake of the
view that offenders  should be treated  as full members of a commu-
nity, and  that the  community  demands  responsibility by  all  of its
members for their actions.85  Even the traditional Christian call to
forgive  rather  than  to  avenge  accompanies  faith  that vengeance
will come through  the Divine.86
Yet, the moral ambitions  seem to diverge when law and forgive-
ness  come  to  be  alternatives  to  one  another and  people  seek  to
substitute one for the other.  This  happens in one  of two contexts.
In  the  first,  a  specific  victim  may  wish  to  forgive  an  individual
wrongdoer.  The  second,  typically involving  large  numbers  of of-
fenders  and  victims, substitutes  for legal  process.  I  will  compare
these by considering  competing moral  ambitions.
84.  See Jeffrie  G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in MURPHY  & HAMPTON,
supra note 78,  at 33.
85.  See Jules Coleman, Adding Institutional  Insult to Personal  Injury, 8 YALE J. ON
REG.  223,  224  (1990).
86.  See SUSAN  JACOBY,  WILD  JUSTICE:  THE EVOLUTION  OF  REVENGE 5  (1983).
Of course,  the central Christian concern is the reconciliation with God.  See VINCENT
TAYLOR,  FORGIVENESS  AND  RECONCILIATION:  A  STUDY  IN  NEW  TESTAMENT THE-
OLOGY  (1960).
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A.  Substituting Forgiveness  for Law  Due to
High Moral Ambition
When  an  identifiable  victim  wants  to  forgive  an  individual
wrongdoer to substitute for legal action, usually it is because either
the wrongdoer has changed or the one who wants to forgive wants
to change.  These are very  ambitious  goals.  To some,  the punish-
ment no longer seems justified  if the moral  ambition  is to change
the  person  who  did wrong,  even though  our  legal system  usually
emphasizes  acts,  not  persons,  and  retrospective  evaluations,  not
prospective predictions.
Other people hope that the act of forgiving itself may transform
the  wrongdoer  in  a  way that  impersonal  punishment  cannot.  By
re-inviting the offender into the moral community of humanity, by
demonstrating  care  and connection,  and by offering  a relationship
some aspire to change the offender  and change themselves.87
For  example,  the  restorative  conferences  following  criminal
charges  offer this kind of invitation to the wrongdoer who  admits
responsibility, but not to one who does not.  The process of forgive-
ness thus transforms  a wrongdoer only if the forgiven  and the for-
giver share  a script.  John  Reed  explains:  "The  forgiven  must act
likewise and be forgiving.  Moreover, to be forgiven  one must first
acknowledge  guilt."88
Allowing  the legal process  to proceed simultaneously  could in-
terfere with this script, worsen the offender's sense of isolation and
exacerbate  his rejection  of the norms  of decency.  If both partici-
pants play their parts, however,  the process can heal the  offender
and also restore a  sense of dignity and self-respect to the offended
person.89
But, of course, not everybody shares this script, as admirable  as
it  may be.  Indeed, some do  not embrace  this script even  as  they
promote forgiveness.  They do so without expecting a change in the
wrongdoer.  Instead,  they  view  a  change  in  the  one  who  was
wronged  as crucial.  Rabbi Harold Kushner argues that "the victim
should forgive  not because  the other deserves  it, but because  the
victim does not want to turn into a bitter, resentful person." 9  Vic-
87.  See Jean Hampton, Forgiveness,  Resentment and Hatred,  in MURPHY  & HAMP-
TON,  supra note 78,  at 35,  80-81.
88.  JOHN  REED,  DICKENS  AND  THACKERY:  PUNISHMENT  AND  FORGIVENESS  17
(1955).
89.  See Aaron  Lazare, The  Healing  Process  of Apology  11  (unpublished  lecture
on file  with author)  (describing benefits of apology).
90.  HAROLD  S.  KUSHNER,  How  GOOD  Do WE HAVE  TO  BE:  A  NEW  UNDER-
STANDING  OF GUILT  AND  FORGIVENESS  107  (1996).
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tims should forgive not because the other has earned it but to per-
mit  victims  to  reshape  themselves  as  people  undistorted  by  the
violation.
Forgiving  can afford not only psychological  release but also the
chance for moral betterment.  Trying not to be like  the wrongdoer
for some means breaking  cycles of vengeance and resisting the de-
sire to  see the wrongdoer suffer.  Forgiving  is the stance to  reach
for precisely  when the wrong is incomprehensible.  For Doris Les-
sing,  "If you understand  something, you  don't forgive  it, you  are
the  thing  itself.  Forgiveness  is  for  what you  don't  understand."'"
The  one  who  forgives,  therefore,  can  stretch herself  to  deal  with
what she cannot comprehend  or control.  By forgiving, she can ele-
vate herself,  avoid  bitterness, prevent  cycles  of revenge,  and free
herself from the kind  of preoccupation with a felt wrong that can
distort  her  own  life  and  sensibilities.  Forgiving  thus  involves  a
script  of  self-making,  with  the  opportunity  for  moral  self-
improvement.
These  aspirations  to  change  the  survivor  and  to  change  the
wrongdoer  stand  in sharp  contrast with the  more skeptical  moral
aspirations  of the law.
The  state's  law  proceeds  with  a  different  script,  one  that  de-
mands accountability  whether  or not the  wrongdoer  has  changed
or could change.  In a world of flexible criminal sentencing, contri-
tion and personal transformation  might be relevant at some point,
but, increasingly,  our  legislatures  mandate  flat  sentencing.  What
matters is the prior acts, not personal  change.
Accordingly,  the role law  scripts  for victims  is  confined  to  sup-
plying inculpating  evidence  and testimony  about their own suffer-
ing.  This  helps  stiffen  the fact  finder's  resolve  to punish.  Victim
witness statements are introduced in death penalty proceedings, for
example,  in order  to  provide  vivid  statements  of pain  and harm
caused by horrific acts, not to permit forgiveness and reconnection
between victim and offender.  Thus, when people choose to substi-
tute forgiveness  for law  they  seek  a personal  transformation  and
interpersonal  connection,  very  different  moral  ambition  than  the
what law seeks  or fosters.
91.  DORRIS  LESSING,  To ROOM  NINETEEN,  A MAN  AND  Two  WOMEN  (1963).
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B.  Substituting "Forgiveness"  for Law Due  to
Political  Necessity
When people  want to substitute forgiveness  for law out of polit-
ical  necessity,  they  express  different  moral  ambitions  Mass  vio-
lence strains the will to forgive - if there are survivors who could
forgive - but also strains the power to prosecute.  The sheer num-
bers of people murdered in Rwanda, for example - one out of five
members of the community were killed in the genocide.92  It is hard
to imagine  how  many people  committed  the  crime,  since  it  con-
sisted of hand-to-hand  killings with machetes.  Can a nation prose-
cute everybody  in the society?  It is a practical  as well  as a moral
problem.
In  addition,  political  circumstances  may  press  against  legal  ac-
tion.  The  governing  political  regime  may  not  have  changed;  the
judiciary  and  the prosecutors  may  be  the  same  as  the  ones who
committed the abuses in the apartheid regime, which is the current
situation in South Africa.  The  new regime may be relatively  pow-
erless, or it may have made  a deal to dispense with prosecution  in
order  to  gain power.  Violations  may  have  occurred  over  such  a
long period of time, with reprisals and revenge by victims, that dis-
entangling victims from offenders becomes  nearly impossible.  As-
sessing  individual  responsibility  under  a  rule  of  law  becomes
unattainable  where  you have  had systematic  violence  and wrong-
doing.  Only a political  solution will work.
Amnesty  is  usually  the  form  it  takes.  Amnesty  for  political
figures of criminal regimes  is much in the news now, as we watch
General  Pinochet  slip  away  even  from  the  legal  accountability
outside of Chile.  If Chile  had not granted him amnesty, we would
not need  the  extraordinary  measures  of Spanish prosecution  and
English extradition.  If Chile had not granted him amnesty, he and
his henchman would still control the country.  Amnesty reflects as-
piration to restore peace, order  and in some instances, democracy.
But official  amnesty is not the same as forgiveness.  Forgiveness
is and must remain  the exclusive  prerogative of the wronged indi-
vidual.  Forced or pressured  to forgive,  a  victim undergoes  a new
harm  and subordination.  Survivors can forgive  the wrongdoer  for
their own suffering but not the suffering of those who did not sur-
vive.  Government  officials may seek to act in the name of victims,
but they cannot forgive on their behalf; they can forego legal con-
92.  See  Stephen  Buckley,  Mass Slaughter was Avoidable, General Says,  WASH.
PosT, Feb. 26, 1998,  at A17  (reporting that at least 500,000 were killed in 100 days).
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sequences,  not  personal,  righteous  resentment.  When  amnesties
are granted because of fear of reprisals, political pressure, or inade-
quate  resources, these aspirations  fall short not only of the loftiest
goals of forgiveness  but also the legal objectives  of accountability,
visibility, and impartiality.  Public apologies  and amnesties  follow-
ing mass oppression elicit objections in the name of justice, under-
stood  as prosecutions,  punishment  or reparations.
Amnesties  can  be granted  as  part of a negotiated  transition to
democracy,  as happened in several Eastern European countries, or
as part of a process of helping multiple antagonistic parties learn to
coexist.  Such amnesties relinquish the moral ambitions  of law due
to  rgalpolitik and  a  sense  of political  impotence  rather than  any
competing  ambitions  of  reconciliation  and  personal  transfor-
mation.
Where  does  South  Africa's  Truth and  Reconciliation  Commis-
sion ("TRC")  fit?  It is a different, unique effort.  Its Chair, Arch-
bishop Desmond  Tutu, characterizes  it as an institutional enabling
of forgiveness.  It occasioned encounters between victims and per-
petrators  but  was  not a  command  performance  of  reconciliation.
The TRC did not require individuals to forgive those who tortured
them  or murdered their loved  ones or otherwise committed  gross
human rights violations.  Instead, by gathering testimony from indi-
vidual  survivors, the  TRC modeled  a form  of respect  to  help re-
store the dignity  of those who  were violated.
Its most controversial  feature  was its  provisions permitting  am-
nesty from criminal  and  civil  liability for human  rights  abuses for
perpetrators  on all sides of the conflict, including the leaders of the
current  ANC-led  government.  Yet,  by resisting  blanket  and  un-
conditional amnesty, the TRC resisted the complete abandonment
of moral  accountability that so often accompanies  political  amnes-
ties.  Instead, the TRC elicited individual applications and received
9,000 of them from people on all sides of the conflict.  In so doing it
did fulfill a political bargain.  It was the chief condition for peaceful
transition  to  democratic  rule.  But  the  amnesty hearings  also  ad-
hered to the rule-of-law  commitments to factual predicates,  treat-
ing likes alike and  predictable  decision making.
The  TRC's  amnesty  application  requires  full  disclosure  of the
facts of the individual's violations of human rights - not avoidance
or suppression of those facts. The application requires memory not
repression.  Thus,  it reflects  the  weighty moral  ambitions of over-
coming communal denial  and secrecy, restoring  dignity to the vic-
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tims,  and  acknowledging  the  wrongs  done  by  individuals  on  all
sides of the Apartheid-era  struggles.
One  mother  whose  son  was  murdered  by  the  governmental
agents explained her support for the amnesty process precisely be-
cause  of the  profound  moral  ambition  to  humanize  victims  and
perpetrators  alike.  Thus, she  explained:  "This  thing called recon-
ciliation,  if I  am  understanding  it  correctly,  if it  means  that  this
perpetrator,  this  man who  has killed  my  son,  if  it  means  he  be-
comes  human  again,  this man, so that  all of us get  our  humanity
back,  then  I agree, then  I support  it all."93
This ambition could  not, in the views  of those most directly in-
volved, have been pursued within preexisting legal institutions. The
courts  in South Africa themselves were so much  a part of the pro-
cess  of enforcing  apartheid.  The  police,  the judges,  the prosecu-
tors, and much of the bar still to this day hold the same roles  that
they  held  while  the  government  notoriously  violated  the  human
rights of a majority of the nation's citizens.  In addition, the imper-
sonality  of law  particularly  seemed  ill  suited  to the  tasks  of the
TRC.
The Amnesty  Committee,  from the start,  gave  a special  role to
victims  and  authorized  them  to  engage  in  cross-examination  of
anyone  who applied  for amnesty.  Reversing  roles, then, torturers
and murderers faced interrogation by their former victims and fam-
ily members.  That face-to-face confrontation  and  engagement en-
couraged  some  applicants  to  seek  forgiveness  and  enabled  some
survivors  to  forgive,  but  there  were  at  least  as  many  situations
where there was no exchange  of apology or forgiveness  at  all.
The  TRC  represents  a unique  effort to  forge the preconditions
for  the  rule of law,  not  an  instance  of forgiveness.  Itself  a legal
institution, the TRC was duly authorized by the Parliament. It was
governed  by political  appointees.  It  was  not  extralegal.  Creating
and supporting  it, the  first  democratic  Parliament  sought  to pre-
vent cycles  of revenge  by  giving public  acknowledgement  to past
wrongs  and by investigating  the causes of, and the participants  in,
the violations  of human  dignity  committed  both by  the apartheid
regime  and those who fought against it.  :
The  Commission's  hearings and public broadcasts  offered  occa-
sions for people to make apologies and forgive, but depended upon
neither.  The amnesty provision,  born of political compromise,  did
not embody the moral ambition of forgiveness, and did not seek to
93.  ANTJI  KROG,  COUNTRY  OF MY  SKULL  109 (1998)  (quoting TRC participants).
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change  the individual offender or the victim, but sought to change
the country.  Indeed,  the Amnesty  Committee  tried to adhere  to
the features of the rule of law, treating like alike, and treating peo-
ple  with impartiality.
In a country like  South Africa, where the trappings  of the legal
system were so profoundly associated with oppression, institutional
innovation  was  a  courageous  step  to help  the  nation  turn  a new
page.  Rather  than serve as  a substitute  for  law, it  was a kind  of
precondition  for its reestablishment.
C.  Can and Should  Law Pursue Higher Moral Ambitions?
Thus, forgiveness  can operate  when individuals leave law's oper-
ations intact.  Forgiveness can lead individuals to forgo or prevent
formal  legal  action.  Something  quite  short  of  forgiveness,  some
kinds  of political  and  practical  assessments,  may  lead societies  or
governments  to preempt legal  action and substitute what they call
forgiveness  but is better  known  as  amnesty.  Something  different
from  forgiveness  and  the  rule  of law, but  something  harmonious
with it occurred with the TRC, as it tried to create a predicate for
establishing  the rule of law.
But what  this conference  raises is  the question  not just of for-
giveness and the law, but forgiveness  in the law.  Should legal insti-
tutions,  most  notably  courts,  themselves  adopt  the  high  moral
ambitions that I have associated with forgiveness?  Should legal in-
stitutions seek to foster forgiveness by victims towards wrongdoers,
to seek to encourage contrition  by wrongdoers?  Should courts try
to frame roles for victims and bystanders that would allow them to
engage  wrongdoers  in a sense  of common  fellowship  and  mutual
recognition?
In this spirit, can legal actors mobilize community?  Many prose-
cutors'  offices use the language of community in efforts to mediate
or work  through violations of rights. The  community, not the law,
forgives them. What  then can the law contribute?
Perhaps the law can promote  a  sensibility of repair and restora-
tion. But can it do so co-existing  with what has to remain the cru-
cial  domain  of law,  that  of enforcement,  neutrality,  objectivity?
There  is  often  tension  inside  an  office  where  restorative  justice
people  vie  with  other people  who  seek  the notches  on  their trial
belt.  Can both attitudes be sustained in the same prosecutor's of-
fice?  Can  both  attitudes  be  sustained  in  the  same  court  room?
Can both attitudes be  sustained in the same  law school?
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I  think the  answer I want to  give  is,  "Yes,  or it's worth  a try."
Nevertheless,  I have  three cautions.
The first is that we better be honest and not call things what they
are not.  Do not call it restorative justice when it is alternative  dis-
pute resolution designed  as docket cleaning, with timed mediation
sessions - you get a half an hour or you get an hour - conducted
by people  who  are not  trained to mediate.  Boy,  you clear  those
dockets fast.  Just do not call it restorative justice.
Second, beware of state power used to try to produce forgiveness
or used to try to produce contrition.  When it is the state  and not
the  community  acting,  I  think  we  have  to be  very  much  on  our
guard,  not  only for  people  feigning  the  change,  but  also  for  the
abuses of government power.  Respecting the choice of an individ-
ual not to forgive has to be as important as respecting an individual
who comes to forgive.  Otherwise, respect for individuals does not
mean  anything.
Third, we should not underestimate the importance of maintain-
ing  a straight, formal, legal system, especially in a divided,  divisive
society. A legal system that does not abandon commitment to im-
partiality, neutrality,  and treating likes alike is itself a remarkable
accomplishment  and not something to be bypassed in the hopes  of
human transformation.
I will close with a few comments on this last one.  The drive  to-
ward the  rule of law, launched  in the West but spreading  around
the  globe,  itself embodied  stirring moral  ambitions.  By  elevating
respect  for  each  individual  over  the  community,  over  hierarchy,
over  inherited  status, the rule  of law  embodied  liberalism's  com-
mitment  to objectivity, to facts,  and to a system of governance  by
law  rather  than  by  people  - or, to  be  historically  accurate,  I
should say men.
To embrace  the rule of law is to embrace rules and rights  as re-
straints on relationships and power.  The movement  for the rule of
law may  have  tried to squeeze  forgiveness  and justice  in order  to
implement  equal,  objective,  and  impersonal  treatment  and  to
guard against the whims of the powerful  and the abuses of power
relationships.  In nations  that do not have  it, it is easier to see the
moral ambition  of the rule of law as the accomplishment that it is.
Consider the situation of the few Serbs remaining in Kosovo to-
day.  If they are alive, it is because they have a one-to-one  ratio of
British  and  French  police  and  security  officials  protecting  their
lives.  And if they are ill, there is no place to go because no hospital
in Kosovo  will treat a Serbian.
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From this kind of vantage  point, it would be admirable,  indeed,
to implement  the rule of law  to ensure  that likes be  treated  alike
and that personal biases be restrained in ensuring equal protection.
I grant  that the movement  to  the rule of law, even where  it is  far
better established, has never completely  succeeded.  It never lives
up to its reputation.  It  also remains  tricky to know what  is  a like
that should be treated alike. It leaves inadequate  discretion to tai-
lor  the  results  to  particular  persons.  It  produces  unfairness  and
rigidity.
Therefore,  within  formal legal  rules, judges and lawyers  always
have invented room for forgiving  individual wrongs and wrongdo-
ers.  The British King crafted  a system of equity, partly as a strug-
gle for gaining political power but also to supplement and override
the common law  courts of the local lords.  Initially, equity permit-
ted flexibility  and justice tailored to the circumstances,  until it too
became rule-bound.  Executive  power  and  pardons  reflect  to  this
day the conception that stemmed from royal forgiveness overriding
the necessary  rigidities of law.  And, to do justice, it is also impor-
tant to make exceptions.
Religious  authorities,  immigrant  communities,  and,  most nota-
bly,  native  traditions  that  existed  in  this  country,  Canada  and
around the world before liberalism came to colonize, have repeat-
edly shaped alternatives to formal legal adjudication.  They permit
face-to-face  resolution  of conflicts that rely on communal ties  and
often on  chances  for  forgiveness.  Over  the  past several  decades,
lawyers,  psychologists  and  others  have  crafted  similar  problem-
solving methods,  such as alternative  dispute resolution, mediation,
and reintegrative  conferences,  to bring  interpersonal relationships
and community and  hopes for personal  change back into the pro-
cess  of dealing with wrongs  and wrongdoers.
Methods  to  permit  apology  and  forgiveness  figure  inside  and
outside of formal legal institutions - and must - but we have  to
be  careful  whenever  we  increase  the  discretion  given  to  formal
legal actors.  I will illustrate with another favorite cartoon of mine.
There  is  a judge  with an  enormous  nose  and  an  enormous  mus-
tache, sitting up at the bench, looking down  at the defendant, who
- guess  what?  - has  the  same  enormous  nose  and  enormous
mustache, and the judge says, hammering his gavel, "Obviously not
guilty."94
94.  Charles Barsottie,  Untitled, NEW  YORKER,  Nov. 21,  1988, at  55.
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Who gets the discretion?  In a society  that is as marked  by divi-
sion and distress as ours, who will be helped by discretion and who
will not be?
Methods  to permit apologies and forgiveness  supplement the in-
sistence on precedent and treating likes alike, they temper the uni-
versal, they reintroduce  the person, and that is valuable;  they also
endanger the very predicates of the rule of law.  Those committed
to  advance  individual  equality,  predictability  of  coercive  power,
and curbing the vagaries of personal preference and feelings  seek,
as they should, to shore up the rule of law and formal legal institu-
tions.  It is a real  accomplishment to establish institutions commit-
ted to law  rather than the whims of the governors.
But, of course,  no  less  admirable  are the  generosity  and hope
associated with forgiveness, with community reintegration.  Admi-
rable  indeed is  the recognition  by the Jewish community  in Iowa
that the  two people who  had defaced  and destroyed  parts of the
synagogue  Were  people too and they  had been  objectified  by the
Jewish  community  as  much  as  the  objectification  worked  in  the
other direction.95  What a story!  This is a story about the possibil-
ity of the human heart and the possibility of change, the possibility
of forgiveness,  and the possibility of embrace.
The moral ambitions of law and forgiveness,  in short, offer wor-
thy challenges  one to the other in our desires for impartiality  and
compassion,  autonomy  and  connection.  Let  us  just  not  confuse
one for the other.
We will, no doubt, make mistakes as we grasp the ideals of both
law and forgiveness.  I am reminded of the actress, Tallulah Bank-
head.  She said late in life, "If I had my past life to live over again, I
would make all the same  mistakes, only sooner. ''96
What a wonderful place to be in, a wonderful stance of self-for-
giveness.  I  wonder  whether  the  strong retributive feeling  in  this
country has  to do  with a failure  of self-forgiveness.  Maybe  if we
started there, we could make some change.  In the meantime, may
we admit that we are like other people and forgive where possible.
May  we  also  respect what  law,  untempered  by  forgiveness,  pro-
vides for the coexistence  of imperfect people.
95.  See supra notes 45-47 and  accompanying  text.
96.  ROSALDE  MAGGIO,  QUOTATIONS  BY  WOMEN  241  (1992).
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FORGIVENESS  IN  THE CIVIL LAW
PROFESSOR  NOLAN-HALEY:  In this panel we  are going to
consider how we advance this project of forgiveness in the civil law:
How do we define  forgiveness in the context of civil law?  To what
extent,  if any, should  forgiveness  play  a role  in the  civil  law?  Is
forgiveness  really a corrective  to a civil justice system that may too
often exclude  the human  element?
PROFESSOR BLOCK-LIEB:  My topic today is the role of for-
giveness in consumer bankruptcy law.  To receive a bankruptcy dis-
charge  means  that debt  is forgiven.  By  virtue  of the  bankruptcy
discharge, creditors are enjoined against any act to collect, recover,
or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor.97  That
means  that,  after  completion  of  a  bankruptcy  proceeding,  the
debtor  need not repay unsecured  creditors any  amount which  re-
mains  unpaid.
So, for example, consider an individual debtor who files a volun-
tary petition  under Chapter  7  of the Bankruptcy  Code. 98  At the
time  of the filing, the debtor owns  $100  in non-exempt,  unencum-
bered  assets  and  owes  $1000  in  non-priority,  unsecured  claims.
These  creditors  would receive  a pro-rata  portion  of the proceeds
from  the sale  of the debtor's assets,  about ten cents on the dollar.
The  remaining  ninety  cents  on the  dollar would  be discharged  in
the bankruptcy  context, forgiven.
It should come as no surprise that an important theoretical justi-
fication for the  bankruptcy discharge  draws  on the moral  philoso-
phy  of  forgiveness.  And  yet,  many  bankruptcy  commentators
reject the notion that the bankruptcy  policy favoring  the debtor's
fresh start  following  bankruptcy  should  be  explained  in terms  of
the philosophy of forgiveness.
I would like to discuss the relevance  of forgiveness  to consumer
bankruptcy law, for I believe that forgiveness provides a controver-
sial,  and yet enormously  important, metaphor  for the  bankruptcy
discharge.  I will first discuss the controversy,  and then address the
usefulness  of this concept  of forgiveness  to consumer  bankruptcy
law.
In her book, Failure and Forgiveness, Professor Karen  Gross ar-
gues that the bankruptcy  discharge  is "how  society  mandates  that
creditors forgive  non-paying creditors."99  Drawing  on the  secular
97.  See 11  U.S.C.  § 524(a)(2)  (1999).
98.  See  11  U.S.C.  §§ 301,  701  (1999).
99.  KAREN  GROSS,  FAILURE  AND  FORGIVENESS:  REBALANCING  THE  BANK-
RUPTCY  SYSTEM  93  (1997).
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philosophy  of forgiveness,  she  acknowledges  that, "forgiveness  is
appropriate where  a wrong is committed,  where the wrong  harms
another, or  the  wronged  party  resents  what  occurred,  where  the
wrongdoer acknowledges  the wrong done and takes steps to rectify
it."'1  She  argues  that  these  conditions  exist  in  the  bankruptcy
setting:
For debtors, the wrong is the nonpayment  of legitimate  obliga-
tions.  That nonpayment  provides a panoply  of injuries.  Credi-
tors who  are not paid  are  damaged  economically,  and  perhaps
emotionally.  And others  who pay  for  the losses  indirectly are
also harmed.  Many injured creditors  are resentful  of the  debt-
ors'  failures because  debtors have  received  a benefit for  which
payment  has  not  been  made.  Creditors  may  also  feel resent-
ment because  debtors overstated  their abilities  to succeed.  Fi-
nally, debtors  admit to  failure  and  take  steps  to  redress  their
wrong  by  accessing  the  legal  system.  The  system  makes  that
wrong a matter  of public record  and requires debtors to submit
to judicial  scrutiny.''
Gross's critics contend that the rhetoric of forgiveness  does not sat-
isfactorily  explain  consumer  bankruptcy  law.  They  offer  alterna-
tive justifications.
For example,  Professor  Marjorie  Girth  rejects  forgiveness  as  a
rationale in this context on the grounds that "the discharge  is man-
dated  by our  bankruptcy  law,  no  matter  how  creditors  may  feel
about  that result.' 10 2  As  a result,  she  views  forgiveness  and  dis-
charge  as "internally  contradictory  concepts,"  and argues that this
follows  from the notion that a  critical aspect of forgiveness  is the
wronged person's decision to forgive.' 3  She, instead, suggests that
a  more  useful  concept  for  the  bankruptcy  context  is  one  of
sympathyY°4
Philosopher Jukki Kilpi similarly  critiques  the usefulness  of for-
giveness  in  this  context:  "An  institution  discharging  . . . debt
against the creditor's will does not represent forgiveness, which can
be a morally meaningful term only in relation to a person's willing-
ness to forgive."'05
100.  Id.
101.  Id. at 93-94.
102.  Marjorie  L. Girth, Rethinking Fairness in Bankruptcy Proceedings,  73 AMER.
BANXR.  L.J. 449,  451  (1999).
103.  Id.
104.  See id. at 450-53.
105.  JUKKA  KILIPI,  THE ETHics  OF BANKRUPTCY  68  (1998).
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Kilpi also rejects sympathy  on roughly the same grounds, for he
views sympathy as "a  subjective attitude of mind, one which cannot
be brought about by decree.' 0 6  He similarly  rejects impossibility,
legalism, and  utilitarianism  as justifications for the bankruptcy  dis-
charge. 107 Kilpi, instead, argues that principles of distributive jus-
tice, in combination with respect for individual autonomy, provide
a strong  ethical explanation  for providing  debtors  a fresh start  in
bankruptcy. 8  In so doing, Kilpi takes  issue with  the notion that
defaulting  debtors  have  acted  wrongfully  and  deserve  punish-
ment.l09
Should forgiveness have any role in consumer bankruptcy policy
making?  Admittedly, the fit between the secular philosophy of for-
giveness  and a theory of consumer bankruptcy  policy is imperfect.
Creditors  do not consent to their debtors'  discharge.  Some would
argue that a debtor's financial distress does not constitute wrongful
conduct.  A discharge  in bankruptcy, furthermore, is not today tied
in  any  way  to  restitution,  repentance,  or  mandatory  repayments
made  through  the  bankruptcy  process.  Nonetheless,  forgiveness
should have an important place in thinking about consumer bank-
ruptcy law and policy.  The importance of forgiveness to consumer
bankruptcy policy making is as a metaphor - an analogy.  It is the
idea of forgiveness  that should permeate  any dialogue  about con-
sumer  bankruptcy law  and its goals.
Bankruptcy policy-making  is not unique in its reliance upon for-
giveness merely  as a metaphor.  Indeed, when applied to any litig-
ious or contentious setting, forgiveness  can only ever constitute an
analogy.  Family law, tort law, criminal law  - in each of these con-
texts  we talk about forgiveness, knowing  full well there may be no
voluntary  act  of forgiveness  by the victim.  We refer to  the notion
of forgiveness  in  these  contexts  largely  as  an  analogy.  And  still,
forgiveness  can  be a powerful  analogy in this context.
We draw on the metaphor of forgiveness  in talking about these
areas of contention in the hopes  of formulating  legal policies that
direct or encourage the resolution of litigation on merciful and for-
giving grounds.  By  reference  to the metaphor  of forgiveness,  we
consider whether, under certain circumstances,  there exists a moral
obligation to forgive  and create  legal rules either to create  incen-
106.  Id.
107.  See id. at  68-72.
108.  See id. at 73-82.
109.  See id. at  93-125.
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tives for  forgiveness  or,  instead, to mandate  forgiveness  in these
circumstances.
Why is it important to analogize the bankruptcy discharge to for-
giveness rather than rely on other normative  explanations  for dis-
charge?  What role can the metaphor of forgiveness play when we
think  about consumer  bankruptcy  law  and  policy?  There  are  at
least five reasons that forgiveness can play an important role in this
context.
First, a focus on forgiveness emphasizes the humanity of debtors.
Other normative justifications for the bankruptcy  discharge, based
on  economic  or  paternalistic  concepts,  often  miss  this  human
element.110
Second,  the analogy to forgiveness  reminds us  of the moral  di-
lemma created  by  a debtor's  financial  distress and the  complexity
of the ethical issues  involved  in the bankruptcy  contest.
Third,  the  concept  of  forgiveness  provides  a  framework  for
thinking about bankruptcy, even if it is conceded, whether for pur-
poses of argument or not, that the debtor has behaved wrongfully.
Concluding that debtors  in financial distress have acted wrongfully
need not end the debate  about consumer bankruptcy policy.  Even
if a debtor's conduct has been wrongful, forgiveness may be appro-
priate - forgiveness through the  bankruptcy discharge.
Moreover, an analogy to forgiveness can assist us in focusing our
assessment  of  what  constitutes  wrongful  conduct  in  this  setting.
Has the debtor acted wrongfully  by borrowing,  rather than relying
on savings, to purchase  goods  and services?  By borrowing  exces-
sively?  By becoming over-extended?  By defaulting?  By failing to
cut  back  on  expenses  or  take  on  an  extra job  in  order  to repay
defaulted loans?  By filing a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of
the  Bankruptcy  Code  rather  than  attempting  to repay  defaulted
obligations  either outside  of bankruptcy  or through  a Chapter  13
repayment plan?"'  By seeking a discharge  from certain hallowed
obligations,  such as the obligation to support dependent  children?
By  hiding  assets  from  creditors?  By  misrepresenting  financial
worth to lenders when obtaining credit?
Thinking more precisely about what counts as a debtor's wrong-
ful  conduct is helped by  linking forgiveness of the wrongful  act to
the  wrongdoer's  repentance  and  restitution.  For  example,  if  a
debtor  has wronged  her  creditor  by  engaging  in fraud,  then  it  is
110.  See  Susan  Block-Lieb,  A  Humanistic  Vision  of  Bankruptcy  Law,  6  AM.
BANKR.  INST.  L. REv. 471,  477  (1998).
111.  See  11 U.S.C.  §§ 1300-1334  (1999).
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meaningful to talk in terms of forgiving the fraudulent conduct,  on
the  one  hand,  but  not  the  obligation  to  provide  restitution  for
fraud, on the other.  That the Bankruptcy  Code  excepts from dis-
charged debts incurred as a result of fraud 12 can make sense in this
way.  And  yet,  if instead  the  debtor  is  said to  have  wronged  the
creditor by virtue of having borrowed, by virtue of failing to repay,
then it  is  illogical  to talk  in terms  of forgiving  the wrongful  debt
and, at the same time, imposing an obligation to provide restitution
for that wrongful  act.
Fourth,  forgiveness  reaffirms  the  notion  that  bankruptcy  laws
should rehabilitate  an individual debtor's personal financial life fol-
lowing  bankruptcy.  Indeed, Professor  Gross  incorporates  notions
of forgiveness  into  the  dialogue  about  consumer  bankruptcy  law
precisely  so that she  can stress the restorative nature  of the bank-
ruptcy  process.113  She  refers  to  bankruptcy  in  this  way  as  "an
opportunity to regain self-esteem and become once again a produc-
tive  member of our capitalistic  economy.
1 M4
Fifth and finally, framing the debate about consumer bankruptcy
policy  in terms  of a creditor's forgiveness  of a debtor's  debt  also
suggests  that the  conduct  of the creditor  should  be  assessed,  not
simply the conduct of a debtor.  Forgiveness implies  a bilateral re-
lationship, a give and take, between victim and wrongdoer. As Pro-
fessor  Minow  reminded  us, the  Lord's  Prayer  refers  to forgiving
our debtors  as they  forgive  us.1 5  In  a religious  context, then, the
focus on forgiveness  emphasizes that we are  all potentially wrong-
doers  in need  of forgiveness.  In psychological  and  secular  philo-
sophical  contexts,  forgiveness  is  often  said  to  be  conditioned  in
some sense  upon the  existence  of proper grounds for resentment.
But if the victim does not have  proper grounds for resentment be-
cause  the  victim,  the  creditor  in  this  context,  has  himself  acted
wrongfully or negligently, then there may be nothing to forgive.  It
may be  inappropriate  to talk in terms of forgiveness.  Forgiveness
theory suggests to me that empathy may be far more important to
the dialogue  about consumer bankruptcy  policy than sympathy.
I  would  like  to  conclude  by  remarking on  the  relationship  be-
tween forgiveness  theory  and  pending legislation  to  rewrite  con-
112.  See 11  U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A),  (a)(4),  (a)(11)  (1999).
113.  See GROSS,  supra note 99,  at  104  ("[D]ebtors  should be forgiven  in order to
encourage  their rehabilitation  - both for their sake and society's.").
114. Id. at 94.
115.  See Martha  Minow, Keynote  Address,  Forgiveness and the Law, supra page
1394 [hereinafter  Minow Keynote  Address].
1412FORGIVENESS IN THE LAW
sumer bankruptcy law, for Congress stands poised today to rewrite
consumer  bankruptcy  law.116 Wide-ranging  proposals  are pending
in Congress.  I  would like  to focus on one of them, means testing.
Means  testing  would condition  eligibility  to  Chapter  7  liquida-
tion upon a showing that the individual debtor has insufficient  dis-
posable  income  with which  to  repay creditors  over  a sixty-month
period." 7  This eligibility requirement would, as a practical matter,
force  or  encourage  debtors  to  repay  their  obligations  either
through  a Chapter  13 repayment  plan or outside  of bankruptcy.
This disposable income test starts by presuming that debtors with
disposable net current monthly income  above the national median
could  repay  their  creditors'  claims  over  a  five-year  period." 8  In
determining  what  counts  as  net  current  monthly  income,  the bill
would  reduce  from  a  debtor's  monthly  gross  income  certain  ex-
penses for maintenance of a household  - not actual expenses, but
those expenses set forth in regulations promulgated by the Internal
Revenue  Service,1 9 regulations  which  are  known for their  exces-
sively stingy estimates as to household expenses.  The bill also goes
on  to  permit  reductions  from  gross  monthly  income  for  any  se-
cured  obligations  the  debtor  may  have  incurred  prior  to  bank-
ruptcy. 2 0  Matrimonial and  other priority obligations  are  similarly
reduced from  gross income. 2'
The debate about means testing involves disagreement,  and pos-
sibly even confusion, about the circumstances  under which debtors
in bankruptcy  have acted  wrongfully, and the circumstances  under
which  restitution  and repayment  is  appropriate.  Much  of the  de-
bate about means testing has circled around whether it is appropri-
ate to even consider the risks which  lenders may have assumed by
lending  on  a  negligent basis.'22  These provisions  raise  important
questions  regarding  the  link  between  a  discharge  in  bankruptcy
and  a debtor's  personal financial  rehabilitation.
116.  See S.  625,  106th Cong.  (2000); H.R. 833,  106th  Cong. (1999).
117.  See S.  625,  § 102;  H.R. 833,  § 102.
118.  See id.
119.  See Internal  Revenue  Service,  Collection Financial  Standards,  Allowable Liv-
ing Expenses for Food, Clothing and Other Items,  Total Monthly National Standards
(Except Alaska and Hawaii) (last  modified  Sept. 28,  1999)  <http:www.irs.gov/prod/
ind_info/coll_stds/cfs-other.html>.
120.  See S.  625; H.R. 833.
121.  See id.
122.  Compare Bad Ideas on Bankruptcy, WASH.  POST,  Feb. 18, 2000,  at A22, with
Winners in Bankruptcy, Mar. 4, 2000, at  A15 (reporting that Representatives  George
W. Gekas, Rick Baucher and Adam Smith co-sponsored  the House's Bankruptcy Re-
form Act).
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In sum, the pending legislation,  while it draws on important con-
cepts of forgiveness, is largely an unforgiving bill.
PROFESSOR  COHEN: 12 3  My  topic  is  the  role  of apology  in
civil lawsuits.  Jeffrey Murphy started our conference by addressing
the  subject  of  forgiveness.12 4  Apology  is,  in  many  respects,  the
"flip  side"  of forgiveness,  for  an apology  can often  be the  trigger
that leads to forgiveness.  The cases I have in mind are not the life-
shattering, criminal events of murder or genocide that some other
panelists have  considered.  Rather  I will focus on the role of apol-
ogy in routine civil cases such as medical malpractice, car accidents,
and divorce.
What prompts  me to examine  this topic?  Three motivations  are
as  follows.  First, if a  child makes  a mistake  and  injures  someone
while playing, and if the child goes to his or her parent, the parent
may respond, "Go  apologize for what you have done.  Try to make
amends."  If an adult makes  a mistake and injures another, and  if
the  adult  visits  a  lawyer, the  lawyer's  focus  may  very  well be  on
how to deny responsibility.  There  is a marked gap between these
two responses,  and it is a problematic  gap.
Morality provides  a  second reason to examine this topic.  Many
people  believe  that apologizing  is the right thing  to  do when  one
has injured  another.
A third motivation for examining this topic is what I would label
a  "vicious  cycle."  Suppose that  a doctor  commits  an  error  while
treating a patient and that the patient suffers harm from it.  In such
circumstances, many doctors would like to say, "I'm sorry.  I made
a mistake,"  and, from the viewpoint  of medical ethics, surely that is
usually  the  proper  response. 25  However,  many  doctors  do  not
apologize  out of fear  of liability.  They  are  told  to remain  silent,
sometimes  explicitly  and  sometimes  implicitly,  by  their attorneys
and  insurance  companies,  their  hospitals'  risk management  com-
mittees, and often their peers too.  Conversely,  if one examines re-
search  on why patients sue  physicians, though the statistics are by
123.  For further comments, see Jonathan  R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations,  27
FORDHAM  URB.  L.J.  1447  (2000)  [hereinafter  Cohen, Apology and Organizations].
124.  See Jeffrie  G. Murphy, Keynote  Address, Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Re-
sponding To  Evil:  A  Philosophical  Overview, supra page  1353  [hereinafter  Murphy
Keynote Address].
125.  See  Albert  W.  Wu  et  al.,  To  Tell  the  Truth:  Ethical and Practical  Issues in
Disclosing Medical Mistakes to Patients, in Disclosing Medical Mistakes to Patients, 12
J.  GEN.  INTERNAL  MED.  770  (1997);  Daniel  Finkelstein  et  al.,  When  a Physician
Harms a Patient  by Medical Error: Ethical,  Legal, and Risk Management Considera-
tions, 8 J. CLINICAL  ETHICS  4, 330  (1997).
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no means perfect, perhaps twenty to  thirty percent of patients  say
words to the  effect of, "If I had received  an apology,  I would not
have sued. ' 126  Hence,  there may  often be  a  vicious  and wasteful
cycle where a doctor refrains from apologizing out of fear of liabil-
ity, and it is precisely the absence  of the apology that triggers  the
lawsuit.
With this in mind, let me pose two questions and offer one exam-
ple.  The first question  is whether, under the existing laws,  defense
attorneys ought to talk with their clients about apology more often.
In response, I will argue  that they should, i.e.,  that lawyers should
think of apology as a possible response to injury.  The second ques-
tion is whether  our laws  should  be revised to encourage  apology.
Again, I will argue  in the affirmative.  After this, I will discuss one
hospital's  special  use of  apology.  I  can  only  treat  each  of these
matters  briefly here,  and I direct interested persons  elsewhere  for
more  extensive  and precise presentations.127
Before  addressing  these  questions, let me  make  clear  that I do
not view  apology  as a substitute for compensation.  Suppose that,
God forbid, you are in a car accident in which you hit a stopped car
from behind  and the  other driver's  leg is broken.  You should get
out of your car and tell the other driver that you are sorry, and you
should  pay for  damages to  the  other driver's  leg, car, etc.  While
sometimes  apology  may  lead  the other party  to drop suit,  mostly
what I have in mind is what one might call "subtracting insult from
126.  TWenty  to thirty percent of patients say that if they had  received an  apology,
they would not have sued.  See, e.g.,  Gerald B.  Hickson et  al., Factors that Prompted
Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal  Injuries, 267  JAMA
1359,  1361  (1992)  (studying families who sued their physicians following perinatal in-
juries, finding that 24%  filed medical malpractice claims when they realized that phy-
sicians  had  failed  to  be  completely  honest  with  them  about  what  happened,  had
allowed them  to believe things that were not  true or had intentionally  misled them).
Further,  19%  of those filing  suit indicated  that they did  so out  of a desire  to deter
subsequent  malpractice  by the physician  and/or  seek revenge.  Such filings  also  may
have  been prevented  by an  apology.  See id.; see also Charles Vincent et al., Why Do
People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients  and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LAN-
CET  1609,  1612  (1994)  (studying  British patients  and  families  and  finding  that 39%
may not have brought malpractice suits had there been a full explanation and apology
- more significant  factors to them than monetary compensation).  For other related
references,  see Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S.  CAL.  L. REV.
1009,  1011  n.7  (1999)  [hereinafter  Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize].
127.  See  Cohen, Advising  Clients to Apologize, supra note  126,  at  1009 (arguing
that lawyers should consider advising clients to apologize  more often and that Ameri-
can society should consider legal reforms to encourage apology); Cohen, Apology and
Organizations, supra note  123  (analyzing  apology  in  the  organizational  context
through the  lens of one hospital's experience  where apology was financially viable,  if
not beneficial).
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injury."  The injurer should apologize, and the injured party may or
may not forgive  the injurer in the  sense  of ceasing  anger, but the
injurer should still pay compensatory  damages.
Returning  to  the  first  question  of whether,  under  the  existing
laws, defense attorneys ought to talk with their clients about apol-
ogy more often, my  approach  is to examine the benefits and  risks
to  the injurer of apologizing.  By  so doing, I do not mean  to "in-
strumentalize"  apology  and suggest  that  the  reason  a  defendant
should apologize  is that the plaintiff might drop the case.  Apology
should  be  rooted  in  remorse  rather  than  in  economic  strategy.
However,  often  injurers  do  not  apologize  out of fear  of  liability
without  thinking  carefully  about  both  the  benefits  and  risks  of
apology.
What  are some possible benefits to the injurer of apologizing?
*  the plaintiff might forgo suit;
*  the settlement process  could be greatly  facilitated, reducing
legal fees;
*  in some cases,  punitive  damages could be avoided;
"  some  injurers  would  benefit  psychologically  and  spiritually
(e.g., guilt reduction);  or
"  an apology could help  to repair a damaged  relationship.
What  are  some  possible  risks  to  the  injurer  of  apologizing?
Some injurers  may fear that  apologizing will  void their insurance
coverage.  One  of my  friends  received  a  small,  wallet-sized  card
from his insurance  company titled,  What To  Do When  [You Are]
Involved in a Car Accident. The last line of the card reads,  "Keep
calm,  don't  argue,  accuse  anyone,  or  admit  guilt."  If my  friend
were  in an accident  and  apologized  to the  other driver, would he
void his insurance  coverage?  Could a physician who apologizes  to
a patient for a medical error void her malpractice  coverage?  Insur-
ance law and insurance  contracts place upon the insured  a duty of
cooperation  in  the  defense  of  the  claim.128  Could  the  insured's
apology  be  taken  as  a  breach  of that  duty  and  thereby  void  the
insurance  coverage?  The  short  answer  is,  "likely  not.' 1 29  How-
ever, this risk is worth keeping  in mind.
The more  substantial  risk for many  injurers  is that the apology
will be taken  as an admission  of liability.  "If I apologize,  aren't I
128.  See John  A. Appleman  & Jean  Appleman,  8  INSURANCE  LAW  &  PRACTICE
4771  (1999);  JEFFREY  W.  STEMPEL,  INTERPRETATION  OF  INSURANCE  CONTRACTS
(1991).
129.  See Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note  126, at  1025-28.
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giving the other side the ability to prove their case?"  This is a seri-
ous  concern,  for  evidence  law  accepts  admissions  by  party oppo-
nents.130  The  question  thus  arises  of whether  there  are  ways  an
injurer can  apologize, including  fully admitting his fault, such that
the  apology cannot  be used against him  as proof of fault.
Note  that there  is  an  important  class of cases  in which  simply
expressing  sympathy for the injury, without admitting  fault, would
go a great distance  toward resolving the dispute.  After many acci-
dents,  who  was  at fault  and  to  precisely  what  degree  is  unclear.
Expressing sympathy through  a statement such as, "We had an ac-
cident.  I don't know who was  at fault, but I do want you to know
that I am sorry that you are injured and hospitalized,"  can be quite
powerful.
Yet  what about  the  legally  most-difficult  case  in which  the  in-
jurer wants to say, or the injured party will not be satisfied unless
she hears, "I'm sorry.  It was my fault."  Can the injurer make such
a statement  "safely,"  that is,  without incurring  the risk that it can
be used against him  in court as  an admission?
Under existing law, there is some room, but not much room, for
such  "safe"  apology.  One vehicle  for "safe"  apology is in media-
tion.  Many states have laws providing that statements made within
mediation  cannot  be  used  as  proof  in  court.131  These  laws  vary
from state to state, and the confidentiality shielding they provide is
not absolute. 132  However, apologizing within mediation  can often
be one avenue  for "safe"  apology.  Another theoretical  possibility
is  to  offer  the  apology  in  the  course  of  settlement  negotiations.
The  Federal  Rules  of  Evidence  purport  to  exclude  statements
made in the course of settlement negotiations from admissibility. 33
However, it  turns out that this  rule is  very "porous"  and, in prac-
tice, offers  little shielding for an apology.1 34  While other theoreti-
cal  possibilities  exist,  the  bottom  line  is  that,  under our  existing
130.  See FED.  R. EvID.  801(d)(2).
131.  See Pamela Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil:  The Intolerable
Conflict  for Attorney-Mediators  Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidential-
ity and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L.  REV.  715, 724
(observing that nearly every jurisdiction  in the United States has different statutes or
local court rules establishing the parameters of the particular mediation programs.  As
a  result,  confidentiality  policies  differ  significantly  from one  program  to  another.).
Currently, efforts  are underway to draft a uniform act to standardize  such mediation
confidentiality  protections.
132.  See id.; see also Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra  note  126, at 1036-
39.
133.  See FED. R. EVID.  408.
134.  Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note  126.
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laws, if the injurer wants to apologize "safely,"  mediation is usually
the best  vehicle.  Yet  from  a  functional  perspective,  mediation  is
often  inadequate,  for  mediation  typically  comes  quite  late.  If
you're in a car accident that you know is your fault, what you want
to be able to do - and what our law should encourage,  or at least
not discourage,  you to do - is get out of your car and apologize to
the other driver right then.
Could we revise our laws so as to prevent apologies  from being
used as proof in court?  There  are different ways  we might do this.
The  simplest is to create an independent  evidentiary  exclusion for
apologies.  Other approaches  are broadening the concept of subse-
quent  remedial  measures  (which  are  inadmissible) 13 5  to  include
apologies  or plugging  some  of the holes  in  Federal  Rule  of Evi-
dence 408 so  as to make that rule less porous.  Through such steps
our  society  could  encourage  apology,  and  thereby  help  foster
forgiveness.
A  basic  goal  of  excluding  apologies  from  use  in  court  is  to
decouple  the act  of apology  from  the liability  system.  While  at-
taching liability to the act of apologizing helps ensure, though does
not  completely  ensure,  that  apologies  that  are  made  are sincere
(for the speaker must "put his money where  his mouth is"),  such
attachment  also risks the "vicious  cycle"  discussed at the outset in
which the injurer wants to apologize, but refrains from doing so out
of the fear of liability, and it is precisely the absence of the apology
that  prompts  the  lawsuit.  Further, an  apology  made  in a  "safe"
haven such as mediation can also be, and be seen as, sincere.  Like
a conversation  with a stranger  on an  airplane,  the fact that there
are  few  consequences  can  help people  speak  candidly.  Note  too
that if apologies  are excluded  from  admissibility in court, nothing
prevents  an injurer  from offering  compensation  with the apology,
and  the  injured party  may  certainly  note  the  absence  of such  an
offer.  At root, creating "safe"  havens for apology increases, rather
than decreases, the possible modes of communication  between the
parties.
I  shall conclude  with an example that focuses on the economics
of apology.  I present it not because  I believe  economic considera-
tions should  motivate apologies  - apologies  should be  rooted in
remorse  rather than economics  - but because  the fear of adverse
135.  See FED.  R. EVID.  407.
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economic  consequences  often  prevents  people  from  apologizing,
and,  in my opinion, that fear  is overstated.
136
JUDGE  ZUCKERMAN:  When  I  was  initially  approached
about participating in today's Symposium, I was quite taken aback
by the  realization  that,  in  my twenty  years  on  the Family  Court
bench, I had given virtually no thought to the question of forgive-
ness and only very occasional  thought to the question of apology,
and I was rather stunned by this realization.  So I quickly accepted
the invitation.  I  figured it would be  a good thing to,  albeit belat-
edly,  focus  on  aspects  of forgiveness  and  apology  in  the  area  of
family  law and  family  court and see what  I thought might be  the
reason  why there  had been  so little discussion  of it amongst  law-
yers, judges, and, to my knowledge, commentators up to this point.
First, I tried to immerse myself in the literature, and that lasted
about  three  minutes,  because  I  quickly  realized  that  people  had
been devoting decades to these questions and that I could not pos-
sibly do it in a couple of weeks.  And  so, I propose to share  with
you some  of the peculiar  aspects  of family  law  and  family  court,
and to try to figure out what  the differences  are important.  I  will
look at whether  there is  room for research  and study of some of
these differences  in order to maximize  what  can be done to bring
the benefits that have been described in the earlier part of this pro-
gram to the litigants and  the parties in interest in Family Court.
There are two basic categories of cases I will talk about:  the pri-
vate cases  and the cases that have  a public aspect.  I  am not going
to be talking about juvenile delinquency  cases today at all because
those are very like the criminal proceedings that were addressed at
some  length  this  morning. 137  They  are  essentially  criminal  cases
without juries, albeit with some differences at the equivalent of the
sentencing stages.
These  cases  involve  public  interest or  public  involvement.  By
that  I  mean  public  agency  involvement  through  child  protective
proceedings,  i.e.  child  abuse,  child neglect.  Also  in that  category,
although they are somewhat different, are termination of parental
rights proceedings and proceedings to free children who are in fos-
ter  care  placement  for  adoption.  This  is  a very large  part of the
family court's jurisdiction.
136.  Professor  Cohen  discusses  the  example  of Lexington,  Kentucky's  Veteran's
Administration Hospital in his article.  See Cohen, Apology and Organizations,  supra
note  123.
137.  For a discussion  of the role of forgiveness  in the  criminal  law, see the panel
discussion supra page  1373.
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A petitioner in those cases, by definition, will be a social service
agency.  In New  York City, it would be either the Department  of
Social Services in a child protective proceeding, or the Department
of Social Services or a voluntary  child care agency in a termination
of parental  rights  case.  But  the  most  important  aspect  of this is
that in the child protective  cases, it is the child who is the victim of
either some action or inaction by a parent or a parental figure,  and
it is  not,  as was  true  of all  the other  cases  we have  talked  about
before, with the exception of some of the criminal  cases, cases  in-
volving two adults, or an  adult and  a corporation.
Children figured in some of the criminal cases, but in every Arti-
cle  10 case,  in every  child  protective  case, the  child is the  victim.
The defendants or respondents are in every case either a parent, a
legal  guardian, or a person  legally  responsible for the child's care.
The person, in other words, who in the criminal matters would  act
as  an  advocate  for  the  victim  is  now  accused  of mistreating  the
victim.
In the termination of parental rights cases, it is somewhat differ-
ent, in that these  are less matters  of fault as matters of failures to
plan for children's futures.
Even within the child protective cases, you have a huge range of
behavior by the offender.  The  behaviors range from the most ex-
cruciating cases in which children  are tortured, maimed, treated in
an  utterly  inhuman  fashion,  to  cases  in which  a  child  is  actually
murdered by a parent and the child protective proceeding only in-
volves  the  surviving  siblings  of  the  child  who  is  deceased.  You
have  cases  of sexual  abuse; you have  cases  in which  children are
used for child pornography courtesy of their parents; and then you
have  the cases  in which the  court is involved because  of parental
drug abuse,  alcohol abuse, or because  a parent  is  incarcerated  for
murdering the other parent and now the children have no one;  or
because of domestic violence between the parents.  The patterns go
on and on.  Abuse  cases also include  those where  a parent leaves
the child  home  alone, unattended  for days at a  time, in charge  of
the younger children,  some of whom are  in diapers.
I cannot  begin  to  sketch  in  the range,  but you  can  see that  in
some  of the  cases  the  children  are  physically  harmed;  in  others,
they are placed in undue risk of harm, physical or emotional; and
in other cases, there is a kind of overlying or overhanging  neglect
which  is often  a risk  of psychological  harm.
In a great  many  of these cases  the children are removed,  sepa-
rated from their  siblings, separated from the parents.  In many  of
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the cases, the children are not as disaffected with the parents as you
might expect,  at least  at first, because  they are  so shocked  by  the
separation.
I remember quite vividly  a case many years ago in which a child
had been kept in a closet for essentially a year and was fed from a
bucket.  It was  only  when the  priest  in the  neighborhood  church
realized  that  he  had not  seen  the  child  in  a  very  long time  and
investigated that this came to light.  The child had stopped growing.
He was  about ten years  old when this  occurred.
The child was brought to court for the testimony that he had to
give  and  they finally  got  him  talking  again.  He  sat  there  on  the
social worker's lap with a court reporter  and the attorneys for the
parents.  This is a civil case, remember.  It was very slow going, but
the  child's  exact  words  I  have  never  forgotten.  When  he  finally
could  be persuaded  to say  something, he just looked  up and said,
"They treated me like a dog.  I never want to see them again,"  and
then he said nothing more.  That is a stunning kind of case because
usually  children  will  not usually  be  as vehement  as  that because
they are afraid.
What  is  the  point of emphasizing  this?  If we  are  going  to  talk
about  apology  and  forgiveness,  we  should  recognize  that  we  are
talking  now  about  parents  and  children  who  have  a  unique
relationship.
Depending  on the  age of the  child, the child  may  very  well  be
aware of what has gone on.  The child may blame himself or herself
in part for what has gone  on, either because  the child  told some-
body or the parent has told the child that it is the child's fault.  In
some cases, the child is furious with the parent because the parent
believed  a paramour instead of the child who said they were being
sexually abused.  By the time the parent wises up, it is too late; the
damage has been done,  at least for the moment.
The  other thing that is different  about these  cases  is that these
relationships existed before  the injury and exist after the injury, so
the issue of reconciliation is crucial.  If reconciliation is not going to
happen,  either  because  the  parent  is  incarcerated  on  a  parallel
criminal case for the same activity or, for some other reason, there
may  still be  a  necessity for  something  to  happen  for  the  family,
even if they are never going  to live together again  and even  if the
legal ties are going to be severed, so each person in the family can
move on.  In other words, the child has to have some form of reso-
lution of the issue, of the betrayal, and the parent, who may end up
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having other  children  or who  may regain  custody  of this  child  or
other children, may need  some transformation  event.
For example,  in the child protective  case a child is removed and
placed with relatives or in foster care and the parent is offered ap-
propriate services.  That often is not what happens for parents who
are drug  addicted  and the  like  because  of the dearth  of services.
But assume the services are out there and visitation is  set up with
the child.  The  parent does  not go  to  drug  treatment,  the parent
does not come  for the  visits half the  time,  or comes quite  drunk.
The  child  now  has  a further  injury  that he  has  suffered,  that the
parent  is  not  trying.  And  again,  there  is a  further  problem  that
stands in the way of the child's development.
The question in this area is:  How do you evaluate the prospects
and the process of apology and forgiveness when it is a parent and
a  child?  What  is different  about  it?  What  is  the  same  about  it?
How  do  you modify  the  way  you  approach  this?  What  are  the
valid goals  that you would articulate?
For this, I think you need to look  to psychologists  and  child de-
velopment  specialists,  for a variety of answers,  depending  on  the
age of the child and the circumstances  that resulted  in the injury to
the child.  As far as I know, this question  has not been explored at
all in a systematic fashion by  anybody.
The  private  cases  are custody  and visitation  cases.  Here there
has been some use of mediation, in family court at least.  I am not
sure about  in supreme  court, and it  is certainly  true in New York
City and  New York  State, as well  as elsewhere  in the  country.
Mediation can be tricky for a number of reasons.  The cases  do
not always  declare  themselves  as pure custody  or visitation cases,
by which I mean cases in which there is no history of child abuse or
neglect  or  no  history  of domestic  violence  between  the  parents.
They  may  appear  at  first  glance  to  be  straightforward  cases,  but
they can be more complicated.
If they  are  straightforward  cases  and  there  is  no  injury  to  the
child,  then  we  have  simply  the grownups  fighting  it  out,  and the
mediation process may help them to reach a rational result without
injuring  the  children  in  the process  of fighting  over  custody  and
visitation.  These  cases  sometimes,  as  time  goes  on,  develop  into
more  problematic  cases  which  have  to  be  taken  from mediation
and brought back to court.
Depending on what is at issue, though, the people may be able to
it work out, without getting into the questions of the redress of old
injuries,  proper  custody  and  visitation.  Certainly,  the things  that
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led  to  a  marital  rift  in  the  first  place  may  or  may  not  involve
"fault,"  "injury"  or mutual fault.
Another  and interesting parallel  development  is  as we move  to
no-fault  divorce,  there  is  a  question  as  to  whether  an  outlet  is
needed for  the moral indignation  factor that  used to be part and
parcel of divorce litigation in order for the people  to move on.
An  area  that has  been removed  entirely,  though,  from  media-
tion, and possibly incorrectly  so, involves  domestic violence.  Do-
mestic  violence  means  lots  of  different  things.  Now,  in  family
court, for example, domestic violence cases are not limited to hus-
bands versus wives, wives versus husbands or paramour versus par-
amour who have  a child in common even if they are unmarried,  or
former paramours.  It includes feuding  siblings,  aunts  and uncles.
The  whole  family  constellation  can  come  into Family  Court  on a
family offense  case alleging domestic violence.
Traditionally, where  it is the case of husbands  and wives or lov-
ers,  who  have  children  in  common,  the  fear  has  been that  using
mediation is inappropriate because the situation is so volatile.  The
whole process in a serious domestic violence case involves the esca-
lation of violence,  a very  violent episode followed  by  a period of
apology,  the  seeking  of  forgiveness,  and  then  the  process  starts
again,  so that,  by definition,  if you were  looking  to apology  and
forgiveness  and  so  on, you  would  be  feeding  into  the  very  syn-
drome  that is causing the risk of harm.
That  analysis  does  not  necessarily  apply  to  every  case.  Quite
apart  from whether  it  applies to every  husband-wife  case or par-
amour  case, it almost certainly  does not apply to some of the ex-
tended family cases, and those often take on more of the aspect of
a neighborhood feud.
MS. LIVINGSTON:  When Dean Feerick contacted  me, asking
me to participate in this Symposium and telling me the topic, I con-
fess I thought initially, not only by myself, but in talking to people
with whom I work about the concept of forgiveness  in the civil law,
that it is not something  we focus on.  However, it is not something
we think of often, and it is not part of what we do.  And then, after
spending  some hours reflecting  on it, I decided that my initial im-
pression was wrong.
Forgiveness is really what civil law is all about.  We do not talk of
punitive damages in civil cases in New York State. 38  It is the rare
138.  The  legal  standard  for  maintaining  a punitive  damages  claim  is  rigorous  in
New York  State.  See,  e.g.,  Taylor  v.  Dyer,  593  N.Y.S.2d  122,  123 (App.  Div.  1993)
(finding that defendant's  conduct must be "morally  culpable or  actuated  by evil and
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case,  I  think perhaps  there  are maybe two  or three  in the State's
history that I know of, that has ever involved punitive damages,  so
the idea of punishing anybody is something that we know exists out
there  in other worlds but not in our  own.
And so what are we compensating for?  We are only compensat-
ing  to  make  a person  whole.  You  all remember  that,  of course,
from your first week in torts.  That is all damages are.  That is what
the entire lawsuit is  about:  somebody has been injured, they have
economic  losses,  they have  pain and  suffering that  must be  com-
pensated for, and the wrongdoer, should he or she be judged to be
a wrongdoer,  must  compensate  only  to  make  that person  whole.
There is no punishment, there is no revenge, only allow this person
to be  compensated,  allow  them  to get back what  they  had in the
only way, of course, that the law can see and understand and actu-
alize  on, money.
If you think about that, then it is indeed  a very forgiving system.
The wrongdoer does not pay.  We hear about civil verdicts and you
think, "My  goodness, look how horrendous that malpractice was,"
for instance.  (I will resort to malpractice throughout my comments
because  it is the area  of the law in which I  practice).  "Look  how
large that verdict was."  It shocks us sometimes when we read of it,
but remember when you hear it that it is only to compensate  that
person  for what  they lost.  It is only  to pay  them for  what their
needs  are.
When you read about large  verdicts, they are almost exclusively
verdicts to pay for the costs, for instance, of the child who has brain
damage  as the result of an obstetrician's  negligence or a hospital's
negligence around the time of his or her birth.  She has a lifetime of
health care  needs:  a lifetime of costs for therapies,  costs for their
maintenance,  and caregivers  because  she can never live alone  and
can  never function  alone.
So are they large  damages?  Of course  they are.  Why  are they
large damages?  Because that is the only thing that can compensate
that person to at least give  her some semblance  of who she would
have  been before.
reprehensive  [sic] motive"); Karen S.  v. Streitferdt, 568  N.Y.S.2d 946, 947  (App. Div.
1991)  (stating that punitive  damages  are  "awarded  in  'singularly  rare cases'  such  as
cases involving..,  malice  or... wrongdoing to the public");  Lugo v. LJN  Toys,  Ltd.,
539  N.Y.S.2d  922, 925 (App. Div. 1989)  ("The  recovery of punitive damages depends
upon the defendant acting with evil and  wrongful  motive or with a willful  and inten-
tional misdoing, or with  a reckless indifference  equivalent  thereto.").
1424FORGIVENESS IN THE LAW
People come to me all the time, because we only represent plain-
tiffs  who  are  injured,  with  tales  as  horrible  as  you  can  imagine
about  situations  where  they  only  went  in  expecting  wonderful
things.  Examples  include the  birth  of a child  or  a minor  medical
procedure  where  a  loved  one ended  up comatose  for  the rest  of
their days.  They  only expected  wonderful  things  to  happen.  In-
stead, in a moment or hours, whichever  it might be, from careless-
ness or from negligence,  their lives, or the lives  of those that they
love, were radically  altered forever.
Time  and  again, I  hear  this.  As  I  look  at them  and  listen  to
them, they  say to  me,  in words  or in  substance,  "And  you  know
what?  He  never  even  said  he  was  sorry."  Or,  alternatively,  we
hear the story and then we get the records; the plaintiffs come back
and we say, "Do you know that  'X' happened,"  whatever the par-
ticular  circumstance  might  be,  and  they  say,  "You  know  what?
They never even told me."  Not  surprisingly, they are angry.
I have heard, probably in half the cases that come to us, the fol-
lowing:  "If they had come  in to me  and said 'I'm sorry,'  or if the
doctor had come in  and  told me  what happened,  I would  not be
here."  I  was  not  surprised  to  hear  the  Lexington,  Kentucky
story139 because  I have  been hearing it for twenty years now.
Forgiveness  is one of the most crucial elements  of medical mal-
practice and personal injury.  Speaking to a group of physicians,  as
I have  done  at times in the past, I  say to them:  "Do you want to
know  how  to  avoid  medical  malpractice  lawsuits?  Sit down with
the patient  afterwards  and talk to her, and  if something  happens,
then you tell her.  People sue because they are angry at being mis-
treated, however  horrendous  their injury."
I could tell you of a hundred different cases  of horrendous inju-
ries where nobody would have  sued except that,  "They didn't  tell
me.  They avoided  me.  My  loved one  went for this simple  proce-
dure in the emergency room and wound up being in a coma, but for
days  I would  say  to people,  'What  happened?,'  and  they  would
avoid me,  no one had an answer.  All the nurses would say, 'Ask
the doctor,'  and all the doctors would  say, 'You have to ask some-
body else.'  I  never got an answer."
They  never  get  an  answer,  so what  do they do?  Do  they seek
lawyers  because they are money-hungry?  Do they come  to us be-
cause  they want revenge?  Do  they come  to us because  they hate
doctors  and this  is  their  chance?  No.  They  come  because  they
139.  See Cohen, Apology and Organizations,  supra note  123.
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want  answers;  and,  if the  answers  were  not  sufficient,  they  also
want  apologies.  They do not get them.
We would all like to say that if medical care was a lot better, then
there would be fewer lawsuits.  I don't know that that will happen.
As many as 98,000 deaths a year in the United States are attributa-
ble to medical malpractice, more than almost all major accidents.' 4
Those  are the people  suing.  The people suing  are the ones who
have  not gotten answers, who have  not been told.
So where does forgiveness come in?  Even if the same negligence
occurred,  but  defendants  were  schooled  to  apologize,  even  once
the lawsuit is started, that would help.  But the reality of the system
is  that  there  is  an  innate  conflict  because  defendants'  lawyers  in
New York State are hired out on a case-by-case  basis by the insur-
ance  companies  and they are paid  on an hourly basis.
Sitting here,  I thought of all the cases  I have  seen in my twenty
years of practice where the defendant admitted liability.  I thought
of two,  and that  is  staggering,  because  in many  cases  there  is  no
question  of how bad the medical care was.  In only two cases  pre-
jury selection, one of them only happened days before the jury was
selected,  did  anybody  say,  "We  admit  responsibility,  we  were
wrong, we  are going to try this case only on damages."
Now, that might  be a function  of people  not wanting to admit,
hoping  against hope that some expert will come  into a courtroom
and testify on their behalf, however unbelievable that might be.  Or
it might be a function of the system as it is set up, with lawyers paid
by the hour.  I am not sure.
The public thinks people are money-hungry, and they are not, as
I said.  The public has the sense that people are  suing because they
want to be compensated only, but they are indeed  suing for justice.
Juries  are rather  forgiving,  not,  I  am sorry  to  say, of plaintiffs,
but rather forgiving of defendants.  They are forgiving of those who
make  a mistake, perhaps  thinking,  "Well,  it could  have  been me
doing that" or "It could have been  any one of us who ran the red
light."
They  have  been  taught, as  most of us  have,  to look  up to the
medical profession  and  respect  them.  Juries  look up  to doctors,
respect them and  believe  what they say.  The  public perception  is
that it is the plaintiffs who exaggerate and lie, it is the plaintiffs who
are making things up.  I can tell you that I see, time and time again,
140.  See Rick Weiss, Medical Errors Blamed For Many Deaths,  WASH.  POST, Nov.
30, 1999, at Al  (citing  a study by the National  Academy  of Sciences).
1426FORGIVENESS IN THE LAW
doctors who rewrite their office  records, hospitals that make parts
of records disappear.  It happens  time  and time  again.
A recent  example  is  the doctor  in a failure  to  diagnose breast
cancer  case,  with a  very believable  woman  who came  in and  was
telling me this horrible story about why she is so fiddled  with can-
cer because of a misdiagnosis.  It was so believable.  And then we
got the doctor's office  records; her story was totally different than
the records.  It just didn't make any sense.  We studied and studied
the records because we couldn't put the two together, until, at the
very bottom, we noticed that the records for this medical malprac-
tice that was supposed  to  have  happened  in 1994  were on  a form
that was first printed  in 1996.
A little digression, but juries want to believe that doctors do not
do wrong  and  that it  was  somehow  the fault  of the patients  who
were  injured.  So they  will  not forgive  the victim,  as  it  often be-
lieved, but forgive the wrongdoer when he or she is in that position
of authority that they want to believe.  It is very hard to overcome.
It contrasts with the public perception that the court system is a
give-away.  The  reality is that it  is far more  likely that those who
deserve to be  compensated  are turned  away.
What does a jury trial do for people?  Horrible injuries, lives de-
stroyed.  People come to a courtroom for justice.  A jury can speak
out for justice for those who are injured.  As disfigured as they are,
when they even cannot stand, they walk  away taller because some
juror has said they are right.  And, should the defendant  not have
admitted  responsibility  all  along,  when  it comes  to  a jury saying
they were right, then that plaintiff forgives them, and the defendant
as well.
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FORGIVENESS  AND  INTERNATIONAL  AMNESTY
PROFESSOR  FLAHERTY:  We  turn  to  forgiveness  and  am-
nesty in the international context.  Today we look at that in at least
two regards.  The more conventional  regard is that as nations come
out of human rights nightmares they are confronted  with the prob-
lem of what to do about past human rights transgressors;  the solu-
tions  run across  the spectrum.  One end  of the  spectrum,  to hold
transgressors  accountable  to  the  fullest  extent  possible,  is  moti-
vated  largely  by  concerns  of justice.  The  other  end of the  spec-
trum,  amnesty,  is  motivated  largely  by  concerns  about  peace-
making, and, to an extent, forgiveness.  As countries  emerged from
repressive  human  rights  situations,  they  fell  at  different  points
along the spectrum;  we will investigate that in this panel.
We will also investigate an intriguing regard to this subject:  for-
giveness of loans and debt when it comes to international law.  Pro-
fessor Chantal Thomas,  in particular, will speak  about this.141
This  discussion  of  forgiveness  is  a  sign  of progress  because  it
shows that nations  are moving beyond repressive  regimes  to deal
with the problem of how  to move forward.
MR. CHIPOCO CACEDA:142  Probably one of the most impor-
tant  contributions  of the  20th  century  to  humanity  has  been  the
notion or conception  of human rights.  One of the most interesting
things in human  rights and public international law is the progres-
sive nature  and how the law has developed  over time with respect
to protecting the individual.
One of the most recently recognized human rights is the right to
truth.  It  emerged  in  the  20th  century  and  really  in  the  last  ten
years.  Among the first jurisprudence  on this was the Inter-Ameri-
can Court's Velasquez Rodriguez case,  where the court found that
it was a state responsibility, not only to punish violators, but also to
investigate  and to prevent violations. 143  I should mention that Juan
M6ndez tried the Velasquez case.
In a number of reports, the Inter-American Human Rights Com-
mission has stated  that it  is necessary  to know  not  only who  has
done  what, but what has happened, why it happened  and  the cir-
cumstances  in which  those  events  and violations  occurred.  More
than twenty-five  African and Latin American national truth com-
missions,  occurring  in  governments  or  states  that  have  been  in
141.  See Thomas,  infra note  174.
142.  Remarks  translated  by Andrew Kaufman.
143.  See Velasquez Rodriguez  Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,  Ser. C, No. 4 (1988),  avail-
able at <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b-11-12d.htm>.
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democratic transitions,  have  stated the need  to know  the truth of
what occurred, the circumstances in which it occurred, and the con-
ditions that led state  institutions to violate human rights.  But why
has the right to truth become  a human right?
In the first place, there  is a moral obligation  to the victims, the
family members of the victims, and society, to discover and expose
what happened.  Perhaps the best example of the need for the right
to  truth  is  in  the  case  of  disappearances.  There  have  been
thousands  of  cases  throughout  Latin  America,  Africa,  Asia,  and
Central America where people have "disappeared,"  either through
state institutions,  such as the army or police, and the need for the
right to truth is reflected through the families.4  It has often been
said that  it  is worse  to  have  a  relative  "disappeared"  than to be
murdered, because  it is the  hope and the lack  of hope that drives
you  all  the  time,  that  inability  to  actually  ever  know  what  has
happened.
A second reason for the right to truth is its preventative nature.
To  prevent  abuses  in  the  future  it  is  transcendental  that  people
know  what  the  circumstances  and  conditions  were  that  led  state
institutions  to  commit  abuses,  and thereby,  with  this  knowledge,
prevent  future  similar  actions.  For example,  with  truth  commis-
sions in El Salvador,  Guatemala, and Honduras,  one  of the basic
findings is that the lack of accountability is what allowed state insti-
tutions to commit serious human rights violations.  This lack of ac-
countability  allowed  police  forces,  military  forces,  and  secret
services  to  act in a  way  that they would not have  been  able to  if
there were  accountability.
With regard  to the right to truth, furthermore,  truth must have
certain  characteristics  that  enable  it  to  reconstruct  the  circum-
stances  of what happened  and,  by revealing  those circumstances,
have a dissuasive effect in the future.  The truth must not be a par-
tial,  but a complete,  truth.  In  Latin America,  there  have  been  a
couple  of cases,  such  as  in  Guatemala,  where  truth  commissions
have  not  individualized  responsibility.  They  just  named  institu-
tions, such  as the  army or the guerrillas.  For the right to truth to
have its desired effect, it needs to reveal not only the circumstances
but also the names of the actors involved.
144.  See, e.g.,  NUNCA  MAS:  THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE  NATIONAL  COMMIS-
SION  ON  THE DISAPPEARED  (Writers and  Scholars  Int'l trans. 1986), cited in Terence
S. Coonan, Rescuing History: Legal and Theological Reflections on the Task of Mak-
ing Former Torturers  Accountable, 20 FORDHAM  INTL.  L.J. 512  n.1  (1996).
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The  truth  must  be  an  official  truth,  a  state-sponsored  truth,  a
public  truth, an impartial  truth, and  a truth to  which  all have  ac-
cess.  Only  through  access  can  truth  contribute  to  processes  of
transition.
Without the truth there can be no forgiveness.  Without knowing
who has done  what, and how they did it, there can be no forgive-
ness; without the actors, the victimizers, the perpetrators, admitting
their responsibility  for these  acts, and  thereby verifying this truth,
the conditions for forgiveness will not exist.  That said, the right to
truth is  a powerful  instrument for societies or countries  that have
suffered  serious human  rights violations  to use  in  their transition
processes.
MR. FORTI:  I have been requested to talk about the instrument
of what Carlos  Chipoco has developed, this concept  of the right to
the truth.  In Latin America, within the past two  decades, several
countries have experienced the emergence and the implementation
of truth  commissions.  These  are  basically  officially  endorsed,  ad
hoc, investigative  bodies  with  the power  to examine  and  inquire
into the past.  Their findings  and conclusions  are expected  to  end
impunity by presenting an authoritative,  an official, and a so-called
"final"  truth behind the crimes and grave acts of violence that they
investigate.
Truth  commissions  in  Latin  America  have  always  been  sur-
rounded by the context of transition.  Argentina and Chile  passed
from  military  dictatorship  to  democracy.  Haiti rehabilitated  and
reinstalled  a democratically  elected  government.  El Salvador  and
Guatemala  reached peace agreements  ending internal conflict.
The common element in all of these cases is a strong demand for
justice by victims, their relatives, and by civil society in general.  In
broad terms,  these  truth  commissions  have  three  main  core  pur-
poses or objectives.  The first is to investigate, to elucidate the facts
behind the grave acts of violence that remain under impunity, espe-
cially, like  Carlos mentioned  before,  human  rights  violations  that
are considered crimes against humanity, like disappearances, extra-
judicial executions, and massacres.  The investigation is expected to
reveal  the  modus operandi of  government  structures  and  state
agents  that were  involved, sometimes  in a clandestine  manner,  in
these massive violations of human rights.  The investigation is also
expected to identify those individuals or institutions responsible for
ordering  and implementing  those  human rights violations.
The  second  goal  is  to  promote  specific  measures  in  order  to
avoid the future  occurrence  of such events  and keep society  from
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forgetting  the past.  This,  in Latin America,  is  done through  spe-
cific actions and recommendations  to honor the memory of the vic-
tims,  such  as  the  case  recently  in  Guatemala;a45  national
monuments;  the broad  dissemination  of the commission's reports;
and the incorporation of the commission's findings and conclusions
through  the public educational  system.
A third goal has also been the promotion of national reconcilia-
tion.  The rationale behind this is that it is possible to forgive only
when three elements  are present:  when the truth is known; when
errors  are  acknowledged  by the perpetrators;  and  when  the  gov-
ernment  implements actions of reparations.
Having said this, my  opinion, after personal experience  in some
of these  commissions,  is  that truth commissions  are  by  no  means
the  ideal  solution  to  bring  about  truth  and  justice  after  human
rights violations.  The proper way is through state bodies of admin-
istration of justice charged with the investigation, prosecution, pun-
ishment,  and reparation of those crimes.  Truth commissions  have
appeared in Latin America precisely because the justice systems of
our countries were unable or unwilling to perform their task.  The
state's  obligation is to find and disclose  the truth and bring  about
justice.  Truth commissions  have been in Latin America  a "last  re-
sort"  solution.
A final point about this general overview, which Carlos has men-
tioned, is the  issue of controversy  surrounding truth commissions.
We can identify two major approaches by truth commissions  in the
implementation  of their mandate;  some focus  on determining the
fate of the victims and some emphasize identifying the perpetrators
of  human  rights  violations.  In  other  words,  some  commissions
name names and  some do not.
Some people  argue  that naming the  individuals  responsible  for
abuses triggers legal processes and produces public debate, which,
in turn, generates instability and polarization  in societies that need,
above all, to be reconciled.  This school of thought also argues that
truth  commissions  are not jurisdictional  bodies, by definition and
by naming  names, they are to  some extent  violating  the due pro-
cess of those persons being named.
On the  other hand, abstention from  disclosing names  of perpe-
trators constitutes  a half or incomplete  truth.  It fails  to meet  the
expectations  of victims, civil society, and the international commu-
nity.  Worst of all, it does not eliminate the possibility of repetition,
145.  See  COMISI6N  DE  EScLARECIMIENT  HIST6RICO,  Guatemala:  Memoria del
Silencio (Feb. 25,  1999).
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since  impunity  is maintained for  those who  commit these  crimes.
Moreover,  not knowing the identity of responsible  individuals im-
pedes the ability of those affected  ones to forgive and  thus to ad-
vance  the national reconciliation, the very objective  given to truth
commissions.
I have  been asked to develop two case studies on this process of
investigation  of past human  rights violations.  I will try to be very
brief  in describing  the cases  of El  Salvador  and  Honduras.  But,
because  of the  time  constraint,  I  would  emphasize  that  they  are
very important cases.
In  El Salvador,  the truth commission  was the  result of a peace
agreement  in  an  internal  armed  conflict.  The  commission  was
made up of three individuals named  by the United Nations Secre-
tary-General.a 4 6  All  of them  were  foreigners.  The  two parties  at
war established the mandate.'47  In El Salvador's truth commission,
even though the mandate did not explicitly call for naming names,
the commission interpreted  the mandate to require them to  name
names.
Honduras is very important because it is not necessarily referred
to  as  a  case  where  a  truth  commission  took  place.  But  the
Hondurans  performed  a thorough  investigation  of the disappear-
ances  that  occurred  throughout  the  1980s.'48  A state  organ,  the
Office  of  the  Human  Rights  Commissioner  (known  as  the
Ombudsman),  did the investigation. 4 9  In Honduras,  for  the  first
time, the state  fulfilled its obligation  to investigate  itself.
In both cases, the recommendations  were partially implemented
and  accepted  by  their  respective  governments.  This  is  evidence
that  perhaps  the  greatest  weaknesses  of  truth  commissions  has
been the inability, or the lack  of strength or instruments,  to make
sure that governments  implement  their recommendations.
In retrospect, the experiences of El Salvador and Honduras were
guided  by  common  objectives  of ending  impunity,  consolidating
the rule of law, and promoting national reconciliation based on the
146.  The  three  members were Belisario Betancur,  former  President  of Colombia,
Reinaldo Figueredo, former Foreign Minister of Venezuela, and Thomas Buergenthal,
former President  of the Inter-American  Court of Human  Rights.
147.  See San Jose Agreement on Human Rights (July 26, 1990); Mexican Agreement
at app. (Apr. 27,  1991).
148.  See  Dr.  Leo  Valladares  Lanza,  Los Hechos Hablan Por Si  Mismos  (Nat'l
Comm. Protection  of Hum.  Rts. Dec. 29,  1993).
149.  See Hector Fix-Fierro & Sergio Lopez-Ayllon,  The Impact of Globalization  on
the Reform of the State and the Law in Latin America, 19 Hous. J. INr'L L. 785, 798
(1997).
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full  knowledge  of the truth.  Something  very important,  and  that
applies to other cases  in Latin America,  is that in both  Honduras
and El Salvador, not only were the truth commissions independent
and  autonomous  from  the  government  but  they  also  were  per-
ceived as such by the population.  That is why their reports were a
very important element, very important documents that still have a
repercussion in those societies.
These  two experiences  are concrete  expressions of the advance-
ment of what  was referred  to by  Carlos and was  brilliantly articu-
lated by Juan M6ndez, 5° this set of principles known as the right to
the  truth, which  is  a right directly  related  with  an  obligation,  an
obligation of the state to investigate these crimes against humanity,
to prosecute  and punish their perpetrators,  to provide reparations
for  victims,  and  to  find  and  disclose  the  truth  about  what
happened.
PROFESSOR  ANDREWS:  I  will  talk  about  South  Africa's
Truth  and  Reconciliation  Commission  ("TRC")  and  essentially
raise the question which Martha Minow touched on in her talk ear-
lier.15'  The question is:  Was this a grand exercise in forgiveness, to
use  her  term,  a  "command  performance  of  reconciliation,
1 52  or
was  this justice  held hostage  to truth?  I  will  attempt  in my brief
comments to answer part of this question.
The TRC in South Africa, apart from its substantive  provisions,
served  a highly symbolic purpose and was  central to the rituals  of
transformation, reconciliation and forgiveness  playing out in South
Africa since  1994 and the first elections  there.  When the TRC was
established in 1996, it was a bold exercise,  and it certainly captured
the imagination  of South Africans,  and also people abroad. 53
It was an ambitious project.  Alfredo Forti commented on some
of  the  aims  of  the  truth  commissions  in  Central  and  South
America.  Some  of those  aims are mirrored  in the South  African
TRC:  to  find  the  truth;  to compensate  the  victims;  to  force  the
nation to pay  attention to the suffering  of others; to reconcile the
victims and the perpetrators; and to close off the past while starting
150.  See Mdndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, infra note 163.
151.  See Minow  Keynote Address, supra note  115.
152.  See id.
153.  For a thoughtful analysis of the Truth and Reconciliation  Commission, see KA-
DER  ASMAL  ET  AL.,  RECONCILLIATION  THROUGH  TRUTH:  A  RECKONING  OF
APARTHEID'S  CRIMINAL  GOVERNANCE  (1997).
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a  future  with  reconciliation  strongly  in  the  minds  of  South
Africans.
1 54
Of course,  the  TRC  was  ultimately  a political  compromise.  It
was part of the process of negotiation  that took place in the coun-
try in the early 1990s.  The past had to be dealt with in some way, it
could only be dealt with in a way that kept together a very fragile
new democracy.  Many aspects  of the structure  and procedures  of
TRC were  consequences  of this compromise.
Human  rights  activists  easily  accepted  a TRC  in South  Africa,
and particularly  its  legitimacy.  Up  until the first  democratic  elec-
tions, there  had been  a universal  consensus  that  apartheid  was  a
crime  against humanity.  The United Nations passed  a Resolution
that  apartheid  was  a  crime  against humanity.  In  addition,  South
Africa  was  one  of  the  first  countries  that  the  United  Nations
Human Rights  Commission  took  action  against. 55  And certainly
by the  time  that South  Africa  started  negotiating, the  shape  and
substance  of the  new  democracy  in the early  1990s,  human  rights
was  the language  of progressive politics.  This emancipatory  script
of  human  rights  certainly  had  a  great  bearing  on  the  TRC  and
made  things easier and  smoother.
Now,  of course,  the language  of human  rights is  a very contro-
versial  one, and it is a topic that I cannot  deal with here.  But this
controversy  plays  out  in  some  of  the  conflicts  in  the  TRC
processes.  The TRC was deliberately chosen to be victim-centered,
and the choice  of Archbishop Desmond Tutu as head of the TRC
recognized  that the  legal  processes  were  not  necessarily  the  best
ways to deal with the way that victims tell their stories.  And so, to
some extent, the rules of evidence  and  formal legal processes  had
to be  suspended.  Of course,  the law,  and certainly  the  Constitu-
tion, loomed  large  in the hearings,  because  as perpetrators  began
to be  named, they  started challenging  what  was happening in the
hearings.
Despite this, the TRC certainly gave victims a venue to tell their
stories.  Telling  the  stories  would  restore  dignity  to  the  victims.
More  importantly, the  narratives  became  part  of official  history,
preventing  national amnesia.
There were several problems that surfaced from the TRC.  One
was the designation of "victim."  Essentially, what the TRC did was
154.  See Priscilla B.  Hayner, Fifteenth Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994:  A Com-
parative Study, 16  HUMAN  RIGHTS  QUARTERLY  597  (1994).
155.  See Michael  Humphrey,  Windows into the Nature of Conflict, XXI,  AFRICAN
STUDIES REVIEW  & NEWSLETTER,  Dec.  1999, at  20, 23.
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to  individualize  justice  and to  distinguish between  the  extraordi-
nary and the ordinary victims of apartheid.15 6  The mandate  of the
TRC  was  to  investigate  gross  human  rights  violations.  But  of
course  the people  that  were  systematically  humiliated  on  a  daily
basis  through  the  whole  system  of  apartheid  were  not  to  be  in-
cluded  in  the  definition  of victim.'57  For  example,  the  apartheid
government  moved whole communities  of black people as part of
designating  areas  "white."
This  is a  very  important issue.  The  victims  of systemic  racism
and  exploitation  see  themselves  as  victims,  and there  has  to  be
some  forum  in  which  they  too  can  tell  their  stories  . 8  But  of
course in South Africa this was a part of political compromise,  and
some limitations had to be placed on the process.
The other set of victims ignored in the process were the people
of the neighboring  countries  that the South  African  Government
systematically  wreaked havoc against.  The South African army en-
gaged  in  military  raids  and  essentially  destabilized  Mozambique
and Angola; it conducted regular raids into Swaziland, Lesotho and
Botswana and in the process destroyed communities. 59  I am sure
many of you are aware of the regional political and economic situa-
tion  at  this  moment;  Angola  has  been  at  war  for  decades  and
Mozambique  is  economically  crippled.  The  South  African
apartheid-era  Government  is to blame for this legacy.  There is no
forum,  as of yet, for those victims.
A second problem arose as the process unfolded.  As South Afri-
cans  became  mesmerized  by  their television sets  at night, and  as
they listened to their radios  to these appalling  tales of horror and
abuse,  it became  clear  that the  process  needed  to  be  stage  man-
aged.  This  was  essential  because  the  hearings  were  supposed  to
generate  ideas  of reconciliation  and  forgiveness;  soon,  however,
there  was  the danger  that revenge  and  resentment began  to  sur-
face.  And  so, increasingly, Archbishop  Tutu needed  to  guide  the
156.  See David Dyzenhaus, JUDGING  THE JUDGES,  JUDGING  OURSELVES:  TRUTH,
RECONCILIATION  AND  THE  APARTHEID  LEGAL ORDER  (1998).
157.  For an interesting  exploration of these matters, see Colin Bundy, Truth...  or
Reconciliation,  14  SOUTHERN  AFRICA  REP. 8 (1999).
158.  See  RANDALL  ROBINSON,  THE  DEBT:  WHAT  AMERICA  OWES  To  BLACKS
(2000)  (discussing  reconciliation  and reparations  in  the United  States).
159.  See  John Daniel,  The Truth About the Region, 14  SOUTHERN  AFRICA  REP. 8
(Aug.  1999).
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hearings  in  a  way to  ensure  that  the TRC  would not degenerate
into a quagmire  of cynicism and  skepticism.
16 0
Ultimately the TRC was a very important process.  Symbolically
it was  important for South  Africans,  for the victims  of apartheid,
albeit a  select  group, to come  and tell their stories.  It was impor-
tant for the perpetrators  to come  and be  cross-examined  by  their
victims; but also substantively  I think it provides  a model for other
societies.
PROFESSOR  MtNDEZ:  My theme  is  basically  an announce-
ment of a research project.  It is something I do not think we have
explored in depth yet.  That is, how much deference does the inter-
national community  owe to domestic arrangements  like truth com-
missions,  partial  amnesties,  or total  amnesties,  in the  interest not
only of state sovereignty  but also  of justice?
Quite  frankly,  this  has  been  suggested  to  me  by this  veritable
revolution in international law - the Pinochet case.  As you know,
the  Chilean  Government's  position  - in  litigation  and  in  diplo-
macy - is that  the international  community must respect, to  the
letter, to the hilt, everything  that the Chilean society and state  has
decided  to  do  about  violations  of  its  recent  past.161  Of  course,
Judge  Baltasar  Garz6n in Spain and  the government  of Her Maj-
esty in Britain contest  this.162
Let me start with an assertion:  International  Law imposes obli-
gations  on states  to deal  with the  past, especially  the  legacies  of
recent egregious  and serious human rights abuses.  I cannot go into
the details  as to why  this is so, but it is what we call  an emerging
principle - you will not find it in the letter of any particular treaty
or multilateral convention.  Interestingly, however, there is very lit-
tle argument about whether  this emerging principle  is really there,
or even  on its binding force  over  all states.163
160.  For the most poignant  account  of the TRC hearings, see  ANTJIE  KROG,  THE
COUNTRY  OF  MY  SKULL  (1998).
161.  See Anthony  Faiola, Pinochet Supporters, Critics  Cheer Verdict, Both Sides Say
Their Causes Will  Benefit, WASH.  POST,  Mar.  25,  1999,  at  A27  (reporting  Chilean
President  Eduardo  Frei's statement  that only  Chile  has  the  right to  determine  Pi-
nochet's fate).
162.  See T.R. Reid,  Spaniard Will Press Pursuit of Dictators,  WASH.  POST, Jan. 16,
2000,  at  A29  (describing  Judge  Garz6n's  perspective);  T.R.  Reid,  Pinochet's Arrest
Upheld, WASH.  POST,  Mar.  25,  1999,  at Al  (reporting  that Britain's  highest  court
found  Pinochet  not  immune  from  criminal  prosecution  for  alleged  human  rights
abuses).
163.  See Juan M6ndez, Accountability  for Past  Abuses, 19 HUM.  RTS. Q. 255  (1997);
Juan Mdndez, In Defense of Transitional  Justice, in TRANSITIONAL  JUSTICE  AND  THE
ROLE  OF  LAW  IN  NEW  DEMOCRACIES  (A. James  McAdams  ed.,  1997)  [hereinafter
Mdndez,  Accountability for  Past Abuses];  Diane  Oreutlicher,  Addressing  Gross
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To  summarize  this principle quickly, what governments  have to
do about  legacies of past abuse  is basically  a four-fold  obligation.
First,  a  government  is  obligated  to  do  justice.  That  essentially
takes the form of an obligation to investigate, prosecute, and even-
tually punish perpetrators.
Second is the right to truth mentioned before.  It can be fulfilled
through truth commissions or by other means, but mostly the prac-
tice of nations  has been to establish truth commissions.
The  third obligation  is to provide  reparations.
The fourth one is to cleanse the security forces of all those peo-
ple  who,  even if they cannot  be  punished, at least  are  known  to
have committed very serious abuses.  Newly democratic states can-
not afford to keep in the ranks of their security forces people  who
have  perpetrated these  crimes.
Now, let me rush to say that these are obligations  of means and
not of results, in the language of French civil law.  States discharge
these obligations to the international community as long as they try
in good faith to comply  with these  four steps.  We cannot  expect,
the international  community has no right to expect, that every sin-
gle  case  will  be  investigated,  prosecuted,  the  truth  disclosed,  et
cetera,  because  there  would  be  insurmountable  obstacles.  But
each obligation is to be performed in good faith.  I would insist on
that.
Further, it is not a menu.  Governments  cannot pick  and choose
and  say,  "We  will  give  them  a truth  commission  but  we will  not
prosecute,"  or,  "We  will  give  them  reparations  but  we  will  not
cleanse  the security forces."  In this  sense,  in  1997,  the European
Court of Human Rights, which finally now has to deal with some of
the serious abuses that the Inter-American  system has had to deal
with, said that in serious cases  of torture, destruction of property,
and  forced  eviction,  it  is  not enough  to  pay  reparations;  there  is
something more that the state has to do."6  This principle emerges
from decisions  like that.
Forgiveness has been offered as a justification for blanket amnes-
ties, and that is why, in Latin America at least, we do not use "for-
giveness" very often.  Even the word "reconciliation"  does not ring
Human Rights Abuses:  Punishment and Victim  Compensation, in  HUMAN  RIGHTS:
AN  AGENDA  FOR  THE  NEXT  CENTURY  (Louis  Henkin & John Hargrove  eds., 1994).
164.  See Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1996); Akdivar v. Turkey, 23 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 143  (1997).
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very true  to Latin  American  victims  of  human  rights  abuse,  be-
cause it has always been no more than a code word for impunity.
165
It  is now clear  that blanket amnesties,  unconditional  amnesties,
amnesties  that prevent  knowledge of the truth, that prevent  even
any serious inquiry, and  that leave  the perpetrators  not only  free
but also even  ascending through  the  ranks in the  security forces,
are inconsistent  with the obligations  of a state  under international
law.  The  kind of reasoning that the Human Rights Committee of
the United Nations has used several times to criticize these amnes-
ties, is that they create an "atmosphere  of impunity,"  and are thus
inconsistent with a State's obligations under the International Cov-
enants  on Civil and Political  Rights.166
But  other  arrangements  may  pass  international  muster.  What
we do not know  is what  will and will not.
In the case  of South Africa,  I  am illuminated  here by  a recent
article by a famous, well-known South African jurist, John Dugard,
where,  after  a  very  close  exploration  of the  international  obliga-
tions  of South Africa, he comes  to the conclusion  that at least, in
principle, the law that creates the South African Truth and Recon-
ciliation  Commission,  with  its  conditional  amnesty  and  leaving
open  the  possibility  of prosecutions,  seems  to  be  in  compliance
with international law.
167  But Dugard goes on to criticize  the Con-
stitutional Court's decision in the AZAPO case. 68  The families  of
Steve Biko  and several others  challenged this law  and tried to set
aside the amnesty part of the law.169  The  Constitutional Court un-
fortunately, in a very poorly elaborated  decision, ruled against the
claim  of  unconstitutionality. 71  Most  of  us would  probably  have
come  to  the  same result  but I  criticize  it because,  for  example,  it
goes to the practice  of nations, but it leaves out some practices.  It
sometimes misquotes or mis-cites the facts of some other practices,
165.  See  AMERICA'S  WATCH,  TRUTH  AND  PARTIAL  JUSTICE  IN  ARGENTINA,  AN
UPDATE  (1991),  cited in Jo  M.  Pasqualucci,  The Inter-American Human Rights Syis-
tern: Establishing  Precedents and Procedure  in Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI  IN-
TER-AM.  L. REV.  297,  326  n.150  (1995).
166.  See Concluding Observations: Argentina,  United Nations Human Rights Com-
mission,  U.N.  Doc.  CCPRIC/79/Add.  96  (1995);  Concluding Observations: Peru,
United Nations  Human Rights  Commission, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.  72  (1996).
167.  See John  Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice:  The South Africa Experience, 8
TRANSNAT'L  L.  &  CONTEMP.  PROas.  277,  301  (1998).
168.  Id. at 302-03 (criticizing Azanian Peoples  Organization v. The President of The
Republic of South Africa,  1996  (8)  BCLR 1015  (cc),  1996 SACLR LEXIS 20).
169.  See Azanian Peoples  Organization,  1996 SACLR  LEXIS at 28-29.
170.  See id. at  34.
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and it does not, like Dugard says,'
171 even mention the Velasquez
172
precedent or several decisions by the Inter-American  Commission
on Human Rights173 that would  go in a different  direction.
We  are making progress here.  The  Guatemala amnesty, for ex-
ample, was passed  as  a result  of the peace  accords.  It is the first
Latin American  amnesty  law that is not  unconditional,  that  does
exclude cases that qualify under what we would call crimes  against
humanity.  But I  do not  think that  that should  be the  end of the
story.  Also, Guatemala has an exemplary truth commission, which
just published  a report  that did  not  mince words  and  said,  in  so
many words, that what was done to  the indigenous community  of
Guatemala was  genocide.
So is  that enough?  Should the inquiry stop there?  I  think not.
Both in South Africa and in Guatemala, the processes still have not
concluded.  We  do  not  know  whether  there  will  be  prosecutions
after the selective  amnesties.  Especially  in Guatemala,  we  are  so
used to what we call in Latin America  "de facto impunity,"  inertia
by  which  prosecutors  do  not  investigate  cases,  judges  look  the
other way  or the military find  all kinds of reasons  to impose their
will.  Military code jurisdiction is an infamous mechanism of impu-
nity in Latin America.  All of those things can make the effort that
is going  in the right direction right now be completely  trumped in
the end.
The point is that, when we have new Pinochet-like  cases, and we
will have new Pinochet-like  cases,  fortunately, we have  to be able
to  decide  whether  what  a  country  has  done  passes  international
muster or not.  That decision  should not rely only  on the general
scheme  of things,  but  on  the  facts  of the  case,  on the  particular
171.  See Dugard, supra note  167, at  306.
172.  See supra note  143.
173.  While AZAPO  cites, approvingly,  that amnesty laws  have been  a part  of re-
cent  Latin American history,  the Inter-American  Commission on Human  Rights has
repeatedly said that amnesty laws of a blanket nature are inconsistent with the Ameri-
can  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  See  Cases  10,288  and  others, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
28,  OEA/ser. L/V/II.83  (1993)  (Argentina), available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/an-
nualrep/92eng/ch3c.htm>;  Cases 10,029 and others, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 29, OEA/ser .L/
V/II.83 (1993)  (Uruguay), available  at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/92eng/ch3s.
htm>; Cases  11,505 and others, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61,  OEA/ser. L/V/II.98, doc. 7 rev.
(1997)  (Chile),  available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/97ench3a41an.
htm#REPORT  N'  25/98>.  The  Commission  reaffirmed  its  position  this  year in  the
Romero  case, which  involves the massacre  of the Jesuits  in  El Salvador;  the  English
translation  will be  available  upon  publication of this  Symposium.  See  <http://www.
cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99span/De%20Fondo/El%2OSalvador1O.488.htm>  (Spanish
version);  <http://www.cidh.oas.org/reports.htm>  (English-language  site  for  recent
commission reports).
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responsibility  of the potential defendant that we may have jurisdic-
tion over, on whether the government  has tried to comply in good
faith with the four obligations.  All of those things, unfortunately,
are  still very much  in a state  of flux and  we still need  a lot more
theoretical  and practical  research  about them.
PROFESSOR  THOMAS:  (Comments presented in detail in her
Essay written in connection with this Symposium.)
74
PROFESSOR FLAHERTY:  We  have time for a few questions.
AUDIENCE:  I think that a common  theme among all the pan-
elists  is  this question  of accountability.  It strikes  me  that, on the
question  of  debt  forgiveness,  perhaps  the  strongest  argument  I
heard  you allude  to is irresponsible  lending.  In many cases much
of the money never got to the people, never got to the public ser-
vice projects,  and so on.
In a sense,  forgiveness  may  not be  the right or the most politi-
cally powerful rhetoric to use, but, instead, fraudulent lending.  The
language  of fraud and corruption would be much  more persuasive
politically in the West, and I have  heard some Transparency Inter-
national 175  folks  talk  about some  really  interesting ideas  on both
legal  and political mechanisms  to get debt  forgiveness,  such as as-
signing the debt to plaintiffs' lawyers who then can use legal mech-
anisms in this country to get it from the expatriate community and
so on.
The  question  of  accountability  and  democratization  may  be  a
pretty  powerful tool in the  debt forgiveness  approach.
PROFESSOR  THOMAS:  I  agree with that.  I  think  one  thing
that Professor Murphy alluded to was the distinction between for-
giveness  as  relinquishing  a right  and  forgiveness  as  a  discussion
about moral  accountability. 176  Both  of those  ideas  have  been  in-
voked  in talks about reducing  debt.
The  most important  part  is reducing  the actual debt obligation,
but there has also been a lot of discussion about the moral account-
ability of irresponsible  governments.  Often, corruption is used not
as  a  reason  for  forgiveness  but  as  a  reason  against  forgiveness.
People  say,  "the  governments  misspent  this  money,  they  were
wrong."  An example  is Mobutu  Sesseseko, who  in his thirty-year
reign stole more from the country of then-Zaire and now the Dem-
174.  See  Chantal  Thomas, International  Debt Forgiveness and Global Poverty Re-
duction, 27  FORDHAM  URB.  L.J. 1711  (2000).
175.  Information  about  Transparency  International  is  available  at  <http://
www.transparency.de>.
176.  See Murphy  Keynote Address, supra note  124.
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ocratic  Republic  of  Congo  than  was  spent  on  education,  health,
and  social services  combined.'77  That  is  an  argument  for holding
debtor governments  accountable.
The  problem  is  that lenders,  as  you suggested,  have  been  also
somewhat  complicitous  with  this.  Mobutu  originally  took  power
by  wresting  power  away  from  the  democratically-elected  prime
minister of the Congo, Patrice Le Mumba, with the support of the
U.S. Government, 78 so if there is blame, it must be spread around.
I think that has to  be taken  into consideration, in  addition to  the
fact that to ultimately hold  the people  of countries responsible  for
the  wrongdoings  of their governments is to meet one  wrong  with
another wrong.
There  are  a lot of initiatives  on debt reduction  and  a lot of re-
search is going  on into it.' 79
AUDIENCE:  From what I understand, the law that established
the TRC did not preclude trials, but it seems that, in practice, trials
are  a road that South Africa has decided  not to take.  People like
Botha  and  De  Klerk  have  basically  walked  away  without  being
held accountable.  What is your opinion  of that, both sort  of exis-
tentially  in terms  of the whole  question  of justice,  and also more
practically  in terms of the political  consequences for the future?
PROFESSOR  ANDREWS:  I  do  not think  that  there  will  be
large  numbers  of criminal trials.  There  are practical  reasons, the
South  African criminal justice system just could not accommodate
that.
But part of the problem emanates from the TRC hearings them-
selves  because  the  hearings were  not  meant  to be  legal  proceed-
ings.  This  subsequently  raises  questions  about  the  nature  of the
evidence presented, particularly since much of the evidence has not
been corroborated.
So  these  are  very  difficult  questions.  It  is not  to  say  that  the
perpetrators  ought not to be penalized,  but I think it raises lots of
practical  questions.
177.  See Michela Wrong,  The Dinosaur  at Bay, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov.  2, 1996,  at
7,  cited in Nora  M. Rubin, Note, A  Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to
Curb Corruption  and Bribery in International  Business Transactions: The Legal Impli-
cations of the OECD Recommendations and Convention for the  United States, Ger-
many, and Switzerland, 14  AM.  U. INT'L L. REV.  257,  320 n.6  (1998).
178.  See Christopher  B. Jochnick & Josh Zimmer, The Day of the Dictator: Zaire's
Mobutu and United States Foreign Policy, 4 HARV. HUM.  RTS. J. 139,  139-40  (1991).
179.  See, e.g.,  Msgr. Dennis M. Schnurr, A Jubilee Call for Debt Forgiveness,  avail-
able at <http://www.nccbuscc/sdwp/international/adminstm.htm>.
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In terms of what it does to the process of reconciliation, it is hard
to  tell.  My observations  have been that when you went  to South
Africa three years ago and you sat in on a hearing, or you listened
to people  talk  about the  TRC, there was lots  of hope and  people
were  optimistic  about  the  process.  Today  the  mood  is  different,
and  part of it is because  there were two parallel developments  in
the country.
The first is that the TRC sat between  1996 and 1998 and listened
to the tales of horror.  At the same  time, not confined  to that pe-
riod, certainly starting before and still carrying on today, South Af-
rica  has  been  gripped  by  violent  crime,  and  some  people  have
argued that particularly the crimes  against women constitute viola-
tions of their human rights. 8°  This discrepancy  with what was go-
ing on at the TRC and  the excessive violence  outside, means that
the criminal justice system cannot cope with developments with re-
spect  to  violence  in  the  last  few  years.  Those  are  very  difficult
problems,  and  it is not clear if the  TRC has impacted on the way
that  South  Africans  deal with  each  other.  The  criminal  statistics
indicate  that there is something  dreadfully wrong. 181  We  can  find
economic  reasons  for this,  but  the  nature  of the  crime  raises  all
kinds of issues.
Personally, I do not know.  The TRC was a political compromise,
and  the  government  does  not  have  the  resources  to  embark  on
large  numbers  of criminal  prosecutions,  and  so  blanket amnesty
will  probably  be  granted.  It  is  a pity.  In  an  ideal  world,  all  the
perpetrators  would  have  been  brought either before  the TRC  or
before  a court  of law, and  the victims  would  have  been  compen-
sated.  But as it  stands now, the Reparations  Committee, which  is
one  of the  committees  of the  TRC,  has been  very  ineffective  in
either compensating victims monetarily or in dealing with what the
country has to confront  as a result of the TRC hearings.
It is a work in progress.  In time - it is too early to tell now -
the  benefits  of  the  TRC  will  be  evaluated  and  its  influence  will
probably be  limited.
And,  as you said, it is an  existential thing.  The problem is I  do
not live  in South Africa.  I  go back very often and so I can under-
stand why people do not want to pursue  the perpetrators.  But, on
180.  See HUMAN  RIGHTS WATCH,  VIOLENCE  AGAINST  WOMEN  IN  SOUTH  AFRICA
(1995).
181.  See  Jon  Jeter,  Millions of S. Africans Partake in  Peaceful Election, WASH.
PosT, June 3,  1999, at  A19 (describing  South Africa,  with an average  of 70 killings a
day,  as "one of the most dangerous places in the world").
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the other hand, I think it has meant to some extent that there has
been  a shortfall in the way the transformation  has taken place.
PROFESSOR  MItNDEZ:  On the same  topic, I  think it  is im-
portant  to  note  that  the  killers of Steve  Biko,  for example,  have
been denied amnesty.  This is little known, because Biko's relatives
challenged  the law  and lost, but then the killers  were  denied  am-
nesty  because,  among  other things,  they were  untruthful  in what
they supposedly "confessed."  They claimed that he had killed him-
self, and so the Amnesty Committee decided that they did not get
amnesty.  The  same  happened  with the  killers  of Chris  Hani, for
example, one of the most egregious  cases that happened when the
peace  process was already underway.
I  have  been reading  the  web page  that Professor  Minow  men-
tioned today.'82  Maybe  80  percent  of the cases  have been  denied
amnesty,  but you have  to  calculate  that many  of those are  really
common crimes, that people  who were in custody were trying their
luck  at  asking  for  amnesty,  claiming  that  they  had  committed
crimes with  a political  motive.  Of the people  who were  members
of the political groupings and of the armed forces, a good 28 or 29
percent, by my calculation, were  also  denied  amnesty.  Now, this
does not mean that there  will be prosecutions  for those cases, for
the reasons  that Ms. Andrews said.
I  also understand  that  the prosecutors  in  South  Africa  are the
same prosecutors from the apartheid regime, and so even the case
of General  Magnus  Malan, that did  go to  trial,  was very  deliber-
ately botched by the prosecutor.  The  court issued an unusual ad-
monition to the prosecutor on that account.
183
The stakes are enormous.  It is very difficult to predict that there
will be prosecutions.  But, on the other hand, I think it would be a
very serious mistake, and a great disappointment to the rest of the
world,  if  South  Africa  decided  to  implement  a  blanket  amnesty
policy.  I know there are pressures there and I know there will con-
tinue to be, but at least the present policy, even if it does not result
in a lot of prosecutions, leaves open the possibility of prosecutions.
Hopefully it  allows the victims to come  up with evidence  that can
stand in court and then eventually, when some new prosecutors are
in place - and some new judges, I would say - some justice  can
be  achieved.  The  present system  in South  Africa  at least  consti-
tutes an attempt at a good-faith effort to comply with international
182.  See  MINOW, supra note 1.
183.  See  Angus  Shaw,  Acquittals  Reopen  Apartheid Wounds,  WINNEPEG  FREE
PRESs,  Oct.  12,  1996, at All, available  in 1996 WL 17253325.
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obligations  and with moral  obligations to the victims in South Af-
rica.  That obligation to the victims is more important than comply-
ing with the international community's  interests.
PROFESSOR ANDREWS:  I agree with Professor M6ndez, but
I think another problem that is peculiar to South Africa is that the
African  National  Congress  ("ANC")  was  implicated  in  gross
human  rights violations,  and  therefore  I  think politically  this  was
difficult for  the government.  When the Truth  and Reconciliation
Commission  report was published, the ANC immediately  went to
court to try and squash parts of it.184
The other thing that concerns me is what I regard as a very puni-
tive turn taken by some groups  in the human rights community.  I
think it  is  important  that perpetrators  who  commit  gross  human
rights violations  be punished.  We  need to focus on what happens
in the long term.  South Africa has an official  unemployment rate
of 48 percent and I think most people  in the country would rather
obtain housing,  water,  and  education  than  continue  this  process.
Ultimately, transformation in South Africa  is  about changing  peo-
ple's economic  circumstances.
AUDIENCE:  I believe that the right to truth is fundamental for
humanity.  However,  Congressman  Chipoco  Ciceda  mentioned
that source institutions  should publish the identity of the protago-
nists of the violations.  Wouldn't that be a demonstration of a viola-
tion of the human rights for the individuals and wouldn't this open
the  door for  the  victims  of the families  to  take justice  into their
own hands?
PROFESSOR  CHIPOCO  CACEDA:  I  think  that,  first,  you
have  to  distinguish  between  judicial  processes  and  reports  from
truth commissions.  Legal processes that involve investigations and
prosecutions  imply a  whole series of procedural  rights both to the
accused and to the plaintiffs or to the victims.  A truth commission
report  has much  more  to do with  the social  and  political  process
that focuses  on collecting  testimony  and describing  investigations,
as opposed  to prosecuting  an individual.
Remember that the duty related to the right to truth is to tell all
the truth.  When  I was on the Truth Commission in El Salvador, in
184.  See  Wally  Mbehele,  ANC,  TRC  Clash Over Final Report, WKLY.  MAIL  &
GUARDIAN  (S.  Africa),  Oct.  9,  1998, available at <http://web.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/
981009/news2.html>;  Wally  Mbehele,  Bid  To  Delay  TRC Report,  WKLY.  MAIL  &
GUARDIAN  (S. Africa),  Oct. 23, 1998, available at <http://web.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/
981023/news5.html>.
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the case of the assassination  of the seven Jesuits,'85  they obtained
the names  of the army  officials  who  gave  the  orders to other  of-
ficers to have the priests  killed.  The commission members felt that
their sources were  good and  that the evidence  they had was valid
evidence, but they were faced with a moral dilemma of whether to
reveal  names  in  their  report,  and  thereby  basically  accuse  these
officers.
The  right  to  truth  often  revolves  around  political  processes,
which  often  with  truth  commissions  imply  amnesties  or  amnesty
laws,  such  as  in Guatemala,  Chile,  El  Salvador, or  South  Africa.
The process of the right to truth is that you need to have this com-
plete, impartial truth to then be able to create conditions for some-
one to ask for pardon and for that pardon to be granted.  So  what
you get with the right to truth is the moral sanction, and this moral
sanction  is a necessary  component of the  transition process.
Let me say in English that during the investigation  of the truth
commission  in El  Salvador,  we  respected  the  due  process  of the
perpetrators.  We tried to respect the human rights of the perpetra-
tors,  but we  had the  duty to say  the  whole truth,  and  the  whole
truth means to say the names of the perpetrators.
PROFESSOR MItNDEZ:  On that point, I think if the possibil-
ity of prosecutions is a real one, it is preferable that the truth com-
missions do not name names so as not to taint evidence that can be
used  in future  cases.  But if the  possibility  of prosecution  is  com-
pletely not in the cards, for example  because there  is a prior am-
nesty,  then  of course  there  is  no full  truth  unless the  names  are
named.
The  questioner makes  a very good point, that even  in the  cases
where no names are  given, there has to be some semblance of due
process,  and  at  the  very  least,  the  people  who  are  going  to  be
named should be confronted with the evidence and given a chance
to tell  their side  of the story.
185.  See Tina Rosenberg,  Terror, Tribunals and Truth, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,  1993,
at  C1.
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